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Introduction  
op·ti·mism (/ˈɒptɪmɪz(ə)m/) noun 1. Hopefulness and confidence about the future or the success 
of something (Oxford English Dictionary, 2018) 
We have numerous symbolic expressions to describe the term optimism in the English language. 
May it be the “light at the end of the tunnel” that keeps us moving through the darkness, the 
“door that opens when another one closes” providing us an unexpected path to reach our goals, 
the “glass that is half full instead of half empty” reminding us to change perspectives from time to 
time, or the “rose-colored glasses” putting our world into a favorable light. Optimism comes in 
many different forms. We encounter the power of optimism in political success stories, such as 
the one of Barack Obama, who spread his optimistic “Yes, we can” attitude before winning the 
United States presidential election in 2008. We marvel at exceptional careers formed through 
optimism as shown by Joanne K. Rowling, who would have never become a best-selling novelist if 
she had not been optimistic enough to resend her famous Harry Potter manuscript to another 
publisher after it had already been rejected twelve times. We all enjoy the optimistic spirit 
conveyed by certain music (such as Monty Python’s “Always look on the bright side of life”) and 
we tell our children stories about the colorful world one can discover with an optimistic outlook 
(e.g., the boundless world of Pippi Longstocking who may be the greatest optimist of our time). 
Optimism is all around us and it plays an essential role in many aspects of our everyday life.  
And then there is reality, which is not always so bright and rose-colored. We listen to the 
news telling us about another terror attack in the Middle East; we see pictures of people crossing 
the sea in nutshells that do not deserve the name boat to flee the war; we pass by an accident on 
the highway and glimpse at ambulances rushing to a hospital. How do we stay optimistic in such 
a world? How can we see the good things in our future while so many bad things surround us as 
well? How do we process the information around us to keep an optimistic outlook on our future? 
The present thesis will bring us one step further to answering these intriguing questions. Its 
purpose is to investigate how optimistic expectancies change the way we see our present 
environment (i.e., the reality around us) and how (selectively) attending to certain parts of our 
environment, in turn, changes what we expect from our future. These relations between future 
expectancies and the way we process the here and now are examined with the help of multiple 
experimental methods to uncover an in-depth view on specific mechanisms that may underlie the 
powerful and persistent phenomenon of optimism. 
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A brief overview on optimism bias and attention bias 
The many different examples described so far show that optimism is often defined quite vaguely. 
Apart from positive expectancies about the future (the light at the end of the tunnel) such vague 
definitions may, for instance, also include the way people interpret situations in the present (the 
glass being half full). Furthermore, optimism is sometimes defined as a stable personality trait 
(e.g., she is an optimist, he is a pessimist) or as a more transient and situation-specific state of 
mind (e.g., I am optimistic that I will submit my thesis on time; Hecht, 2013). In the present work, 
optimism is defined narrower and only includes expectancies about specific positive future 
situations. This narrow definition allows to attribute any research findings to a precise and most 
common characteristic of optimism and reduces potential confounds that may result from a more 
multifaceted definition. Examples for such expectancies about specific positive future situations 
include expecting to gain money in the future or expecting to get a good job after graduation.  
In the 1980s, seminal research by Neil Weinstein revealed for the first time that such 
positive future expectancies are often biased, meaning that most people are unrealistically 
optimistic about their future. Specifically, when asked to compare expectancies about their own 
future with expectancies about other people’s future, most people indicate that they will 
experience more positive events and less negative events than others will. However, this belief 
cannot hold true for all people (everybody cannot have a better future than everybody else), thus 
revealing a systematic cognitive bias called unrealistic comparative optimism (Weinstein, 1980). 
After this seminal discovery, optimism bias has been extensively investigated. Such investigations 
revealed that the same systematic bias emerges when people´s future expectancies are compared 
with base-rates obtained from epidemiological data (i.e., unrealistic absolute optimism). For 
instance, people greatly underestimate their personal risk of getting a divorce even though 
popular statistics show that more or less every second marriage is divorced in the Western World 
– ironically enough this is even true for divorce lawyers (Sharot, 2011).  
By now, different neurocognitive mechanisms that likely underlie and maintain such 
overly optimistic future expectancies have been investigated. For instance, a specific cognitive 
process has been suggested to contribute to the formation and maintenance of optimism bias: 
People selectively update (i.e., adapt) their future expectancies after receiving positive (desirable) 
feedback but not after receiving negative (undesirable) feedback (Sharot, Korn, & Dolan, 2011). 
This updating asymmetry can maintain optimism bias over time because negative information is 
not integrated into the formation of new future expectancies. Furthermore, investigations of the 
neural processes underlying optimism bias have revealed that the bias can be enhanced through 
neuromodulation (e.g., by administering L-Dopa which enhances the dopaminergic function in the 
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brain; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, Korn, Chowdhury, & Dolan, 2012a). In addition, the updating 
asymmetry that strengthens optimism bias can be altered by disrupting the function of important 
brain areas involved in optimism bias (i.e., through neuro stimulation of the left inferior frontal 
gyrus; Sharot et al., 2012b).  
Notably, optimism bias about the future is not only shown by people who would generally 
be described as optimists but more or less by everyone (i.e., optimism bias and the personality 
trait optimism describe conceptually distinct phenomena; Shepperd, Waters, Weinstein, & Klein, 
2015). According to statistics, the bias is shown by about 80% of the population, making it a very 
general and pervasive cognitive phenomenon (Sharot, 2011). However, optimism bias is not 
shown by a specific group of people, namely people who suffer from depression. Instead of having 
overly optimistic expectancies about the future, patients with depression have realistic or even 
overly pessimistic expectancies about the future (Strunk, Lopez, & DeRubeis, 2006). Furthermore, 
instead of asymmetric expectancy updating and associated neural mechanisms maintaining 
optimism bias in healthy people, patients with depression show symmetric expectancy updating 
following both positive and negative feedback and altered underlying neural responses (Garrett 
et al., 2014; Korn, Sharot, Walter, Heekeren, & Dolan, 2014).  
Similar to this optimism bias, another positive cognitive bias is seen in healthy people but 
not in patients with depression, namely positive attention bias (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). 
Whereas healthy people preferably pay attention to positive (compared to neutral) information 
in their environment (Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, & Sander, 2016a), patients with depression 
preferably pay attention to negative (compared to neutral) information (e.g., sad faces; Gotlib, 
Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004). Thus, optimism bias and positive attention bias are both 
related to mental health, whereas pessimism bias and negative attention bias are both related to 
depression. To illustrate these similarities, the most important research findings on optimism and 
attention bias were embedded into a model of behavior that serves as a basis for the present 
thesis (see Figure 1.1).  
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Figure 1.1. Cognitive biases in future expectancies and attention displayed by patients with 
depression (left) and healthy people (right). Whereas patients with depression show no 
expectancy bias (or even a pessimism bias), healthy people show an optimism bias about their 
future. Similarly, patients with depression preferably attend to negative information in their 
environment, whereas healthy people preferably attend to positive information. Finally, patients 
with depression update their expectancies in both an optimistic and a pessimistic direction 
following positive and negative feedback, whereas healthy people update their expectancies 
selectively into an optimistic direction following positive feedback but not into a pessimistic 
direction following negative feedback. This asymmetric expectancy updating has been suggested 
to maintain optimism bias in healthy people, whereas symmetric expectancy updating may 
contribute to the absence of optimism bias in patients with depression. 
 
Starting points for an integrative perspective on optimism bias and attention bias  
As described above, optimism bias and positive attention bias have very similar implications for 
mental health (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Sharot, 2011). In addition, the two biases are associated 
with activity in largely overlapping brain areas (e.g., the anterior cingulate cortex; Blair et al., 2013; 
Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010; Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007), indicating that they 
may interact. Furthermore, recent theories (i.e., the combined cognitive biases hypothesis) 
suggest that cognitive biases usually interact and mutually enforce each other (Hirsch, Clark, & 
Mathews, 2006). Even though this combined cognitive biases hypothesis has largely stimulated 
research on negative cognitive bias interactions (e.g., in depression; Everaert, Koster, & 
Derakshan, 2012), positive cognitive biases have mostly been investigated separately. It is 
currently unclear how optimism bias and attention bias interact or mutually inforce each other 
and which neural mechanisms may support such links. To date, very little research has focused on 
the interaction between the two phenomena and the few studies that did examine such 
interactions have several shortcomings (Peters, Vieler, & Lautenbacher, 2015). For instance, prior 
empirical studies revealed that optimism is associated with an attention bias to positive and away 
from negative information (Isaacowitz, 2005; Luo & Isaacowitz, 2007; Segerstrom, 2001). 
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However, these studies investigated the personality trait optimism instead of optimism bias. 
Moreover, they only used correlational methods that cannot uncover causal relations between 
optimism and attention processes and they did not examine the neural mechanisms underlying 
optimism-attention interactions. Thus, the current state of research on optimism bias and positive 
attention bias has significant gaps and raises specific important questions:  
1. How do optimism bias and positive attention bias resemble each other with respect 
to motivating factors, underlying brain mechanisms, and beneficial consequences? 
2. How do optimistic expectancies causally influence attention deployment? 
3. Which neural mechanisms support such causal influences of optimistic expectancies 
on attention? 
4. How does selective attention causally influence optimism bias?  
These intriguing questions will be answered in the present thesis (chapters 2-5). Thereby, the 
present thesis will for the first time reveal how different positivity biases interact and how such 
mutually enforcing biases shape healthy information processing. For instance, interacting positive 
cognitive biases may prevent the development of mental disorders and can reveal specific 
cognitive mechanisms that should be targeted by future interventions aimed to protect mental 
health.  
Outline of the present thesis 
Based on the above described starting points, the present thesis will examine the neurocognitive 
mechanisms underlying causal relations between optimism bias and attention bias. Chapter 2 
provides an overview on prior literature that examined the two biases separately to uncover 
similarities in motivating factors, underlying neural processes, and beneficial consequences of 
optimism bias and attention bias. Furthermore, an integrative perspective combining these two 
separate lines of research is developed by emphasizing possible optimism-attention interactions 
and neurocognitive communication paths. This theoretical framework serves as a basis for the 
empirical studies on causal links between optimism and attention reported in chapters 3-5 and 
provides specific hypotheses that will be investigated in the current thesis.  
In chapter 3, causal influences of optimistic and pessimistic expectancies on attention 
deployment are examined. Therefore, optimistic and pessimistic expectancies about future gains 
and losses were experimentally induced and their causal influence on subsequent attention to 
stimuli signaling reward (i.e., gains) and punishment (i.e., losses) was tested with reaction time 
measures and eye tracking (to examine both initial orientation of attention and maintenance of 
attention). In addition, the neural mechanisms underlying such causal influence of optimistic 
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expectancies on attention deployment are investigated in chapter 4. Therefore, participants 
performed the same attention task in a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. Here, the 
influence of optimistic and pessimistic expectancies on attention deployment and activity in large-
scale neural networks such as the salience network and the executive control network was 
examined.  
Furthermore, chapter 5 focuses on the opposite direction of influence, namely causal 
influences of attention processes on optimism. Participants either performed a two-week 
attention training during which they actively directed attention to positive social information or a 
neutral control training. To reveal specific causal effects of the positive attention training on 
optimism, participants completed questionnaires on optimism bias and state optimism before 
they started the training, after one week of training, and after two weeks of training.  
Together, these empirical investigations can shed light on how optimism and attention 
bias interact and which neural mechanisms support such dynamic optimism-attention 
interactions. This in-depth view on specific mechanisms underlying the powerful and persistent 
phenomenon of optimism can ameliorate our understanding of healthy information processing 
and reveal crucial implications for the prevention of mental health and the treatment of 
psychopathology. 
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Chapter 2 
The Link Between Optimism Bias and Attention Bias:         
A Neurocognitive Perspective 
 
Laura Kress and Tatjana Aue 
Abstract 
 
Both optimism bias and reward-related attention bias have crucial implications for well-being and 
mental health. Yet, the extent to which the two biases interact remains unclear because, to date, 
they have mostly been discussed in isolation. Examining interactions between the two biases can 
lead to new directions in neurocognitive research by revealing their underlying cognitive and 
neurophysiological mechanisms. In the present article, we suggest that optimism bias and reward-
related attention bias mutually enforce each other and recruit a common underlying neural 
network. Key components of this network include specific activations in the anterior and posterior 
cingulate cortex with connections to the amygdala. We further postulate that biased memory 
processes influence the interplay of optimism and reward-related attention bias. Studying such 
causal relations between cognitive biases reveals important information not only about normal 
functioning and adaptive neural pathways in maintaining mental health, but also about the 
development and maintenance of psychological diseases, thereby contributing to the 
effectiveness of treatment.1 
  
                                                          
This chapter has been published as: Kress, L. & Aue, T. (2017). The link between optimism bias 
and attention bias: A neurocognitive perspective. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 80, 
688-702. 
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1 Introduction 
Being able to adequately predict future events is crucial in everyday life, especially when planning 
behavior and making decisions (Damasio, 1994). Humans, however, tend to overestimate the 
likelihood of future positive events and underestimate the likelihood of future negative events 
(Sharot et al., 2011; Weinstein, 1980). This phenomenon, named optimism bias, describes a 
positivity bias in expectancies about the future and has cognitive (forming beliefs about the future, 
imagining and judging future events, estimating probabilities), motivational (maintaining 
favorable self-perception, denying threat), and affective origins (mood, hope; Armor & Taylor, 
1998). Moreover, it entails a behavioral component (initiating goal-directed behavior, persistent 
pursuit of goals).   
Optimism bias has been studied extensively in recent years because of its implications in 
everyday life (e.g., goal persistence, positive affect; Armor & Taylor, 1998; Shepperd et al., 2015) 
and in the clinical domain (e.g., better physical health, lowered depression rates; Garrett et al., 
2014; Hevey, McGee, & Horgan, 2014; Korn et al., 2014). Despite the theoretical and practical 
significance of optimism bias, its underlying neural and physiological functioning have not yet 
been completely identified, and its interplay with other cognitive biases, for instance, in attention 
or memory, remains to be determined.  
Of note, taking other cognitive biases into account instead of studying optimism bias in 
isolation can fill several important gaps in the literature. Such an approach could (a) shed further 
light on the cognitive mechanisms underlying optimism bias, (b) allow investigation of why 
optimism bias exists and how it is maintained over time, and (c) help with the understanding of 
the extent to which the highly beneficial role of optimism bias is rooted in other cognitive biases. 
Moreover, studying optimism bias (known to play a role in mental health; Garrett et al., 2014; 
Korn et al., 2014) in relation to other cognitive biases could (d) uncover divergences and 
commonalities in health and psychopathology (first by comparing interplay among reward-related 
biases between the two populations; subsequently by also comparing reward-related and 
negative biases) and contribute to a better understanding of psychopathologies by (e) including 
potential mediating and moderating factors in models of psychiatric diseases, thereby fostering 
the understanding of complex disease-specific chains of causality, and (f) revealing how 
interacting cognitive biases constitute risk factors for psychopathologies and identifying the 
mechanisms impeding their treatment (Kraemer, Stice, Kazdin, Offord, & Kupfer, 2001). 
Furthermore, taking into account how different cognitive biases that are relevant in psychological 
disorders interact can (g) enhance prevention of psychopathology, (h) improve the effectiveness 
of state-of-the-art treatment (Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Everaert et al., 2012; Hirsch et al., 2006), 
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and (i) lead to more fine-grained diagnosis of patients. In summary, studying optimism bias in 
relation to other cognitive biases could not only broaden our knowledge about the bias itself (a-
c) but could also advance theoretical models in psychopathology (d-f) and provide help for clinical 
practice (h-i). 
In order to take a first step toward filling these gaps in the literature, the present article 
aims to (a) set up a framework of neurocognitive processes that might influence or be influenced 
by biased optimistic expectancies and (b) stimulate future research in the field by outlining specific 
hypotheses within the framework that are yet to be examined. We concentrate on attentional 
processes with a specific focus on reward-related processes (for the sake of brevity, we use the 
term “attention bias” instead of “reward-related attention bias” in the remainder of this article). 
Several ways in which optimism bias and attention bias may interact and the extent to which they 
rely on shared neural mechanisms are outlined.  
We specifically focus on the interplay between optimism bias and (reward-related) 
attention bias for several reasons: First, it is likely that optimism and attention biases interact to 
reach a common goal: A motivation to reach a rewarding goal has been suggested to underlie both 
biases and is associated with shared neural activations (optimism bias: Bateson, 2016; Buehler, 
Griffin, & MacDonald, 1997; Richter et al., 2012; attention bias: Mohanty, Gitelmann, Small, 
Mesulam, 2008; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010; Small et al., 2005). Here, motivation represents the 
driving force for behavior that is directed to a specific goal (i.e., a desired outcome), whereas 
reward functions as an incentive that makes this goal desirable. Second, in the empirical literature 
and theories on psychopathology (Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015), attentional processes have been 
repeatedly suggested to influence (optimistic) expectancies, which further underscores our claim 
that both biases should be examined by using an integrative approach. For instance, certain brain 
activations have been proposed to contribute to optimism bias by biasing attention to positive 
stimuli (Aue, Nussbaum, Cacioppo, 2012; Sharot, 2011; Sharot et al., 2007). Third, the first 
evidence that processes present in optimism bias and attention bias are indeed causally 
associated has been provided (Kress, Bristle, & Aue, 2018; Peters et al., 2015). Specifically, induced 
state optimism has been causally related to biased attention away from negative stimuli (Peters 
et al., 2015), and induced optimistic expectancies have been shown to guide attention toward 
rewarding and away from punishing stimuli (Kress et al., 2018).  
Although the main aim of the current paper is to stimulate research on the interplay of 
optimism and attention bias, we also discuss the potential role of biased memories in influencing 
the link between optimism and attention bias. Notably, because attention and memory are highly 
interactive processes (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007) and biased memories have been associated 
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with optimistic expectancies (Roy, Christenfeld, & McKenzie, 2005), consideration of memory bias 
provides additional important information about critical cognitive bias interplay. Therefore, we 
want not only to emphasize the role of other cognitive biases that may influence the link between 
optimism and attention bias, but also to motivate researchers to take additional biases into 
account in future investigations and theoretical models.   
It is further important to note that our ideas build on past work from our laboratory on 
expectancy biases in fear and anxiety and their link to attention biases (Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015). 
Although the previous and current articles focus on biased expectancies as related to attention 
processes, the current article adds several new and important aspects: a. Optimism bias 
represents a specific form of future expectancies that stands out from other forms in terms of 
robustness (as shown by selective updating of pessimistic but not optimistic expectancies when 
people are confronted with disconfirming feedback; see Sharot et al., 2011, 2012b). b. Because 
optimism bias is suggested to play an important role in the maintenance of depression (Garret et 
al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014), in regard to implications for the clinical context, we concentrate on 
implications for depression in the current article, in contrast to anxiety in the previous article. c. 
The current article focuses on reward-related biases in information processing that likely derive 
from a motivation that is different from negativity biases, which are most often centered around 
various forms of punishment (including frustrating non-reward), the latter being the focus of the 
previous article. d. The current article proposes possible mechanisms of neural communication 
that link optimism bias and attention bias and therefore could advance future research paths not 
only in cognitive research but also in neuroscientific research. 
After outlining the rationale for the current framework and its specific focus on optimism 
and attention bias, we next briefly introduce the two phenomena of interest. We emphasize their 
relevance and underlying neural networks, which constitute the basis on which we have built our 
framework. Of note, we keep these sections short, as both optimism bias and attention bias have 
been reviewed earlier (optimism bias: Sharot, 2011; reward-related attention bias: Pool et al., 
2016a). In the present article, therefore, our primary focus is on the relation of the two cognitive 
biases and the neural foundations of the proposed relation. To further refine our model and 
inspire future research and theorizing in the area, we additionally propose that memory processes 
influence the interplay of the two biases of main interest. 
2 Optimism bias 
When trying to define optimism bias, one encounters a major problem: On the one hand, different 
terms (e.g., wishful thinking, unrealistic optimism, comparative optimism, and overoptimism) 
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have been used to refer to the same psychological phenomenon (or at least highly similar 
phenomena), while on the other hand, the same terms have been used for slightly different 
phenomena in past research. Despite being aware that there are fine-grained differences between 
the different concepts, we pool them together by using the broad term optimism bias (as currently 
there is not enough literature on any of the subconcepts of optimism bias to focus our framework 
on just one of them). Representing the main character of all concepts mentioned, optimism bias 
is thus defined as an overestimation of positive future events and an underestimation of negative 
future events (this definition is used by all studies on optimism bias cited in this article). Moreover, 
in the present article, optimism bias is exclusively defined as a bias in expectancies directed 
toward the future (not the present or past), a definition that has been widely accepted in the 
literature (e.g., Armor & Taylor, 1998; Campbell, Greenauer, Macaluso, & End, 2007; Chambers, 
Windschitl, & Suls, 2003; Jefferson, Bortolotti, & Kuzmanovic, 2016; Sharot, 2011; Shepperd et al., 
2013; Weinstein, 1980; for a more detailed discussion on the definition of optimism bias, see 
Bortolotti & Antrobus, 2015).  
Moreover, it is important to note that optimism bias is closely linked to anticipation of 
reward (Sharot, 2011). In fact, in humans, optimistic expectancies are usually directed toward a 
rewarding goal (Bateson, 2016), and anticipating reward is the crucial motivating force in 
optimism bias shown by non-human animals (e.g., Matheson, Asher, & Bateson, 2008). One major 
component of reward is “wanting.” It describes individuals being motivated to strive for reward 
through both unconscious incentive salience processes and conscious desires for incentives or 
cognitive goals (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Pool, Sennwald, Delaplanque, & Sander, 2016b). 
Because it represents the phase of reward expectation, wanting is an important factor in shaping 
optimism bias. In contrast to wanting (i.e., reward expectation), “liking” (i.e., reward 
consummation) represents the pleasure component of reward, and “learning” (i.e., reward 
satiety) refers to associations and representations about rewards (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2011). 
Both liking and learning might additionally contribute to optimism bias by determining the 
hedonic value of the expected reward and influencing subsequent predictions about future 
rewards. The three phases of Berridge and Kringelbach’s model can, therefore, be essential to the 
formation of optimism bias and its maintenance over time.  
2.1 Relevance of optimism bias 
In everyday life, optimism bias ensures that people engage in a task, a crucial and beneficial aspect 
when a task is difficult and its outcome self-relevant (Armor & Taylor, 1998; Shepperd et al., 2015). 
Hence, being optimistic about one´s future can help in obtaining rewards, which in turn justifies 
that optimism bias exists. In fact, optimism bias might even have derived from evolutionary 
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advantages. More precisely, when a situation is uncertain and risky, optimism has been suggested 
to help people make better decisions and avoid mistakes, thereby contributing to survival 
(Bortolotti & Antrobus, 2015). In line with this idea, overly optimistic expectancies are not human 
specific, but have been reported in animals as well (Brydges, Leach, Nicol, Wright, & Bateson, 
2011; Douglas, Bateson, Walsh, Bédué, & Edwards, 2012; Harding, Paul, & Mendl, 2004; Matheson 
et al., 2008; Richter et al., 2012).  
In humans, optimism bias functions on a continuum, with normal stamping having great 
benefits and extreme stamping having dramatic negative consequences. For instance, optimism 
bias is thought to foster physical and mental health (Garrett et al., 2014; Hevey et al., 2014; Korn 
et al., 2014). Whereas healthy people display optimism bias and update their expectancies of 
future events selectively into an optimistic (i.e., desirable) direction when feedback suggests 
modifying them, patients with depression display no bias at all, or even pessimism bias, and 
update their expectancies in both the optimistic (i.e., desirable) and the pessimistic (i.e., 
undesirable) direction (note that causality of the association between depression and lowered 
optimism bias remains to be investigated; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; Strunk et al., 
2006). However, extreme optimism bias can also have dramatic negative consequences and costs 
emerging from it. Individuals characterized by optimism bias underestimate health risks 
(Weinstein, Marcus, & Moser, 2005; Weinstein, Slovic, & Gibson, 2004) and refrain from showing 
preventive health behavior (Davidson & Prkachin, 1997; Pligt, 1998), engage in risky activities 
because they are overly optimistic about future payoffs (e.g., Calderon, 1993; Linnet et al., 2012), 
and possibly consume substances because they overestimate the positive effects of a drug and 
underestimate its negative effects (e.g., Dillard, Midboe, & Klein, 2009; Fromme & D'Amico, 2000; 
Goldberg & Fischhoff, 2000). In conclusion, therefore, a systematic investigation of normal and 
pathological types of optimism bias is of great interest for individuals and society. Important 
insights can be gained by looking into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying optimism bias. 
2.2 Neural correlates of optimism bias 
Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies investigated the neural mechanisms 
of optimism bias and found altered activity in the following key areas: (a) the rostral anterior 
cingulate cortex (rACC), possibly extending into the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC); (b) 
the amygdala; and (c) the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (Blair et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2007; see 
Figure 2.1 for visualization of peak voxel activations reported by studies referred to in this section 
and see Table 2.1 for included studies; note that these structures are not specific to optimism bias, 
but are relevant to many psychological characteristics such as emotion processing in general; 
Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002; Sabatinelli et al., 2011). Whereas increased activity in the 
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rACC has been related to optimism bias for positive events (increased probability of positive 
events occurring to oneself compared with others), decreased activity in the dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex and the insula has been associated with optimism bias for negative events 
(decreased probability of negative events occurring to oneself compared with others; Blair et al., 
2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Peak voxel activations reported in studies on optimism bias. See Table 2.1 for a list of 
included studies. Red dots represent stronger activations in optimism bias, blue dots represent 
stronger deactivations in optimism bias, and green dots represent stronger activations in biased 
optimistic updating. Only data reported by studies on healthy participants are displayed in the 
figure. Peak voxel coordinates are depicted as dots (size: 3 mm) on a Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) brain, as provided in the Mango 4.0 Desktop Application for Windows (Research 
Imaging Institute, The University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio; 
http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). If peak activations were originally reported in Talairach 
coordinates, either they were converted to MNI 
coordinates by using the Yale BioImage Suite Application (http://sprout022.sprout.yale.edu/mni2
tal/mni2tal.html), or original MNI coordinates were requested from the study authors.  
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Table 2.1. List of studies on optimism bias included in Figure 2.1. The table shows the respective 
brain areas found and the coordinates of peak voxel activation in MNI and Talairach space. 
Coordinates that were originally reported in the studies are written in italics.  
 
Along these lines, activity in the rACC and the amygdala has been shown to be highly 
correlated when participants are forming positive (compared with negative) expectancies about 
the future (Sharot et al., 2007). The amygdala is central for emotional processing (Ochsner, Silvers, 
& Buhle, 2012; Phelps, 2006) and assumed to index personal salience (Cunningham & Brosch, 
2012; Liberzon, Phan, Decker, Taylor, 2003). Among other things, the amygdala is critically 
involved in many different aspects of emotions (e.g., development of fear, emotional appraisal 
and recognition, perception and memory of affective stimuli, reward learning and appetitive 
behavior; LeDoux, 2003; Wassum & Izquierdo, 2015) and may also be involved in forming 
emotional expectancies. Sharot and colleagues (2007) suggest that the rACC regulates emotional 
and motivational signals generated by (and stored in) the amygdala.  
Although the rACC and the amygdala are considered fundamental, optimism bias may rely 
on characteristic activations and deactivations in additional areas. As described in section 2.1, 
healthy people show an updating asymmetry in an optimistic direction (only updating future 
expectancies in a desirable but not an undesirable direction when presented with disconfirming 
evidence; Sharot et al., 2011). Brain activity in the left IFG, left and right medial frontal cortex, 
right cerebellum, and vmPFC was positively correlated with desirable updating of expectancies 
(Kuzmanovic, Jefferson, & Vogeley, 2016; Sharot et al., 2011). Additionally, activity in the vmPFC 
and right IFG correlated negatively with undesirable updating of expectancies, thus further 
supporting the idea that undesirable information is not integrated when the right IFG is activated 
(Kuzmanovic et al., 2016; Sharot et al., 2011). In addition, optimism bias can be magnified by 
administering L-DOPA, thereby increasing dopamine function and impairing updating of 
undesirable information (Sharot et al., 2012a). Consistent with this picture, the right IFG, an area 
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known to have projections from dopaminergic neurons (Fallon & Moore, 1978), has been shown 
to be involved when patients with depression update their beliefs toward an undesirable direction 
(Garret et al., 2014). 
3 Reward-related attention bias 
A reward-related bias is observed not only in expectancies (as described in section 2 on optimism 
bias), but also in attention. In line with the outlined relation between optimism bias and reward, 
recent studies imply that reward-associated (i.e., desirable) stimuli capture visual attention to a 
greater extent than neutral and sometimes negative stimuli do. This phenomenon has been shown 
by altered reaction times and biased eye movements when reward-related stimuli capture visual 
attention during a task (Anderson & Yantis, 2012; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012). Attention 
capture is most often considered to be an automatic phenomenon, independent of strategic top-
down control (Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012): Even when participants have a strong top-down 
goal to look for a specific target, a currently task-irrelevant but salient distractor can capture 
attention (Balcetis, Dunning, & Granot, 2012; Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002; Miendlarzewska, 
Bavalier, & Schwartz, 2016).  
3.1 Relevance of reward-related attention bias 
An attention bias to reward-related information enables people to efficiently detect events in an 
environment in which several stimuli compete for access to limited attentional resources (Pool et 
al., 2016a). Rewarding stimuli are suggested to have a positive hedonic value and therefore elicit 
wanting and approach behavior (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Schultz, 2004). If people preferably 
attend to rewarding stimuli in their environment in everyday life, they are more likely to perceive 
chances to maximize future gains, which in turn contributes to survival fitness (Schultz, 2004). 
Having said this, it is correct to assume that attention bias to rewarding stimuli might have derived 
from an evolutionary benefit. In support of this idea, such biased attention does not seem to be 
human specific but is also displayed by animals (Paul, Harding, & Mendl, 2005; similar to optimism 
bias; see section 2.1).  
In humans, biased attention toward reward-related stimuli plays an important role in the 
clinical domain. Mirroring research on optimism bias, attention bias toward rewarding stimuli is 
not shown by depressed or by dysphoric people, nor is it shown by formerly depressed people, in 
comparison to healthy controls (Duque & Vázquez, 2015; Gotlib et al., 2004; Joorman & Gotlib, 
2007; Koster, de Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Murphey et al., 1999). On the other 
hand, some clinical symptoms are characterized by the existence of positive biases, and these 
biases do not need to be restricted to the specific diagnosis. For example, patients with addictions 
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are characterized by an attention bias not only for substance-related reward stimuli, but also for 
non-substance-related reward stimuli (Anderson, Faulkner, Rilee, Yantis, & Marvel, 2013). 
Moreover, neural indices of biased attention toward (socially rewarding) happy face pictures have 
been associated with a risk for psychiatric and behavioral symptoms such as rule breaking and 
social problems in anxious youth (Bunford et al., 2016). It is thus important to examine the neural 
underpinnings of normal and dysfunctional attention bias to better understand their respective 
underlying mechanisms.  
3.2 Neural correlates of reward-related attention bias 
Recent fMRI studies on the neural mechanisms underlying attention bias to reward-related stimuli 
have found altered activity in the following key areas: (a) the ACC, (b) the posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC), (c) the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), (d) the amygdala, and (e) the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) (Armony & Dolan, 2002; Hickey et al., 2010; Mohanty et al., 2008; Pool et al., 2016a; 
Small et al., 2005; see Figure 2.2 for visualization of peak voxel activations reported by studies 
referred to in this section and see Table 2.2 for a list of included studies).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Peak voxel activations reported in studies on attention bias. See Table 2.2 for a list of 
included studies. Red dots represent stronger activations in expectancy-related attention capture, 
blue dots represent stronger deactivations in expectancy-related attention capture, and green dots 
represent stronger activations in threat-related attention bias. Only data reported by studies on 
visual attention are displayed in the figure. Peak voxel coordinates are depicted as dots (size: 3 
mm) on an MNI brain, as provided in the Mango 4.0 Desktop Application for Windows (Research 
Imaging Institute, The University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio; 
http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). Peak activations that were originally reported in Talairach 
coordinates have been converted to MNI coordinates by using the Yale BioImage Suite Application 
(http://sprout022.sprout.yale.edu/mni2tal/mni2tal.html). 
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Table 2.2. List of studies on attention bias included in Figure 2.2. The table shows the respective 
brain areas found and the coordinates of peak voxel activation in MNI and Talairach space. 
Coordinates that were originally reported in the studies are written in italics. 
 
 
As is the case for optimism bias, the ACC, an area strongly interconnected with 
dopaminergic structures (Marín, Smeets, & González, 1998), turns out to be a critical structure 
underlying reward-related visual attention. For instance, the ACC response to reward feedback 
predicted the magnitude of reward-related attention bias in a visual search paradigm (Hickey et 
al., 2010). Reward-related mesolimbic dopamine might bias attention toward reward-associated 
stimuli rather than less beneficial stimuli. This was the case even when people knew that attending 
to reward-associated features would be counterproductive and result in suboptimal outcomes 
(Hickey et al., 2010; the process could again be triggered by wanting and is possibly mediated by 
optimistic expectancies formed in the ACC; see section 4.4 for further details).  
Attention can be influenced by object saliency in a “bottom-up” manner, meaning that 
salient stimuli attract people´s attention automatically as an output of the sensitized 
dopaminergic system (i.e., in particular concerning initial orienting of attention; Field & Cox, 2008; 
Franken, 2003). Thus, the primary structures associated with processing of salient stimuli are the 
amygdala and insula. Whereas the amygdala has been observed to play a key role in the detection 
and attribution of salience (Liberzon et al., 2003), the insula is suggested to act as a hub structure 
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within a bigger salience network (e.g., comprising the ACC). The purpose is to detect salient 
events, activate other brain structures needed to access attention and memory resources, and 
generate appropriate behavioral responses to salient stimuli (Menon & Uddin, 2010).  
Moreover, attention can be controlled in a “top-down” manner (e.g., by monetary 
incentives signaling reward; Small et al., 2005). In this context, two processes of top-down 
attentional control were examined in a target detection task: visual spatial expectancy (the degree 
to which a predictive spatial cue benefits performance) and disengagement (the degree to which 
a misleading spatial cue diminishes performance). Whereas visual spatial expectancy was 
associated with activity in limbic regions and the PCC, disengagement was associated with activity 
in the inferior parietal lobule. These processes of the attention network were enhanced through 
monetary incentives. Findings show that expecting incentives (i.e., optimistic expectancies) can 
boost neural processing within the attention network in a top-down manner, which can be 
important in fulfilling the current behavioral goal (Small et al., 2005; Hahn & Gronlund, 2007). In 
summary, reward-related information seems to be integrated with spatial attention in the parietal 
and cingulate cortices.  
In line with this assumption, stronger functional coupling between the PPC and PCC was 
present in attention bias toward reward-related targets (i.e., food images when participants were 
hungry) in a covert spatial attention paradigm (Mohanty et al., 2008). In this study, activity in the 
OFC, the intraparietal sulcus, and the PCC was correlated with how fast attention shifted toward 
reward-related targets after participants had seen spatial cues indicating the location at which 
they should expect the target. Supporting this finding, Engelmann and colleagues (2009) reported 
that reward-related incentives modulated attention, which accompanied increased activation in 
fronto-parietal sites, including the ACC and PCC, as well as nodes of the reward system such as the 
caudate and substantia nigra.  
In conclusion, the PPC and PCC integrate motivational information with visual attention, 
a process that is essential in everyday life (Mohanty et al., 2008). Moreover, several structures, 
such as the amygdala, the ACC, and the PCC, have been demonstrated to play a key role in both 
optimism and attention bias. Along these lines, the studies by Mohanty and colleagues (2008) and 
Small and colleagues (2005) provide good examples of expectancy-attention interactions (e.g., 
visual spatial expectancy determining the top-down control of attention) and therefore give a 
good starting point for our interactive cognitive bias framework. We now introduce the theoretical 
and empirical work that further corroborates our suggestion that reward-related biases in 
expectancies and attention should be examined by using an integrative approach. 
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4 Possible interactions between optimism bias and attention bias 
After reviewing the literature on optimism and attention bias in isolation, we now begin with the 
core focus of our article, namely, the link between optimism bias and attention bias. In what 
follows, we show that ideas derived from theoretical considerations converge with existing 
empirical data on the interplay between optimism and attention processes. These converging 
ideas, in concert with widely overlapping neural activations at the basis of optimism and attention 
bias (see sections 2, 3, and 4.3), give strong hints that the two phenomena interact, which is the 
central statement of our framework. To reveal the motivation for our framework, we first draw 
on theoretical models in favor of a link between optimism and attention bias (section 4.1). 
Thereafter, by first describing empirical support for such an association (section 4.2) and shared 
neural networks (section 4.3), we thoroughly outline our framework, which is organized around 
three core principles: First, optimism bias and attention bias do not work in isolation, but enforce 
each other in both directions. Second, both optimism bias and attention bias rely on activations 
in overlapping brain areas (such as the ACC and PCC). Third, both phenomena are characterized 
by similar underlying motivational processes (i.e., striving for reward possibly initiated by limbic 
structures), a fact likely related to the observation of shared neural activations of the two biases. 
In conclusion, we propose three mechanisms of neural communication between optimism bias 
and attention bias by taking into account the overlapping neural substrates that have been 
reviewed (section 4.4). 
4.1 Theoretical models on the link between cognitive biases 
As currently little empirical work has been done on the relation between optimism bias and 
reward-related attention bias, we substantially base our framework on theoretical models that 
are in favor of links between biases displayed in different domains of information processing. First, 
we explain how established models of psychopathology (Beck, Rush, Sahw, & Emery, 1979; 
Joorman, Yoon, & Zetsche, 2007; J. Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997), including the 
combined cognitive biases hypothesis (Hirsch et al., 2006), propose the general need to study 
cognitive biases in an integrative way. These theoretical approaches, hence, are fully in line with 
the rationale for our own framework. Second, we elaborate how predictive coding theory (C. 
Summerfield et al., 2006; Zelano, Mohanty, & Gottfried, 2011) and our interpretation of 
Broadbent’s filter model of attention (1958) can provide further support for a connection between 
the two specific phenomena of interest in the present framework, namely, biased (optimistic) 
expectancies and attention. Third, we demonstrate the numerous important implications that an 
integrative view on cognitive biases will have for future research and clinical practice. 
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Influential models of psychopathology, such as Beck’s cognitive theory of depression 
(1979), suggest that negativity biases are crucial for the development and maintenance of 
psychological disorders. Beck’s cognitive triad refers to negative views about the self, the world 
(including aspects of attention), and the future (including expectancies) shown by patients with 
depression. According to Beck, these negative cognitions contribute to various symptoms of 
depression, such as apathy, paralysis of the will, and suicidal wishes. More recent models of 
depression additionally introduce the interactive nature of these cognitive biases. For instance, 
an interplay of biased attention, memory, and interpretation has been proposed to act at the basis 
for depression (Joorman et al., 2007; J. Williams et al., 1997). Together, these models of 
psychopathology have led to the evolution of the combined cognitive biases hypothesis in clinical 
research. It holds that negative cognitive biases (e.g., in attention, interpretation, and self-
imagery) rarely exist in isolation (Everaert et al., 2012; Hirsch et al., 2006), but rather interact and 
mutually enforce each other. Recently, this perspective has been extended to additionally include 
negative expectancy biases (Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015).  
Even though these models of psychopathology (Beck et al., 1979; Joorman et al., 2007; J. 
Williams et al., 1997) are widely accepted and implemented in psychotherapy, research on the 
influence of cognitive biases on psychopathological symptoms has mainly examined the different 
biases separately, thereby neglecting important information about their interactive effects 
(Everaert et al., 2017). Going beyond such restricted considerations, the combined cognitive bias 
hypothesis constitutes an important starting point for future integrative investigations on 
cognitive biases. Among other things, it guides research in the field by proposing possible 
mechanisms in psychopathology, including specific directions of interaction between diverse 
biases.  
Studying interactive and mutually enforcing cognitive biases in psychopathology can have 
pivotal implications for clinical research and practice. In clinical research, it can, for instance, 
reveal how specific interactions among cognitive biases contribute to complex chains of causality 
that lead to psychopathologies or create conditions that impede successful treatment (e.g., 
because one bias mediates or moderates the association between another bias and certain 
psychopathological symptoms). Moreover, in clinical practice, it can lead to more fine-grained 
diagnoses of patients (e.g., by taking into account how the strength and time course of interacting 
cognitive biases influence the severity of symptoms) and can improve the effectiveness of 
contemporary treatment options by simultaneously targeting multiple cognitive mechanisms 
involved in the development and maintenance of psychological diseases (e.g., during focused 
cognitive bias modification training; Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Everaert et al., 2012; Hirsch et al., 
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2006). In sum, leading models of psychopathology, in particular the combined cognitive biases 
hypothesis described above, present strong arguments for the interaction of negative biases 
displayed in psychological disorders (Everaert et al., 2012; Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2014; 
Everaert, Tierens, Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013; Hirsch et al., 2006). 
With the current framework, we extend this compelling perspective by suggesting that 
the same holds true for positive reward-related biases. Attention bias, which makes people 
preferably attend to reward-related information, can well accompany optimism bias, which makes 
people overly optimistic about future rewards. More precisely, we postulate that optimism bias 
increases when people preferably attend to rewarding information in their environment and that 
reward-related attention bias increases when people have overly optimistic expectancies about 
their future (for a more detailed outline of these causal links, see section 4.4). Furthermore, 
application of the combined cognitive biases hypothesis to reward-related biases implies that 
additional cognitive biases (e.g., in memory) interact with the proposed link between optimism 
and attention bias (see section 5 for further details). Effects of reward-related biases are proposed 
to mutually reinforce each other, thereby establishing and conserving a positive outlook and 
mental health in the long run. Therefore, interactions of reward-related biases are especially 
interesting for life quality (e.g., how mutually enforcing biases maintain well-being during the ups 
and downs of everyday life) but also for the prevention of psychopathology (e.g., how 
psychoeducation about causal influences among reward-related biases can prevent negative 
mutual enforcement and increase positive mutual enforcement before a disease is developed).  
Compared with the combined cognitive biases hypothesis and models of psychopathology 
proposing that different cognitive biases are generally linked, predictive coding theory specifically 
emphasizes the interplay of expectancy and attention processes. Furthermore, its postulates are 
not restricted to negative cognitions. Predictive coding theory states that when expecting certain 
outcomes (of any valence) in the future, humans use prior experience to create a mental template 
or “search image” and then compare incoming sensory information to this template (e.g., C. 
Summerfield et al., 2006; Zelano et al., 2011). This interplay helps to efficiently process a wealth 
of sensory information and facilitates the choice of subsequent behavior. It has been suggested 
that the predictive template created in the brain is updated according to incoming information, 
implying that the process constantly repeats over time (Rao & Ballard, 1999).  
Whether predictive coding theory can transfer to optimism bias and attention bias has yet 
to be examined empirically and therefore constitutes an interesting aspect that has just recently 
started to be investigated. It is imaginable that individuals characterized by overly optimistic 
expectancies create a mental image that directs their attention to confirming reward-related 
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sensory input. In fact, empirical evidence supports such a mechanism (Kress et al., 2018; see 
section 4.2 for details). Although such confirming sensory input stabilizes optimism bias over time, 
disconfirming sensory input that reaches attentional awareness can lead to an update of the 
mental template (Rao & Ballard, 1999), thereby counteracting optimism bias. Empirical evidence 
about such processes that are implied by predictive coding theory will guide neurocognitive 
research in the field of cognitive bias interactions because it directly proposes a direction of 
influence (influence of expectancies on attention). Studying such causal influences of optimistic 
expectancies on attention allows, for instance, the investigation of how optimism bias is 
maintained over time (e.g., because optimistic expectancies guide attention toward confirming 
rewarding evidence, which, in turn, further strengthens optimism bias; see Kress et al., 2018, for 
supportive empirical findings).  
In contrast to predictive coding theory that implies expectancy influences on attention, 
Broadbent’s filter model of attention (1958) claims that selective attention acts as a sensory filter 
that prevents the information processing system from being overloaded. Prioritized selective 
attention to rewarding (often self-relevant) information then leads to preferable processing of 
such desirable information (Pessoa, 2005; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002). This 
again should strengthen optimism bias because future expectancies are generally based on 
available information (Metcalfe, 1998). Empirical evidence for such influences of attention on 
optimism bias have outstanding implications. For instance, such evidence can reveal that 
optimism bias and its benefits, such as the initiation of goal-directed behavior, are rooted in 
underlying attentional mechanisms and that these benefits therefore cannot necessarily be solely 
attributed to optimism bias itself.  
Broadbent’s filter model basically implies the opposite direction of influence (influence of 
attention on expectancies) to that of predictive coding theory (influence of expectancies on 
attention). Both theories reveal the importance of examining causal relationships (i.e., directions 
of influence) between different biases and therefore guide future research in the field away from 
correlational and toward experimental studies. Only these studies can reveal the mechanisms 
underlying healthy and pathological functioning, such as specific circumscribed expectancy-
attention interactions contributing to well-being or symptoms of psychopathology.  
In summary, the three theoretical approaches presented in this section provide strong 
supportive evidence for a link between optimism and attention bias. Whereas models of 
psychopathology, particularly the combined cognitive biases hypothesis, suggest that different 
cognitive biases are generally linked and should be examined by using an integrative approach, 
predictive coding theory is in line with the idea of causal influences of optimism bias on attention 
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bias, and Broadbent’s filter model implies causal influences of attention bias on optimism bias. 
From an integration of these approaches, we postulate bi-directional influences between both 
biases (see section 4.4). After having outlined these theoretical models in favor of our framework, 
we now continue by briefly reviewing the first empirical findings that further substantiate our 
claim of a close association between optimism and attention bias. 
4.2 Empirical evidence of optimism-attention associations 
The first core principle of our framework states that optimism bias and attention bias do not work 
in isolation but enforce each other in both directions. In support of this principle, first empirical 
findings by Peters and colleagues (2015) revealed an effect of experimentally induced state 
optimism (i.e., temporarily increased optimistic expectancies induced through external 
manipulation; Peters et al., 2015) on attention to faces displaying different emotional expressions. 
Even though, in general, their optimism manipulation did not influence gaze behavior, the authors 
observed an effect of state optimism in a post hoc analysis: Those participants who displayed 
increased state optimism because of the manipulation looked at angry (i.e., socially punishing) 
faces for a significantly shorter time. Moreover, they looked at joyful (i.e., socially rewarding) faces 
for a nearly significant longer time. To our knowledge, this is the first study that has examined 
how visual attention is causally influenced by induced state optimism that likely shares important 
features with optimism bias (although both phenomena are characterized by optimistic 
expectancies about the future, these expectancies are not necessarily unrealistic or biased in state 
optimism), thus supporting our claim regarding the existence of optimism-attention bias 
interactions.  
In line with this study, the first evidence from our own laboratory suggests that induced 
optimistic and pessimistic expectancies alter attention to rewarding and punishing stimuli, with 
optimistic expectancies having a stronger effect on attention deployment than pessimistic 
expectancies (Peters et al., 2015, induced state optimism at the beginning of the experiment; in 
contrast, we induced optimistic and pessimistic expectancies by verbal cues on a trial-to-trial basis 
in our study; Kress et al., 2018). Although optimistic expectancies strongly biased attention toward 
rewarding compared with punishing stimuli in our experiment, pessimistic expectancies had either 
no effect or a weaker effect on attention deployment to punishing versus rewarding stimuli. An 
important consideration is that this observation is generally in accordance with our framework’s 
postulate of causal relations between optimism and attention bias. Moreover, this finding in our 
laboratory delineates important differences between biased reward- and punishment-related 
processing (e.g., optimism vs. pessimism) and strongly supports the idea that optimism has an 
outstanding impact on other types of cognitive processing (i.e., optimism exerts stronger 
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influences on cognitive biases than pessimism). Such differences between reward- and 
punishment-related processing imply that influences among cognitive biases can be valence 
specific. Further details about how such valence-specific biased cognitive processing contributes 
to health and psychopathology can have crucial implications for everyday life and clinical practice. 
Generally in line with the idea of causal influences of optimistic expectancies on attention 
(Kress et al., 2018), expectancy cues have been shown to guide visual attention to reward-related 
stimuli and to modify attention via top-down control outside the area of optimism bias research. 
In a covered attention shift paradigm, participants reacted faster to spatially cued reward-related 
targets that were motivationally relevant compared with those that were motivationally irrelevant 
(i.e., food pictures when participants were hungry vs. full; Mohanty et al., 2008). Other studies 
showed that attention to socially rewarding stimuli (happy as opposed to angry faces) could be 
enhanced through top-down modulation (i.e., by specific instructions or cues; Hahn & Gronlund, 
2007; M. Williams, Moss, Bradsahw, & Mattingley, 2005). These studies thus give further hints 
that influences of expectancies on attention deployment exist in the reward-related domain. Even 
if these findings do not directly refer to optimism bias, they are supportive of our claim of 
expectancy-attention interactions because they touch upon expectancies about future outcomes. 
Furthermore, they correspond well with Peters and colleagues´ (2015) results concerning the 
influence of state optimism on attention to happy and angry faces.  
One can find further inspiration from the literature on expectancy-attention interactions 
in the negative domain (Aue, Hoeppli, Piguet, Sterpenich, & Vuilleumier, 2013b; Aue & Okon-
Singer, 2015; Mohanty, Egner, Monti, & Mesulam, 2009). For negative affective phenomena, a 
strong correlation between attention deployment and expectancies has already been revealed 
(Aue et al., 2013b). Moreover, experimentally manipulated expectancies, induced by prior cues in 
a visual search task, causally influenced attention to neutral stimuli, but – interestingly – not 
consistently to negative stimuli (Aue et al., 2016, 2013a; Burra & Kerzel, 2013; Mohanty et al. 
2009). Similarities and divergences between positive and negative cognitive bias interactions still 
need to be revealed, an aspect that should substantially advance theorizing and prevention in 
clinical psychology, as well as the adaptation of individual treatments. 
In summary, behavioral studies reported in this section provide supportive evidence that 
optimism bias and attention bias are related and that optimism causally influences attention 
deployment (similar interactions have been proposed in animal research; Mendl, Burman, Parker, 
& Paul, 2009). Behavioral studies revealed an association between expectancies and attention not 
only by using negative affective (Aue et al., 2013b; Mohanty et al., 2009) and neutral stimuli (Aue, 
Chauvigné, Bristle, Okon-Singer, & Guex, 2016; Aue, Guex, Chauvigné, & Okon-Singer, 2013a; 
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Burra & Kerzel, 2013), but also by using appetitive and reward-related stimuli in experiments that 
did not directly address optimism bias (Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Mohanty et al., 2008; M. Williams 
et al., 2005). Most important, state optimism and induced optimistic expectancies – two 
manipulations representing important aspects of optimism bias – have recently been shown to 
causally influence subsequent attention deployment (Kress et al., 2018; Peters et al., 2015). Such 
evidence, which is in line with the idea of a link between optimism and attention bias, has yet to 
be corroborated by additional empirical data in the behavioral domain. Also of note is that, 
although we were able to outline supportive empirical evidence for causal influences of optimistic 
expectancies on attention, no empirical evidence is yet available on causal influences of attention 
on optimism bias. Thus, future studies should straightforwardly and systematically target this 
direction of influence.  
The continuous adaption and combination of currently dominant experimental paradigms 
in each area will enable researchers to uncover the central interplay between cognitive biases. 
Demonstrating causal associations between biases has crucial implications for future cognitive 
research about both optimism and attention bias. Such a research strategy has, for instance, the 
potential to reveal fundamental operating principles at the basis of both biases, thereby 
contributing to our understanding of positively biased cognitions and current theorizing. 
Moreover, it should reveal important commonalities and divergences in the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying health and psychopathology. An important aspect of cognitive functioning in health 
and disease is that much can be learned from knowledge about the neural foundations of 
associations between cognitive biases. In the next sections, we therefore integrate findings from 
neuroimaging studies on optimism bias and attention bias (section 4.3) and propose different 
ways in which the corresponding neural mechanisms interact (section 4.4).  
4.3 Shared neural networks in optimism bias and attention bias 
The second core principle of our framework affirms that both optimism bias and reward-related 
attention bias rely on activations in overlapping and interacting brain areas. Key areas identified 
in research on optimism bias (section 2.2) and attention bias (section 3.2) do indeed overlap 
considerably. In line with this principle, recent fMRI studies on optimism bias also propose shared 
mechanisms and conform to the idea that biases in expectancies are shaped by biases in attention 
or vice versa (Sharot, 2011; Sharot et al., 2007). For instance, the ACC has been implicated in 
optimism bias (Blair et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2007, 2011) and was suggested to guide attention 
toward rewarding information while people imagine future events (see Hickey et al., 2010; for its 
implication in reward-related enhancement of selective attention). Moreover, activity in this 
region has been found to vary as a function of amygdala activity in optimism bias (Sharot et al., 
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2007), suggesting that the salience of an anticipated outcome shapes the extent of the optimism 
bias displayed (Bastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, 2011; Weinstein, 1980). Further supporting the idea of 
a link between optimism and attention bias, object saliency and associated amygdala activity have 
also been related to attentional capture (Field & Cox, 2002; Franken, 2003).  
Besides amygdala and ACC activity, connectivity between occipital areas associated with 
visual attention and the human reward system (striatum), as well as with the PCC, has been 
observed to be at the basis of optimism bias (Aue et al., 2012). Again, there are convincing 
commonalities with findings on attention bias. For example, the PCC has been reported to be 
critically involved in selective attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Such an observation is 
consistent with the idea that the more the PCC is recruited when a specific piece of information is 
encoded, the more this information’s valence will influence the overall impression formed 
(Schiller, Freeman, Mitchell, Uleman, & Phelps, 2009). Indeed, the PCC has been proposed to be a 
hub structure connecting motivation-related processing with top-down control of attention 
(Mohanty et al., 2008; Small et al., 2005). Thus, we suggest that the striatum and the amygdala, 
in concert with the PCC, initiate shifts in visual attention that then contribute to how future 
expectancies are formed (see section 4.4, first mechanism, for details).  
Notably, in accordance with the findings outlined earlier and with our claims, Rolls (2013) 
proposes that attention and expectancies recruit a common neural network: Mediated by the ACC 
and the OFC, both “cognition” (including expectancies; original term used by Rolls, 2013) and 
attention exert top-down influences on the processing of bottom-up sensory inputs. These top-
down influences can facilitate activation of selective neuronal assemblies and inhibit other 
neuronal assemblies in the early information processing stream. Consequently, certain stimulus 
representations will be enhanced and others suppressed (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). In this way, 
subsequent processing will be biased. Along these lines, selective attention can be assumed to 
influence activity in early visual processing areas, possibly mediated by the functional connectivity 
between fronto-parietal brain regions associated with attentional control and the human reward 
system (e.g., dorsal striatum; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). What remains 
to be investigated is whether or not this is part of the mechanism by which attentional processes 
bias expectancies or vice versa.  
Direct evidence for the neural mechanisms that we propose to underlie generally 
beneficial optimism-attention interactions will not just support behavioral findings in the field: 
Apart from revealing patterns of healthy neural processing, such findings also have the potential 
to pinpoint vulnerability factors for psychopathology by specifying activations that are responsible 
for a disruption of the generally healthy neural patterns. Moreover, documentation of neural 
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interactions during the normal interplay of optimism and attention bias will have important 
implications for pharmacological treatment of psychological disorders in which none of the biases 
are displayed. For instance, drugs that influence the dopamine system can be used to alter 
important processes in the brain, thereby enhancing reward-related biases and their interplay (in 
line with this idea, L-Dopa has already been shown to enhance optimism bias; Sharot et al., 2012a). 
Before these ultimate goals are reached, however, causal influences between optimism 
and attention bias and their neural correlates have yet to be purposefully examined. Because 
direct neuroscientific evidence about the association between optimistic expectancies and 
attention in the reward-related domain is to date missing, research on optimism-attention bias 
interactions might be inspired by research in the negative bias domain. In the negative domain, 
the association between visual attention and expectancies has indeed been shown to be mediated 
by activity in key regions such as the OFC, the ACC, and the precuneus (Aue et al., 2013b). 
Moreover, in a visual search task, in which attention to angry facial expressions was influenced by 
prior knowledge about the location and type of the target stimulus, spatially informative cues 
(predicting the location of a subsequent target) activated the fusiform gyrus and parts of the 
frontoparietal spatial attention network (such as the intraparietal sulcus and the frontal eye field), 
and emotionally informative cues (predicting angry faces) additionally activated limbic areas, 
including the amygdala (Mohanty et al., 2009). Notably, the authors propose that expectancy-
related emotional information is essential to generate a top-down salience map that guides visual 
attention. Together, these findings suggest that the spatial attention network, in concert with 
limbic areas, constitutes the neural substrates at the basis of expectancy-driven emotional spatial 
attention.  
As outlined in greater detail in the next section (section 4.4, second mechanism), we 
suggest that optimism bias can modulate attention toward rewarding stimuli in a highly similar 
way. Positive rewarding and negative threatening stimuli have been shown to recruit partly 
overlapping neural networks (including the amygdala and the OFC; Li, Howard, Parrish, & 
Gottfried, 2008; Murray, 2007; Pool et al., 2016a). Consequently, expectancies about significant 
positive future events likely recruit at least partly intersecting brain mechanisms and likewise 
generate a salience map that guides attention toward rewarding stimuli.  
In conclusion, the neuroscientific literature on optimism and attention bias provides 
supportive evidence that both biases are closely related. Brain areas underlying optimism bias and 
reward-related attention bias overlap considerably. An interplay between the amygdala and the 
human-reward system with cingulate areas such as the ACC and PCC is proposed in both optimism 
(Aue et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2007) and attention bias (Field & Cox, 2002; Franken, 2003; Hickey 
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et al., 2010) and these areas can therefore represent critical underlying structures for bi-
directional interactions between both biases. Yet, concrete empirical evidence on the neural 
mechanisms of causal links between optimism and attention bias is still needed. Such evidence 
will greatly advance knowledge about the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying optimism bias 
and therefore allows further investigation into why the bias exists and how it is maintained. 
Moreover, it will advance theories on cognitive bias interactions, such as the combined cognitive 
biases hypothesis, and will generate new hypotheses about the specific causal relations between 
optimism and attention bias by revealing the involved brain areas and their functional and 
structural connectivity (see Aue, Lavelle, & Cacioppo, 2009). Finally, research in the area has the 
potential to contribute to the identification of significant neural vulnerability factors in 
psychopathology and to impact on current treatment strategies.  
4.4 Possible mechanisms of neural communication linking optimism bias and 
attention bias 
Given that the ideas derived from fundamentally different sources (theoretical models outlined in 
section 4.1, empirical studies outlined in section 4.2, and neuroscientific evidence outlined in 
section 4.3) converge, it is more than timely to address the potential interplay between optimism 
and reward-related attention bias. In what follows, therefore, we outline three mechanisms of 
possible interaction between these biases. All three mechanisms are based on the idea that 
anticipated reward (i.e., positive outcomes) functions as an incentive that drives motivation. This 
hypothesis corresponds to the third core principle of our framework, namely, that both optimism 
bias and attention bias are characterized by similar underlying motivational processes (i.e., striving 
for reward, as initiated by limbic structures; see Bateson, 2016; Small et al., 2005). Moreover, this 
similar underlying motivation is proposed to be reflected in the shared neural activations of the 
two biases. Through this motivation to strive for reward, specific expectancy and attention 
systems are (re)directed to maximize reward consumption (for an overview of brain areas 
involved, see Figure 2.3).  
Of note, all three proposed mechanisms imply that a minimum of attention is always 
needed to identify stimuli: In order to ignore or attend to individual pieces of information, it is 
necessary to know in advance whether they contain positive or negative value. However, we 
propose that the depth of processing of any given piece of evidence can be substantially modified 
by varying the amount of attention it receives, which influences optimism bias, on the one hand, 
and is influenced by optimism bias on the other. For instance, attention processes that exert a 
causal influence on optimism bias can be imagined in various situations. To illustrate, in Las Vegas, 
winning money can be perceived as a rewarding positive outcome that (re)directs our ongoing 
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attention toward other people who just won money through gambling, consequently making us 
more optimistic about being the next one to win. Such a view is consistent with the first 
mechanism within our framework. At this point, it is important to note that the first mechanism 
(causal influences of attention bias on optimism bias) and the second mechanism (causal 
influences of optimism bias on attention bias) are not necessarily mutually exclusive; rather, based 
on the findings displayed in sections 4.1 to 4.3, we suggest the existence of bi-directional 
influences between optimism (expectancies) and attention bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Brain regions that have been most consistently involved in the processing of 
optimistic expectancies and positive attention bias. The proposed mechanisms of neural 
communication linking optimism bias and positive attention bias (see section 4.4) are illustrated in 
separate parts of the figure. Note that the depicted arrows show functional, not anatomical, 
connections. None of the mechanisms have been examined experimentally and are thus 
hypotheses of what underlying neural communication could look like. Different mechanisms and 
brain areas may be involved. The brain templates have been created with the sample MNI image, 
as provided in the Mango 4.0 Desktop Application for Windows (Research Imaging Institute, The 
University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio; http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). Colored 
arrows display the suggested direction of processing. a) First mechanism: Causal influence of 
attention bias on optimism bias. Wanting (striatum, amygdala) is suggested to drive ongoing 
36 
 
visual attention to rewarding stimuli. The critical structures to shift attention are the PPC and the 
PCC, and selective attention then affects how early visual input is processed (reflected in the 
primary visual cortex). By allocating selective attention, desirable evidence is processed preferably 
(striatum, amygdala), thus creating or strengthening optimism regarding goal achievement (ACC, 
OFC, and vmPFC). b) Second mechanism: Causal influence of optimism bias on attention bias. 
Wanting (striatum, amygdala) can directly shape optimism bias in order to further increase goal-
directed appetitive motivation and task engagement; via top-down mechanisms (ACC, OFC, and 
vmPFC), optimism bias is then proposed to redirect currently ongoing visual attention (PCC, PPC, 
and visual cortex) toward supportive environmental evidence (while largely ignoring negative 
evidence) in order to facilitate pursuing the goal to obtain the reward. c) Third mechanism: No 
causal influence between optimism bias and attention bias. Wanting (striatum, amygdala) 
independently initiates supportive attentive (PPC, PCC, and visual cortex) and expectancy-related 
processes (ACC, OFC, and vmPFC) with no interaction between the two. 
 
First mechanism: Causal influence of attention bias on optimism bias. In accordance with 
Broadbent´s filter model of attention (1958), we postulate that selectively attending to reward-
related information (and away from negative information) leads to optimism bias, in that selective 
visual attention determines which part of the environmental information is preferably processed. 
Wanting (striatum, amygdala) drives ongoing visual attention to rewarding stimuli. This is in line 
with Berridge and Robinson’s (1998) incentive salience theory, in which mesolimbic and 
neostriatal dopamine functions to increase wanting of specific rewards and thereby shapes the 
attention-capturing quality and neural representation of reward-related stimuli. We propose that 
the critical structures to shift attention are the PPC and the PCC, and selective attention then 
impacts on how early visual input is processed (e.g., reflected in the primary visual cortex; 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; the suggested flow of information is 
depicted in Figure 2.3a). By allocating selective attention, desirable evidence is processed 
preferably (striatum, amygdala), thus creating or strengthening optimism regarding goal 
achievement (ACC, OFC, and vmPFC).  
Coming back to our Las Vegas example, wanting to win a lot of money through gambling 
directs our ongoing visual attention preferably to smiling faces of people in the environment who 
just won a game, while mostly ignoring those who lost and look sad, thus making us more 
optimistic about winning money ourselves, for it seems to happen to so many other people. In 
contrast to this example of healthy processing, patients with depression do not show biased 
attention to rewarding stimuli (but rather to negative stimuli; Gotlib et al., 2004) and are 
simultaneously not characterized by an optimism bias (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; 
Strunk et al., 2006). In fact, we suggest that biased attention to negative rather than positive 
stimuli among patients with depression leads to more negative expectancies about the future (in 
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line with mechanisms involved in fear and anxiety described by Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015), thereby 
maintaining a generally negative view. On a neural level, it is imaginable that connections between 
the amygdala and striatum associated with wanting, on the one hand, and the PPC and PCC areas 
important for shifting attention, on the other, are missing or dysfunctional and therefore prevent 
the formation of an attention bias toward rewarding stimuli in patients with depression. 
Alternatively (or additionally), one can speculate that an interaction between reward-related 
biases in attention (PPC, PCC) and expectancies (ACC, OFC, vmPFC) is not established because of 
dysfunctional activity of the amygdala and the striatum. Such a deviation would also hinder the 
above proposed “normal” flow of information. 
Second mechanism: Causal influence of optimism bias on attention bias. From the 
considerations outlined in the previous sections, we further suggest that wanting (striatum, 
amygdala) can directly shape optimism bias in order to further increase goal-directed appetitive 
motivation and task engagement. In line with postulates derived from predictive coding theory, 
we hypothesize that optimism bias, via top-down mechanisms (ACC, OFC, and vmPFC), redirects 
currently ongoing visual attention (PCC, PPC, and visual cortex) toward supportive environmental 
evidence (while largely ignoring negative evidence) in order to facilitate the pursuit of a goal to 
obtain a reward (see Figure 2.3b). Re-entrant neural processes in that sense have already been 
shown in the field of perception (Amaral & Price, 1984; Keil et al., 2009) and could apply to the 
redirection of attention in a highly similar fashion.  
In our example, wanting to win money through gambling makes us highly optimistic about 
winning that money in the next game and having the best hand of cards, which then redirects 
ongoing attention toward supportive evidence, such as our friend smiling to encourage us. In 
contrast to this process suggested to be shown by healthy individuals, patients with depression or 
other psychopathologies do not display optimism bias in the first place (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn 
et al., 2014), but have negative expectancies about the future (Strunk et al., 2006). These 
expectancies can then lead to biased attention toward negative as opposed to positive stimuli 
(Gotlib et al., 2004), thereby generally maintaining negative cognitions. On a neural level, at least 
two dysfunctional scenarios are imaginable as being responsible for an absence of healthy 
optimism-attention interactions in psychopathology. On the one hand, malfunctioning 
connectivity of the amygdala and the striatum with the ACC, OFC, and vmPFC could prevent 
wanting from shaping optimism bias in the first place. On the other hand, it is conceivable that 
optimism bias does not exert top-down influences on attention because connections of the ACC, 
OFC, and vmPFC with the PCC, PPC, and visual cortex are dysfunctional.  
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Third mechanism: No causal influence between optimism bias and attention bias. Although 
we consider it improbable, at the moment we cannot rule out that wanting (striatum, amygdala) 
independently initiates supportive attentive (PPC, PCC, and visual cortex) and expectancy-related 
processes (ACC, OFC, and vmPFC) with no interaction between the two (Figure 2.3c). In our 
example, this would mean that wanting to win money in Las Vegas would (re)direct attention 
toward other people winning money and shape expectancies toward optimism about winning 
independently. However, research on the link between attention and expectancies in threatening 
and in reward-related situations suggests that both processes are highly correlated in salient 
situations, with attention causally influencing expectancies or vice versa (e.g., Aue et al., 2013b; 
Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Mohanty et al., 2009; Peters et al., 2015; M. 
Williams et al., 2005). Therefore, we generally predict that the attention and expectancy systems 
are coordinated and mutually reinforce each other. In addition, although there is clear evidence 
that wanting affects both optimism and attention (Bastardi et al., 2011; Hickey et al., 2010; 
Weinstein, 1980), there is no reason to suspect that the impact of attention (optimistic 
expectancies) on optimistic expectancies (attention) is mediated by changes in wanting.  
In sum, all three proposed mechanisms are imaginable. An important consideration, as 
mentioned earlier, is that the first and the second mechanism are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. In fact, we anticipate that the first two mechanisms combine. The concrete direction of 
influence between the biases can be context dependent. In both cases, neural key activations 
would be expected in areas such as the striatum, amygdala, ACC and PCC, and primary visual 
cortex. However, from our review of the literature (sections 2.2 and 3.2), we hypothesize that 
causal influences of optimistic expectancies additionally recruit more frontal areas, whereas 
causal attention influences rely on supplementary parietal areas.  
Investigating functional and structural connectivity between these areas will yield 
important insights into the nature of the neural networks that underlie normal and pathological 
relations between reward-related biases in expectancies and attention. Neuroscientific evidence 
on such causal relations between attention and optimism bias has further important implications 
for the treatment of psychopathology and can help intervene in mutually enforcing negative bias 
patterns displayed by patients with psychological diseases (Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Everaert et 
al., 2017; Hirsch et al., 2006). Information about the direction of influence between attention bias 
and optimism bias can, for instance, give hints on which biases should be targeted as a priority in 
psychotherapy (namely, those biases that can automatically alter other clinically relevant biases) 
and on their specific role in the causation of pathological symptoms. Moreover, knowledge about 
the specific neural structures involved in optimism-attention bias interplay and their functional 
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connectivity can be decisive for the development of novel psychopharmacological treatments (see 
Fossati, 2008). 
In conclusion, with the present framework, we propose that biased optimistic 
expectancies causally influence attention deployment, and attention bias causally influences 
optimism. Through this mutually re-enforcing interplay, reward-related biases are preserved in 
the long term and a positive view of the environment and the future is maintained. This framework 
can be used to understand previous and future neurocognitive work on optimism and attention 
bias because it will (a) help to integrate research on single reward-related biases into a bigger 
picture of interacting cognitive biases resulting from the overarching motivation to pursue reward 
(i.e., motivation to reach a reward that drives both biases in expectancies and attention); (b) make 
it easier to interpret pivotal findings in research that focus on only one phenomenon (e.g., 
updating asymmetry in optimism bias), which often partly represents effects additionally arising 
from another, simultaneously present, bias (e.g., attention bias; see Kress et al., 2018); (c) shed 
light on the mechanisms related to the development and maintenance of each bias (e.g., 
underlying attention processes contributing to biased optimistic expectancies and vice versa); (d) 
help to uncover divergences and commonalities in health and psychopathology (e.g., by testing 
how evidence on interacting negative cognitive biases displayed in psychopathology can be 
replicated in reward-related biases and whether health and psychopathology result from different 
or similar interactions between cognitive biases); and (e) inspire new, personally adapted, 
therapeutic interventions (e.g., by taking into account which specific biases are shown by an 
individual and how their interplay affects particular symptoms of disease).  
5 Potential roles of memory in the interplay of optimism bias and 
attention bias 
So far, we have argued that optimism and attention bias are linked. However, according to the 
combined cognitive biases hypothesis (introduced in section 4.1), additional information 
processing biases (i.e., in memory or interpretation) can come into play. In particular, there is 
evidence that expectancy and memory processes are highly related to each other (Aue & Okon-
Singer, 2015) and that many optimistic expectancies we have as humans are based on our prior 
experiences (Metcalfe, 1998). At the same time, memory and attention processes are highly 
interactive processes, as evidenced by a large body of behavioral and neuroscientific research 
(Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007). It is for this reason that we now point out how memory processes 
have been observed to interact with optimism bias on the one hand and attention bias on the 
other. We then suggest how memory processes can influence the interplay of optimism and 
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attention bias, one possibility being that memory functions as a mediator in the optimism bias–
attention bias associations we put forth earlier. Evidence about such threefold interactions can 
reveal even more refined mechanisms underlying the benefits of reward-related biases and 
explain how a positive outlook is ultimately maintained in healthy individuals. 
Concerning the relation between optimism and memory bias, it has been suggested that 
optimism bias is the result of memory-based processing heuristics. If – as proposed – people use 
all information at hand (e.g., evoked from memory) to build expectancies, optimism bias simply 
arises because the information at hand is not always correct and complete (Metcalfe, 1998). As a 
consequence, unreasonably positive memories can lead to biased expectancies in the form of 
optimism bias. Accordingly, in a meta-analysis on time estimations of future events, Roy and 
colleagues (2005) indeed found strong support for a positive association between biased 
memories and expectancies. Some famous examples of overoptimistic time expectancies have 
been observed in the time estimations for the construction of various important buildings, such 
as the Sydney Opera House or the Channel Tunnel between England and France. Specifically, the 
authors state that people base their predictions of future task duration on their memories of how 
long past events have taken, but these memories systematically underestimate the true duration. 
Although these links between memory and optimistic expectancies primarily concern temporal 
aspects, one also wants to consider the valence aspect. For instance, people who better 
remember positive events in their life than others do are likely prone to see their future more 
optimistically. Empirical evidence for such a mechanism will have wide-reaching implications for 
the treatment of psychopathology, as it implies the need to correct the absence of positive 
memory biases (e.g., through cognitive restructuring; Liang, Hsu, Hung, Wang, & Lin, 2011; Rinck 
& Becker, 2005; Watkins, Vache, Verney, & Mathews, 1996) to make patients see their future 
more optimistically. 
In a similar vein, it has been suggested that attention processes are strongly related to 
memory processes (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007). Numerous investigations have demonstrated 
that the current focus of attention determines which information is encoded in memory (e.g., 
Everaert et al., 2014; Fougnie, 2008) and that attention during memory retrieval predicts 
subsequent memory bias of positive information (Everaert & Koster, 2015). Therefore, preferably 
attending to positive stimuli in one’s environment is likely closely related to the predominance of 
positive information in memory (see Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011, for similar reflections on the 
relation between interpretation bias and memory bias).  
In addition to these influences of attention on memory, the opposite direction of influence 
has also been proposed, namely, that past experience reflected in multiple memory systems 
41 
 
guides attention (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007). Evidence for this memory-guided attention 
allocation has been shown for implicit long-term memory experience (Johnson, Woodman, Braun, 
& Luck, 2007, J. Summerfield, Lepsien, Gitelman, Mesulam, & Nobre, 2006). In conclusion, 
memory and attention interact in both directions: First, memory has a limited capacity and 
therefore depends on selective attention processes that determine which pieces of information 
will be encoded. Second, memory about past experiences guides attention in order to secure 
optimal selection (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007). Of note, the existence of bi-directional influences 
between memory and attention has important implications not just for the clinical context, 
because these influences contribute to the development and maintenance of psychological 
diseases (Everaert et al., 2014). Such interactions may be equally momentous for healthy 
processing by ensuring positive mood and well-being. 
Even though there is evidence for both optimism-memory and attention-memory 
interactions, to our knowledge no studies have yet empirically examined the threefold 
relationship between optimism bias, attention bias, and memory bias. However, one can 
speculate that a threefold link exists (for similar reflections in the negative domain, see Aue & 
Okon-Singer, 2015). On the one hand, a positivity bias in memory has been suggested to initiate 
shifts in attention (e.g., Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012) toward positive stimuli in the 
environment, which can then lead to biased optimistic expectancies about future events. On the 
other hand, it is also imaginable that biased memories directly shape optimistic expectancies 
about the future (Metcalfe, 1998; Roy et al., 2005), which then result in biased attention toward 
the internal and external environment (Kress et al., 2018; Peters et al., 2015). In applying this to 
affective disorders, one can assume that if depressed patients do not show a positivity bias in 
memory (Watkins et al., 1996), they also form less optimistic expectancies about their future. The 
latter is characteristic for patients with depression (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014) and has 
been suggested to bias attention less toward rewarding stimuli and more toward negative stimuli 
in the environment (Beck, 1976; B. Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; Koster et al., 2005; Leyman, de 
Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2007).  
In line with mutual influences among the three biases, it is also conceivable that memory 
processes mediate the link between expectancies and attention. For instance, the current focus 
of attention determines which information is encoded in memory (Craik & Rose, 2012; Fougnie, 
2008). Biased attention toward reward-related stimuli can, therefore, lead to a positivity bias in 
memory. Subsequently, expectancies about the future are too optimistic, as future expectancies 
derive at least partly from biased past experience (Metcalfe, 1998; Roy et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
memory bias can also mediate how expectancies influence attention. In this scenario, biased 
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expectancies activate corresponding working memory content in the form of an a priori map or a 
mental template. This template then drives attention toward rewarding stimuli in a top-down 
manner (Kress et al., 2018; for related ideas in the negative domain and corresponding studies, 
see Aue et al., 2013a, 2016). Empirical evidence for such mediating mechanisms of memory 
content regarding the link between attention and optimism can explain further details about 
multifaceted cognitive bias interactions and contribute to a more nuanced view on how exactly 
these interactions are related to emotion regulation and mental health. 
Further information regarding the determining mechanisms in these bias interactions can 
be gained from studying the neural correlates of the different biases. Critical brain structures 
underlying emotional memories usually consist of the amygdala (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998), 
the insula (Hamann, 2001), and the septo-hippocampal system (McNaughton & Corr, 2004), as 
well as prefrontal cortex regions such as the vmPFC (Dolcos, Denkova, & Dolcos, 2012; Phelps, 
Delgado, Nearing, & LeDoux, 2004). The amygdala, the ACC – an area often coactivated with the 
insula (Menon & Uddin, 2010) – and the prefrontal cortex areas have also been involved in 
optimism bias (Sharot et al., 2007, 2011) and attention bias (Mohanty et al., 2008; Naghavi & 
Nyberg, 2005). This points to similar neural networks at the basis of the different cognitive biases 
and therefore further supports the idea of intimately intertwined processes. Consequently, 
studying the neurophysiological nature of a link between all three biases is of high interest.  
One promising approach for uncovering the neurophysiological nature of multiple bias 
interactions has been provided by Soto and colleagues (2008). They suggest that neurons in the 
prefrontal and more posterior brain regions are active when certain stimuli are held in working 
memory. Such neural activation has been proposed to drive attention in a top-down manner. 
According to these authors, "the sustained enhancement of cells tuned to particular features 
might provide the neural correlate of expectancies that influence subsequent selection, leading 
to enhanced responding when the item in memory is represented in a search display" (p. 346). 
This is one possible neural mechanism that explains the threefold link between biased 
expectancies, memory, and attention. However, Soto and colleagues (2008) do not explicitly refer 
to optimism bias, which is why further research is still needed. Together, the theoretical 
considerations outlined in this section strongly call for an integrated view of overlapping processes 
related to memory, attention, and expectancies. Revealing the underlying neural mechanisms of 
optimism-attention-memory interplay can stimulate hypotheses for future neurocognitive 
research (e.g., regarding functional and structural connectivity among specific brain areas) and 
has the potential to improve current psychopharmacological treatment options (Fossati, 2008). 
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6 Concluding remarks and future directions 
Optimism bias represents a – usually – highly beneficial cognitive phenomenon that not only is 
associated with mental and physical health (Hevey et al., 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 
2014) but that also has a high impact on our society. However, in order to identify the mechanisms 
underlying optimism bias, it is important for other cognitive biases and their neural correlates to 
be taken into account. Studying different cognitive biases in an integrated approach helps us 
understand causalities and connections that are still unclear and thereby contributes to a more 
advanced view of each bias, improves theoretical models, and provides help for clinical practice. 
One promising approach is to investigate the link between optimism and attention bias. The 
outlined framework of bi-directional interplay between optimism and attention bias can be used 
to (a) understand prior and future research, (b) guide future work in the field by emphasizing 
methodological advice for and specific hypotheses to be tested in future empirical research, and 
(c) outline a number of open questions that might lead to further refinement of the current 
framework.  
Regarding improved understanding of prior and future research, our theoretical 
framework implies that isolated studies that examine cognitive biases, especially optimism bias 
and attention bias, should be evaluated with caution. Attention processes can be present but not 
detected in studies on optimism and vice versa. For instance, taking attention bias into account 
can extend, alter, or explain past findings on optimism bias (e.g., updating asymmetry in optimism 
bias being shown because of biased attention processes; see Kress et al., 2018). Moreover, the 
current framework calls for caution in interpreting neuroscientific findings on optimism and 
attention bias in isolation. We have shown that neural correlates of optimism and attention bias 
widely overlap and can therefore be attributed to either of the two biases or their interplay. This 
aspect is thus evidently of great importance for the interpretation of existing data in terms of 
specific study questions. 
In order to distinguish biased expectancy and attention processes and to ensure that 
reliable conclusions can be drawn from studies on interacting cognitive biases, the current 
framework calls for fundamental methodological changes to guide future research in the field. To 
date, correlational methods are often used to examine associations between optimism and 
attention bias. However, additional consideration of causality is imperative in order to identify the 
cognitive processes underlying optimism bias and should thus be emphasized. Causal relations 
can be examined by manipulating one of the biases and measuring its effect on the other, just as 
was done in the study of Peters and colleagues (2015). Such causal influences should be 
investigated in both possible directions (i.e., optimism bias on attention bias and attention bias 
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on optimism bias). The first evidence from our laboratory suggests that manipulated optimistic 
and pessimistic expectancies alter attention to rewarding and punishing stimuli. More important, 
optimistic expectancies repeatedly had a stronger effect on attention deployment than 
pessimistic expectancies did, thereby emphasizing the powerful effects of optimism on other 
types of information processing (Kress et al., 2018). Whether causal influences of attention on 
optimism bias, as suggested by our framework, exist in a similar manner is yet to be investigated 
in empirical studies.  
By additionally proposing a network of brain areas serving as the underlying neural 
correlate of cognitive bias interplay, our framework helps generate specific hypotheses to be 
tested in future empirical research. The suggested network includes the amygdala, which 
generates emotions, on the one hand, and the fronto-parietal and cingulate cortices, which are 
involved in emotion regulation and attentional control, on the other. Different mechanisms 
regarding the relationship between optimism and attention bias are conceivable, but there are 
most likely bi-directional influences. For instance, wanting can lead visual attention to rewarding 
stimuli driven by the PPC and PCC and can strengthen optimism regarding goal achievement. We 
also postulate that wanting can directly shape optimism bias, which then exerts top-down 
influences (ACC, OFC, and vmPFC) on visual attention and activity in the visual cortex.  
Both of these mechanisms of neural communication are driven by goal-directed behavior 
toward reward (Bateson, 2016; Small et al., 2005), a central underlying motivational factor for 
optimism and attention bias that we emphasize in our framework. It is for this reason that we 
have specifically focused on reward-related attention processes. In this regard, the dominant role 
of neurotransmitters, especially dopamine, in reward processing (Berridge & Robinson, 1998) has 
to be investigated because this has been shown to have important implications in both optimism 
and attention bias (Field & Cox, 2008; Franken, 2003; Sharot et al., 2012a) and could reveal crucial 
information about the neural mechanisms underlying their interplay (e.g., concerning the 
question of whether administration of L-DOPA enhances not only optimism bias, but also its 
interplay with attention bias; Sharot et al., 2012a). Moreover, even though we propose a pivotal 
role for reward as a motivational factor in our framework, future theoretical and empirical 
investigation should determine whether optimism-attention interplay extends to non-reward-
related forms of positive attention bias, such as biased attention to stimuli, which have a positive 
value but no direct relevance for the observer (e.g., pictures displaying sport scenes; Pool et al., 
2016a; see Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012, and Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010, for meta-analyses 
on this broader view of positive attention bias).   
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The proposed framework can still be extended in different directions. Therefore, we 
discuss a number of open questions to be answered by future theoretical and empirical work in 
the remainder of this section. According to a recent taxonomy by Chun and colleagues (2011), 
attention processes can be classified as internal or external (internal attention refers to internal 
cognitive representations, whereas external attention refers to the external, perceptual world). 
Within these two areas, one can further distinguish between selection, modulation, and vigilance. 
Because of limited processing capacity, people need to select which information they attend to 
from numerous competing stimuli. After a piece of information is selected from these competing 
options, attention modulation refers to how this selected piece is processed (influencing 
subsequent behavior and memory). Whereas modulation refers to the current, immediate effects 
on attention processing, vigilance refers to the ability to sustain attention over time (Chun, 
Golomb, & Turk-Brown, 2011). Future research on the interplay of optimism and attention bias 
should take these different processes into account to shed further light on the question of 
whether particular attention processes are differently influenced by, or can differently influence, 
optimism bias. It will be an important benefit to the literature if prospective empirical research in 
the field of interacting cognitive biases distinguishes between the different aspects of attention 
represented in selection, modulation, and vigilance. 
In a similar vein, the proposed framework may need to be adapted to specific forms of 
optimism bias (e.g., unrealistic optimism, wishful thinking; see section 2) that, in the present 
article – because of limited numbers of studies in any area – were pooled together under the 
broad term optimism bias. Findings on the interplay between optimism bias and attention and 
memory processes could differ if one differentiates between subconcepts of optimism bias 
instead of working with a possibly multifaceted concept, as we did in the current framework.  
Likewise, it will be interesting to further study whether a possible link between attention, 
expectancy, and memory biases applies equally to optimism and pessimism. It is assumed that, 
because of its adaptive and beneficial use in human life, optimism bias is a unique cognitive bias 
(support for this is provided by Kress et al., 2018). Thus, the processes underlying pessimism can 
indeed be different. However, one problem in examining pessimism is that it is often defined as 
the opposite of optimism. It can sometimes even be assessed on the same scales as optimism, 
which then automatically leads to the detection of comparable mechanisms (Mehrabian & 
Ljunggren, 1997; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). Similarly, to distinguish between optimism and 
pessimism, future research needs to determine whether valence-specific biases in attention and 
memory have a differential impact on other cognitive biases (e.g., whether reward-related and 
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punishment-related biases in attention and memory differently influence or are influenced by 
expectancies). 
In addition, as we have emphasized, the role of memory processes in possibly influencing 
attention and optimism bias, or their association, needs to be examined in greater detail. This is 
because forming biased expectancies about the future has been suggested to be based on biased 
memories, which also appear to be related to biased attention (see section 5 for additionally 
proposed causal influences between the three biases). Moreover, interpretation bias is another 
phenomenon that is possibly linked to the cognitive biases mentioned earlier, which calls for the 
need to extend our framework to include even more cognitive biases. For example, it has been 
shown that imagery of positive events could lead to a positive interpretation bias (Holmes, Lang, 
& Shah, 2009; Pictet, Coughtrey, Mathews, & Holmes, 2011; Torkan et al., 2014) and that 
interpretation bias modification training affects memory (Tran et al., 2011). However, 
interpretation biases toward positive information in general and their neural correlates have been 
examined to a much lesser extent than have memory biases; hence, this is the reason that we 
focused on optimism, attention, and memory.  
Furthermore, when investigating the threefold relationship between optimism, attention, 
and memory bias, one also has to be aware that on the one hand, different changes in one bias 
might lead to the same outcome in another bias (equifinality), and on the other, the same change 
in one bias in different contexts might lead to different outcomes in another bias (multifinality). 
These concepts of equifinality and multifinality are commonly used in developmental research 
(Cichetti, & Rogosch, 1996) and can well apply to research on multidirectional influences between 
cognitive biases. For instance, it is conceivable that various forms of reward-related biases in 
attention (e.g., during selection, modulation, and vigilance; Chun et al., 2011) and memory (e.g., 
during encoding and retrieval; Everaert et al., 2014; Everaert & Koster, 2015; Fougnie, 2008) can 
result in optimism bias. At the same time, the same single form of reward-related bias in attention 
and memory displayed at different moments in time or in different contexts does not necessarily 
result in a comparable optimism bias. Whether the concept of equifinality and multifinality really 
applies to cognitive bias interplay and which specific (neural) circumstances might lead to equifinal 
and multifinal outcomes in the relation between attention, memory, and optimism bias could be 
the topic of intriguing questions in future neurocognitive research and theoretical considerations.    
Finally, differentially salient situations and stimuli have been suggested to correspond 
with differences in cognitive processing (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Menon & Uddin, 2010). 
Investigations should therefore be made into how a possible link between attention and optimism 
differs when highly salient stimuli are used compared with low salient stimuli. This is particularly 
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interesting for an application in the clinical context. Stimuli that are relevant for biased 
expectancies and attention in clinical settings (e.g., cigarettes or drugs) are often highly salient for 
the person concerned, whereas stimuli frequently used in attention tasks in nonclinical settings 
(e.g., colored letters or graphical objects) are of comparatively low personal saliency even if they 
are associated with small monetary incentives. However, how stimulus saliency affects the link 
between attention and optimism is also relevant in everyday life. For instance, companies should 
use highly salient stimuli when advertising their products to increase people’s attention, hence 
making potential customers more optimistic about the benefits of their products.   
In summary, positivity biases in the past, present, and future – i.e. memories, attention, 
and expectancies – share specific characteristics. They are important for goal-directed behavior 
and related to well-being and health. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that these biases are 
intimately intertwined and interact or mutually influence each other. Notably, because the 
simultaneous consideration of different biases has very much advanced research, insights, and 
therapeutic interventions in the negative domain (e.g., regarding anxiety disorders), a combined 
cognitive biases approach cannot be ignored by researchers when examining optimism bias. 
Determining exactly how reward-related cognitive biases interact will have a large impact on 
theoretical considerations as well as on practical applications. For instance, solving the question 
of whether the relation between these biases has a specific direction or acts bi-directionally will 
reveal important mechanisms for the prevention of psychopathology. Moreover, a more profound 
understanding of the interactive nature of cognitive biases and their neural determinants not only 
will help explain how psychological disorders such as depression, addiction, and mania are 
developed and maintained, but will also reveal possible mechanisms to be targeted in 
psychotherapy. 
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Chapter 3 
Seeing Through Rose-Colored Glasses: How Optimistic 
Expectancies Guide Visual Attention 
 
Laura Kress, Mirko Bristle, and Tatjana Aue 
Abstract 
 
Optimism bias and positive attention bias have important highly similar implications for mental 
health but have only been examined in isolation. Investigating the causal relationships between 
these biases can improve the understanding of their underlying cognitive mechanisms, leading to 
new directions in neurocognitive research and revealing important information about normal 
functioning as well as the development, maintenance, and treatment of psychological diseases. In 
the current project, we hypothesized that optimistic expectancies can exert causal influences on 
attention deployment. To test this causal relation, we conducted two experiments in which we 
manipulated optimistic and pessimistic expectancies regarding future rewards and punishments. 
In a subsequent visual search task, we examined participants’ attention to positive (i.e., 
rewarding) and negative (i.e., punishing) target stimuli, measuring their eye gaze behavior and 
reaction times. In both experiments, participants’ attention was guided toward reward compared 
with punishment when optimistic expectancies were induced. Additionally, in Experiment 2, 
participants’ attention was guided toward punishment compared with reward when pessimistic 
expectancies were induced. However, the effect of optimistic (rather than pessimistic) 
expectancies on attention deployment was stronger. A key characteristic of optimism bias is that 
people selectively update expectancies in an optimistic direction, not in a pessimistic direction, 
when receiving feedback. As revealed in our studies, selective attention to rewarding versus 
punishing evidence when people are optimistic might explain this updating asymmetry. Thus, the 
current data can help clarify why optimistic expectancies are difficult to overcome. Our findings 
elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underlying optimism and attention bias, which can yield a 
better understanding of their benefits for mental health.2 
                                                          
This chapter has been published as: Kress, L., Bristle, M., & Aue, T. (2018). Seeing through rose-colored 
glasses: How optimistic expectancies guide visual attention. PLoS ONE, 13(2), e0193311. 
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Introduction 
Charlie Chaplin once said that “you’ll never see a rainbow, if you’re looking down”. His famous 
saying implies that we do not notice the good things around us with a pessimistic attitude. Is that 
true? Does being optimistic or pessimistic influence which parts of our environment we pay 
attention to? To answer this question, we focus on the interplay between two important cognitive 
phenomena displayed by humans: optimism bias and positive attention bias. 
Research has shown that approximately 80 % of humans overestimate the likelihood of 
positive events and underestimate the likelihood of negative events in their future – a 
phenomenon called optimism bias (Sharot, 2011; Weinstein, 1980). In contrast to healthy people, 
who tend to be overly optimistic, patients suffering from depression do not display an optimism 
bias and are rather realistic about their future (Korn et al., 2014). Therefore, optimism bias is 
broadly viewed as a necessary psychological adaptation that promotes mental health (Garrett et 
al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014) and ensures motivation for goal-directed behavior (Armor & Taylor, 
1998; Shepperd et al., 2015). However, being too optimistic can also have dramatic negative 
consequences and might lead to criminal or addictive behavior, especially when people 
underestimate the negative consequences of committing a crime or consuming drugs (Dillard et 
al., 2009; Weinstein et al., 2005).  
Notably, optimism bias is displayed even considering contradictory information (Sharot et 
al., 2011). People find it more difficult to adapt their expectancies regarding important future life 
events when they receive feedback that is worse than expected (bad news such as that the 
average likelihood to incur serious health problems is higher than the individual had initially 
predicted for herself) than when it is better than expected (good news such as that the average 
likelihood to incur serious health problems is lower than the individual had initially predicted for 
herself; Sharot et al., 2011). Such selective updating could explain why optimistic outlooks are 
maintained over time and shows that optimism-related processing in healthy individuals is distinct 
from other forms of future expectancies (i.e., pessimism) in terms of robustness.  
Although selective updating has been proposed to maintain optimism bias, the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying optimism bias and its pervasiveness – even in light of existing 
contradictory information – are still unclear. We know that optimism bias exists but we do not 
know precisely why it exists and how it is maintained. Here, we suggest that investigation of the 
interactions between different types of cognitive biases can provide information about these 
mechanisms. We argue that examining optimistic expectancies in relation to attention 
deployment could yield a better understanding of optimism bias and its benefits in everyday life 
as in the clinical domain.  
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Our postulate that biased expectancies and attention deployment are interdependent is 
based on two points; the first is observational and the second is theoretical in nature. First, a 
positivity bias not only exists in regard to future expectancies (as in optimism bias) but also in 
regard to visual attention: Positive and rewarding stimuli attract people´s visual attention more 
than neutral (and sometimes negative) stimuli do (Becker, Anderson, Mortensen, Neufeld, & Neel, 
2011; Pool et al., 2016a). This has been shown by more rapid reaction times (RTs) and captured 
eye movements to rewarding than neutral information in different attention paradigms. Happy 
faces, for instance, have been proposed to "pop out" of crowds in visual search tasks (Becker et 
al., 2011). Moreover, positive attention bias, comparable to optimism bias, has been 
demonstrated to hold important implications for mental health (Everaert et al., 2012).  
Preferably attending to positive rather than neutral stimuli enables people to efficiently 
detect events in an environment in which several stimuli compete for access to their limited 
attention resources. If people´s attention is biased toward positive stimuli in their environment, 
they are more likely to perceive chances to maximize beneficial output. From an evolutionary 
point of view, this could contribute to fitness for survival (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Schultz, 
2004). However, how biased expectancies relate to biased attention (e.g., whether expectancies 
modulate biased attention or vice versa) has not been investigated. The discovery of interactions 
between the two biases under investigation would yield a better understanding of optimism bias 
and positive attention bias. 
Second, according to the combined cognitive biases hypothesis, negative cognitive biases 
(e.g., in attention, interpretation, and self-imagery) usually interact and mutually enforce each 
other (Hirsch et al., 2006; see Everaert et al., 2012 for considerations on the combined cognitive 
biases hypothesis in depression, and Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015 for the interplay of expectancies 
and attention in anxiety). This theory mainly focuses on associations between negative biases. 
Recently, similar interactions between different cognitive biases have been proposed in the 
positive domain (Kress & Aue, 2017). Revealing such causal relations between cognitive biases in 
the positive domain allows for investigation of why positive cognitive biases exist and how they 
are maintained over time. These investigations broaden our knowledge about normal functioning 
and the development of psychological disorders as well as their treatment and uncover 
divergences and commonalities between cognitive bias interactions in health and 
psychopathology. 
Investigating the relation between optimism bias and positive attention bias is especially 
interesting because causal influences of optimistic expectancies on attention can elucidate how 
certain stimuli are processed when people are optimistic (e.g., concerning their processing depth). 
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For instance, optimism-driven attention deployment could directly explain important phenomena 
shown in optimism bias such as the selective updating described above (Sharot et al., 2011). This 
selective updating could be caused by optimistic expectancies shifting attention to rewarding (i.e., 
good news) rather than punishing (i.e., bad news) evidence, thereby determining the processing 
depth of the respective evidence. This should have retroactive, stabilizing effects on the initial 
optimism displayed. For example, it is conceivable that people displaying optimism bias might be 
particularly attentive when being told that their likelihood to incur a serious health problem is 
lower than they had initially predicted (good news) whereas they are less attentive when being 
told that their likelihood to incur a serious health problem is higher than they initially predicted 
(bad news). This will lead to a deeper processing of the good news (e.g., by further thinking about 
the new information). Consequently, people could selectively integrate good news when updating 
their expectancies and neglect bad news. Asymmetric attention deployment to good vs. bad news 
following optimistic expectancies would thus have significant feedback effects on these initial 
expectancies, thereby stabilizing optimistic tendencies in the long run.  
If one assumes that the processing depth of rewarding or punishing stimuli can be 
influenced by optimistic expectancies, it is especially important to distinguish between various 
stages of attention deployment (e.g., initial orientation and maintenance of attention) and 
determine at which stage such differential processing takes place. The use of eye tracking allows 
for such a distinction (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012) and could therefore reveal insights into the 
concrete attentional mechanisms that are crucial for selective updating processes in optimism 
bias. For instance, one could imagine that, when being optimistic, people initially orient their 
attention (primarily an automatic process) toward both good and bad news but later maintain 
attention (primarily a controlled process) selectively on good news (see Caseras, Garner, Bradley, 
& Mogg, 2007 for differences in attention orientation and maintenance on emotional stimuli 
shown by dysphoric participants). Such a finding would have crucial implications for a more 
profound understanding of the concrete nature of biased expectancy-attention interplay in 
healthy individuals and may fundamentally inspire psychotherapy. For instance, it could uncover 
the specific mechanisms to be targeted in depressive patients, who do not show a beneficial 
updating asymmetry (Korn et al., 2014).  
There is no substantial empirical evidence for a causal link between biased optimistic 
expectancies and attention. However, examples in the literature show that expectancies can guide 
visual spatial attention in the positive domain (Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Mohanty et al., 2008; M. 
Williams et al., 2005). Spatial attention could be influenced by expectancy cues when using 
motivationally relevant (rewarding) target pictures in a covered attention shift paradigm 
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(Mohanty et al., 2008). Participants reacted faster to cued food targets when they were 
motivationally relevant (i.e., when participants were hungry compared with when they were full). 
The same effect was not present for motivationally irrelevant tool targets. Other findings suggest 
that attention to happy faces can be modulated in a top-down manner through instructions that 
presumably impact expectancies (Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; M. Williams et al., 2005; see Aue et al., 
2013a, 2016, and Burra & Kerzel, 2013 for similar effects with neutral stimuli). These findings are 
in line with predictive coding theory (C. Summerfield et al., 2006; Zelano et al., 2011), which states 
that expectancies allow people to create a mental template of expected information that is then 
compared with sensory input. During this comparison, attention might be biased to information 
that fits with the created template. However, it is important to note that the respective 
expectancies in the abovementioned studies (Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Mohanty et al., 2008; M. 
Williams et al., 2005) were unrelated to optimism and pessimism (e.g., because participants were 
explicitly instructed to search for a happy or sad face; Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; M. Williams et al., 
2005). 
 Even though there are no studies directly linking optimism bias and positive attention bias, 
a few studies examine the link between trait optimism (typically assessed with the Life Orientation 
Test (LOT-R; Scheier et al., 1994) or similar personality scales) and attention deployment. Whereas 
trait optimism describes a stable disposition of having an optimistic yet not necessarily unrealistic 
life orientation, optimism bias describes unrealistic expectancies regarding specific future 
situations that can be manifold (e.g., concerning health, relationships, and wealth). Although trait 
optimism and optimism bias are different constructs, trait optimism might increase an individual’s 
readiness to demonstrate optimism bias in specific circumscribed situations (Armor & Taylor, 
1998; Sharot, 2011). Notably, trait optimism has been related to an attention bias toward positive 
and away from negative stimuli, shown by altered reaction times in a Stroop paradigm 
(Karademas, Kafetsios, & Sideridis, 2007; Segerstrom, 2001) and biased eye movements 
(Isaacowitz, 2005; Peters et al., 2015). Unfortunately, all reviewed results on the link between trait 
optimism and attention are of correlational nature and thus do not provide information on causal 
relationships.  
To our knowledge, only one study attempted to manipulate participants’ optimistic 
expectancies experimentally and provide information about the direction of influence between 
optimism and attention. Peters and colleagues (2015) induced state optimism, measured by the 
Future Expectancies Scale, in half of their participants using the Best Possible Self (BPS) 
manipulation. During this BPS manipulation, participants imagined a future life in which 
everything had gone well while the other half of the participants underwent a neutral control 
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manipulation. Next, both groups performed a passive viewing task in which their attention 
deployment was assessed. Although optimism manipulation did not influence gazing behavior in 
general, post-hoc analyses showed that, in contrast to non-responders, participants whose state 
optimism increased after the state optimism or control manipulation gazed significantly shorter 
at angry faces and nearly significantly longer at joyful faces than participants whose state 
optimism did not increase (Peters et al., 2015). These data indicate that state optimism, which 
most likely instigates optimism bias, might bias attention deployment toward positive and away 
from negative stimuli. However, additional research is needed to substantiate such a causal 
association. 
It is generally difficult to directly manipulate optimism bias because (a) it is unclear how 
to reliably provoke such a bias across individuals and situations because it depends on a 
combination of many different aspects (some of which are impossible to manipulate, e.g., 
personal experience, individual preferences; Weinstein, 1980); (b) a bias is always relative to some 
other measure (e.g., overly optimistic expectancies in comparison with other people or reality), 
which makes it difficult to be evoked and measured; and (c) some types of manipulations may rely 
on simultaneous control of expectancies and attention. Thus, research on optimism bias and other 
cognitive biases has mostly been of a correlational nature. A first step toward demonstrating that 
optimism bias and positive attention bias are causally associated may be to demonstrate that 
optimistic expectancies (which are not necessarily biased) influence attention deployment and/or 
vice versa (Peters et al., 2015).  
In the current studies, therefore, we manipulated optimistic and pessimistic expectancies 
that are present in optimism bias (Bateson, 2016) (instead of operationalizing optimism bias per 
se) and investigated their respective causal influences on attention deployment. If the findings 
show that variations in experimentally induced expectancies successfully generate changes in 
visual attention, it may be assumed that biases in expectancies can generate biases in attention. 
In our studies, expectancies were manipulated by verbal cues presented prior to a visual search 
task (see Aue et al., 2013a, 2016 for studies using a similar paradigm with neutral and threatening 
stimuli). During the presentation of expectancy cues, the change in participants’ pupil diameter 
(measure of autonomic arousal; M. Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008) was measured to 
demonstrate that cues elicited an affective response that can be attributed to optimistic and 
pessimistic expectancies. During the visual search task, two different components of attention 
were measured. First, attention orientation was measured by (a) RTs in the visual search task and 
(b) time to first hit on a target revealed by eye tracking data (i.e., the moment when the 
participant’s gaze was registered to be first on the target). These measures of attention 
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orientation were intended to investigate more automatic effects of optimistic expectancies on 
attention deployment. Second, attention maintenance during the visual search task was 
measured by how long participants looked at a target half a second after the first hit. Attention 
maintenance reveals information on how deeply stimuli signaling reward and punishment were 
processed following optimistic expectancies (Carretie, Martin-Loeches, Hinojosa, & Mercado, 
2001; Craik, 2002) and can provide information on more controlled attention processes that 
explain the selective updating shown in optimism bias. We chose to acquire eye tracking in 
addition to RTs as it represents a more direct measure of attention and can reveal effects that are 
not visible in RT data (Fashler & Katz, 2014). Moreover, we measured participants’ self-reported 
comparative optimism bias (Weinstein, 1980) to determine how individual differences in self-
reported optimism bias are related to optimism-induced attentional biases revealed by our 
experiments. 
We conducted two experiments using different stimuli (Experiment 1: happy, sad, and 
neutral faces and Experiment 2: letters of different colors) in the respective visual search tasks. 
The letter experiment was conducted in addition to the first experiment because the happy and 
sad faces themselves contain fixed valences. In the second experiment, valence was assigned by 
verbal instructions to neutral letter stimuli and "reward" and "punishment" connotations for the 
different stimuli were balanced across participants to avoid rigid stimulus-valence associations.  
The aim of the present studies was to determine if experimentally induced optimistic and 
pessimistic expectancies regarding future gains and losses causally impact attention deployment 
to stimuli signaling reward (i.e., gain) and punishment (i.e., loss). For both experiments, we 
hypothesized that (1) gain and loss cues presented during the expectancy phase of the 
experiments elicit an affective response that can be attributed to optimism and pessimism 
(manipulation check). We hypothesized a larger increase in pupil diameter when participants were 
presented with gain or loss cues than when they were presented with ambiguous cues (control 
condition that should not contain a specific affective dimension). This hypothesis was drawn from 
past research that has shown differential pupil diameter change for gain and loss cues compared 
with neutral cues (Seymour, Daw, Dayan, Singer, & Dolan, 2007).   
Furthermore, we hypothesized that (2) induced optimistic expectancies guide attention 
toward reward compared with punishment whereas pessimistic expectancies guide attention 
toward punishment compared with reward (differences between attention orientation and 
maintenance were examined exploratively as we did not have specific hypotheses). We 
anticipated that (2a) gain cues enhance attention to gain targets in comparison with loss cues, 
(2b) loss cues enhance attention to loss targets in comparison with gain cues (cue congruency 
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hypothesis), (2c) gain cues enhance attention to gain in comparison with loss targets, and (2d) loss 
cues enhance attention to loss in comparison with gain targets (target congruency hypothesis).  
Moreover, we hypothesized that (3) optimistic expectancies guide attention more toward 
reward compared with punishment than pessimistic expectancies guide attention toward 
punishment compared with reward because optimistic expectancies have been shown to be more 
robust (i.e., more resistant against disconfirming feedback) than pessimistic expectancies (Sharot 
et al., 2011; optimism robustness hypothesis). Therefore, even though we hypothesized an 
influence of pessimistic expectancies on attention toward punishment compared with reward, we 
anticipated this influence to be much weaker than the influence of optimistic expectancies on 
attention to reward compared with punishment.  
Last, we hypothesized that (4) this optimism robustness in attention (i.e., stronger 
guidance of attention to reward compared with punishment through optimistic expectancies than 
to punishment compared with reward through pessimistic expectancies) is positively related to 
participants’ self-reported comparative optimism bias (comparative optimism bias hypothesis; 
Weinstein, 1980). 
Experiment 1: Methods and materials 
Participants 
Thirty-two healthy psychology students recruited via the participant pool at the University of Bern 
took part in this RT and eye tracking study. Wearing hard contact lenses or reporting the use of 
psychoactive substances served as exclusion criteria. Participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were reimbursed with course credit and 5 Swiss francs for participation. One 
participant was excluded because of a technical error in data logging, leaving a final sample of 31 
students (4 male, age: M = 21.19 years; SD = 1.60 years; range = 19 – 26 years). All participants 
gave written informed consent according to the ethical standards guidelines of the Declaration of 
Helsinki and were told that they could end the experiment at any time. All procedures were 
approved by the local ethical review board of the Faculty of Human Sciences at the University of 
Bern, Switzerland. 
Stimuli 
Visual search task (attention): Forty-eight face stimuli taken from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set 
(Tottenham, Borscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus, & Nelson, 2002) served as stimuli. Sixteen different 
faces (half male and female) each displayed happy, sad, and neutral facial expressions. In every 
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trial, eight faces were shown on a white background on a circle around the position where the 
fixation cross had been presented before (Figure 3.1, top). The participants’ task was to find the 
deviant (happy or sad) target face among seven neutral distractor faces. Happy and sad faces 
appeared equally probable in any of the eight different locations on the circle and signaled gain 
(i.e., reward) and loss (i.e., punishment) of money, respectively. The stimuli were matched for 
luminance and contrast and displayed in color.  
Cues (expectancy): Three different verbal cues were presented: “gain 90 %”, “loss 90 %”, 
or “gain loss 50 %” (“loss gain 50 %” for half of the participants). These cues indicated the 
probability that the to-be detected target in a subsequently presented search array is a happy or 
sad face. The gain 90 % (loss 90 %) cue condition referred to a probability of 67 % (64 trials) that 
there would be a happy face (sad face) among seven neutral faces in the subsequent search array. 
In the remaining cases, a sad face (happy face) was presented (32 trials). In the 50 % cue condition, 
happy and sad faces were equally likely to be the target in the search array (64 trials, 32 happy 
face targets and 32 sad face targets). This 50 % cue was included as a control condition inducing 
ambiguous expectancies with maximum uncertainty. E-Prime 2.0 Professional (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) was used to present stimuli and record the participants’ responses. 
Experimental procedure 
After providing written informed consent, participants read the instructions in which the 
experiment was described as a gamble task with the opportunity to gain or lose money. They were 
told that they would gain 25 Swiss cents in addition to a starting amount of 5 Swiss francs upon 
seeing a happy face in the visual search array and lose 25 Swiss cents upon seeing a sad face. 
Participants were told that the cues in the beginning of each trial described an average probability 
of a happy or sad face being presented subsequently but the computer randomly picked a target 
out of a pool of 100 targets (for 90 % gain [loss] cues, this pool consisted of 90 happy [sad] and 10 
sad [happy] faces). Therefore, the real probabilities could differ from the average value displayed 
as the expectancy cue. Before starting the experiment, participants performed six practice trials 
to become familiar with the task. 
Figure 3.1 (top) shows the timing and sequence of one example trial. In each trial, 
participants were presented a fixation cross for 2000 - 3000 ms followed by a cue word that was 
presented for 1500 ms. The cue indicated how probable it was that the to-be detected target in 
the subsequently presented search array would be a happy or a sad face (see the preceding 
section for details regarding the expectancy cues). After the cue was presented, another fixation 
cross appeared for 2000 - 3000 ms. The search array consisting of eight pictures (seven neutral 
faces and either a happy [gain] or sad [loss] face) was then shown for 2500 ms. During the visual 
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search task, participants had to indicate whether the target was presented on the left or right side 
of the screen by pressing 1 or 2 on the number pad of the computer keyboard. The participants 
were instructed to react as quickly and correctly as possible. After the detection period had 
elapsed, another fixation cross was presented for 0 - 2000 ms before the next trial. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Task sequence. An example of a gain-90 % cue (Gewinn [German word for gain] 90 %) 
followed by a search array depicting a gain target (happy face [Experiment 1, top] or red T 
[Experiment 2, bottom]). Participants were told that the cues described the likelihood of seeing a 
gain or loss target in the search array. They were also told that they would gain (lose) 25 Swiss 
cents in addition to a starting amount of 5 Swiss francs when seeing a gain (loss) target. 
Participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible according to the target 
(i.e., gain or loss target). Due to the copyright regulations of the NimStim face stimuli (Tottenham 
et al., 2002), faces that were not used in Experiment 1 were displayed for illustration (top) and two 
faces are shown twice although the same face was never repeated in any trial of Experiment 1. 
 
Two hundred forty-four experimental trials were presented in random order in four blocks 
of 61 trials with short pauses in between. The frequencies of trials of different types (cues, targets) 
were comparable between blocks. In total, participants both gained and lost 32 Swiss Francs, 
leaving them with the starting amount of 5 Swiss Francs. Participants were not informed about 
the progression of their gains and losses during the experiment. 
After the experiment, participants completed a post-experimental questionnaire 
consisting of specific questions about how they perceived and conducted the task (e.g., whether 
they had employed a specific strategy during the search task [and if so, which strategy], see 
Analysis S.3.1 for further details). Participants also completed different personality questionnaires 
(LOT-R; Scheier et al., 1994; Comparative Optimism Scale [COS]; Weinstein, 1980; Future 
Expectancy Scale [FEX]; Hanssen, Vancleef, & Peters, submitted; Satisfaction With Life Scale 
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[SWLS]; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Positive And Negative Affect Schedule [PANAS]; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Emotion Regulation Questionnaire [ERQ]; Gross & John, 2003; 
Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System Scales [BIS/BAS]; Carver & White, 
1994; 10-Item Big Five Inventory [BFI–10]; Rammstedt, 2007), were debriefed, and received their 
“gain” of 5 Swiss francs. 
Eye tracking 
Eye tracking data were acquired with a Tobii Pro X2-60 remote eye tracker (Tobii AB, Stockholm, 
Sweden). The system used the corneal reflection light source (corneal reflex method) to measure 
the eye’s orientation. Eye movements were recorded binocularly with a 60 Hz sampling rate and 
an accuracy of .4°. The system was controlled by Tobii Studio (version 3.1.6) to register ocular 
movements. 
Manipulation check 
As a manipulation check, affective arousal during the presentation of expectancy cues was 
measured by the change in participants’ pupil diameter. For pupil diameter analysis, five 0.5-s 
intervals from 0 to 2.5 s after cue onset were considered. Pupil diameter during the 0.5 s before 
the appearance of the cue (presentation of fixation cross) served as baseline. Pupil diameter 
baseline scores were subtracted from the scores during cue presentation to obtain difference 
scores describing changes from the presentation of the different cues. On average, 19 % of pupil 
diameter data per time interval were excluded from the analysis because missing eye gaze data 
made up > 50 % of the samples. Moreover, outliers (deviating more than 3 SDs from the average 
diameter of a given participant during a particular time interval) were eliminated (on average, 
0.8 % of the remaining pupil diameter data per time interval). 
Dependent variables 
One dependent variable that measured attention orientation during the visual search task 
consisted of participants’ RTs for correct responses (in ms); errors comprised ~ 5.5 % of responses. 
The dependent eye tracking variables during the visual search task consisted of two components: 
attention orientation was measured by the time to first hit on the target (in ms; note that it was 
possible to detect the target in the visual search task without performing a saccade, which is why 
we cannot rule out effects of covert attention that might have interfered with this measure of 
attention orientation; however, this should only have weakened the effects of interest in our 
study) and attention maintenance was measured by the percentage of gazing at the target half a 
second after the first hit (in % of overall looking at the screen). Hits were defined as gaze points 
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on the area of interest, which consisted of the target picture and 10 % of the picture size added 
to each side. The employed measures and time intervals are commonly used in eye tracking 
research (Palanica & Itier, 2011; Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & Muhlberger, 2009). Trials in 
which participants did not gaze at the target at all were excluded from eye tracking analyses (an 
additional ~ 4.6 % of all trials). Peripheral attention to target stimuli possibly led to these trials in 
which participants responded correctly even though they did not hit the target. For the percentage 
of gaze analysis, ~ 7.4 % of all trials were additionally excluded because participants did not hit 
the target within the first 2000 ms of the presentation of the visual search task (and therefore the 
time spanning half a second after first hit would have exceeded the presentation of stimuli). In 
addition, ~ 2.2 % of all trials were excluded due to missing eye gaze data of greater than 40 % of 
the sample (mostly due to eye blinks).   
Data analysis 
We hypothesized that (1) gain and loss cues elicit a stronger affective response, demonstrated by 
a larger increase in pupil diameter, than do ambiguous cues that serve as a control cue and should 
not contain a specific affective dimension (manipulation check). To test this hypothesis, we 
conducted a 3 × 5 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the within-subject factors expectancy (gain 
cue [gain 90 %], loss cue [loss 90 %], ambiguous cue [gain loss 50 %/loss gain 50 %]) and time (0-
0.5 s, 0.5-1 s, 1-1.5 s, 1.5-2 s, 2-2.5 s) on the pupil diameter change data. Our hypothesis should 
be reflected in a significant main effect of expectancy cue, as well as in a significant expectancy 
cue × time interaction. Significant main effects of expectancy cue and significant interactions of 
expectancy cue and time were further investigated by post-hoc pairwise comparisons.  
Moreover, we hypothesized that (2a) gain cues, rather than loss cues, enhance attention 
to gain targets and (2b) loss cues, rather than gain cues, enhance attention to loss targets (cue 
congruency hypothesis). In addition, we predicted that (2c) gain cues enhance attention to gain 
targets rather than loss targets and (2d) loss cues enhance attention to loss targets rather than 
gain targets (target congruency hypothesis). To test these hypotheses, we conducted a 3 × 2 
ANOVA with the within-subject factors expectancy (gain cue [gain 90 %], loss cue [loss 90 %], 
ambiguous cue [gain loss 50 %/loss gain 50 %]), and target (gain, loss) on RTs, the time to first hit 
on the target (attention orientation), and percentage of gazing at the target half a second after 
the first hit (attention maintenance). We also performed analyses on logarithmic RTs and excluded 
outliers (± 3 SDs from individual average RT). However, the effects observed in the current study 
were not affected by these data transformations. Therefore, only the results for the original RT 
data are described. Ambiguous cues that served as a control condition with maximum uncertainty 
in our experiment were included as an anchor in the analyses. If true, our hypotheses should be 
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reflected in a significant interaction of the expectancy cue and target. Significant interaction 
effects were further investigated by post-hoc (Sidak corrected) pairwise comparisons. An α-level 
of .05 (two-tailed) was applied to all analyses (unless otherwise specified). Reported effect sizes 
are partial η2 and noted as η2p. If the sphericity assumption was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected values are reported.  
Furthermore, we hypothesized that (3) optimistic expectancies guide attention more 
toward gain targets compared with loss targets than pessimistic expectancies guide attention 
toward loss targets compared with gain targets (optimism robustness hypothesis). Therefore, two 
difference scores between four of our experimental conditions were computed: DiffGainCue = [Gain cue, loss target] – [Gain cue, gain target] DiffLossCue = [Loss cue, gain target] – [Loss cue, loss target] 
We anticipated larger difference scores for optimistic expectancies than for pessimistic 
expectancies (DiffGainCue > DiffLossCue) for the RTs and the time to first hit (attention 
orientation). We anticipated smaller difference scores for optimistic expectancies than for 
pessimistic expectancies (DiffGainCue < DiffLossCue) for the percentage of looking at the target 
half a second after the first hit (attention maintenance). The last measure was expected to show 
negative difference scores because it was inverted to the RTs and time to first hit (i.e., enhanced 
attention results in shorter RTs and time to first hit but a larger percentage of looking at the target 
half a second after the first hit). To test the optimism robustness hypothesis, DiffGainCue and 
DiffLossCue were compared using pairwise t-tests with an α-level of .05 (one-tailed). The reported 
effect sizes are Cohen’s d and are denoted by d.   
Last, we hypothesized that (4) optimism robustness scores in our experiment are 
positively associated with participants’ self-reported comparative optimism bias (cf. comparative 
optimism bias hypothesis). Comparative optimism bias was operationalized as overly optimistic 
expectancies about future life events for oneself compared with a person of the same age and 
gender measured by the COS (Weinstein, 1980). Optimism robustness scores were computed with 
the following formula for the three attention measures (RTs, time to first hit, percentage of looking 
at target half a second after first hit): Optimism Robustness Score = DiffGainCue – DiffLossCue 
Because a large sample is needed to investigate inter-individual differences, we merged 
participants in the two studies (N = 63). A Pearson product-moment correlation was run to 
determine the relationship between participants’ mean score on the COS (Weinstein, 1980) and 
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the optimism robustness score for each of the three measures of attention as revealed by our 
experiments. The α-level was set to .05 (one-tailed). 
Experiment 1: Results  
The results of our experiments are reported in two sections – one devoted to analyses of the 
expectancy phase of our experiment (manipulation check: pupil diameter change) and another to 
analyses of the visual search phase (RTs, time to first hit the target and percentage of gazing at 
the target half a second after first hit revealed by eye tracking, and relation to comparative 
optimism bias). The mean values, standard errors and 95 % confidence intervals for all 
experimental conditions from the described analyses are shown in Tables S.3.1 and S.3.2. The 
difference scores related to the optimism robustness hypothesis are given in Table S.3.3. F-values 
and effect sizes are only reported for significant results of the ANOVAs. Statistical values for all 
effects (including non-significant results) can be found in Tables S.3.4 and S.3.5. P-values for all 
post-hoc pairwise comparisons can be found in Tables S.3.6 and S.3.7. 
Expectancy Phase 
Pupil diameter change 
Pupil diameter change during the presentation of expectancy cues is shown in Figure 3.2a. 
As predicted, the main effect of expectancy cue was significant, F(1.44) = 11.854, p < .001, η2p = .283. 
Gain and loss cues elicited a smaller decrease in pupil diameter than did ambiguous cues (gain vs. 
ambiguous cues: p = .001, loss vs. ambiguous cues: p = .007, as revealed by post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons). In addition, there was a significant main effect of time, F(2.50) = 4.098, p = .029, 
η2p = .120. Moreover, the predicted interaction expectancy × time was significant, F(5.148) = 9.052, 
p < .001, η2p = .232. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the differential effect of 
expectancy condition on pupil diameter change started between 0.5 and 1 s following the onset 
of the expectancy cues and remained stable until the end of the analysis interval. The pupil 
diameter increase was larger and the decrease was smaller for gain and loss cues than for 
ambiguous cues (0.5-1 s, 1-1.5 s, 1.5-2 s, 2-2.5 s: gain vs. ambiguous cues: ps = .005, < .001, = .002, 
= .004, respectively; loss vs. ambiguous cues: ps = .001, .001, .057, .072, respectively, as revealed 
by post-hoc pairwise comparisons).  
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Figure 3.2. Pupil diameter change during the expectancy phase as a function of time and 
expectancy cue. Gain cue, loss cue, and ambiguous cue refer to the gain 90 %, loss 90 %, and gain 
loss [loss gain] 50 % cues, respectively. The error bars depict standard errors. 
 
Visual Search Phase 
Reaction times 
The RTs are shown in Figure 3.3a. The RTs did not differ between gain and loss targets or between 
the three expectancy conditions, ps > .08. Notably, the predicted expectancy × target interaction 
was significant, F(2.60) = 8.324, p = .001, η2p = .217. As anticipated by our cue congruency 
hypothesis, participants reacted faster to loss targets when they expected to lose than when they 
expected to gain or had ambiguous expectancies (i.e., when neither optimistic nor pessimistic 
expectancies dominated; loss vs. gain cues: p = .001, loss vs. ambiguous cues: p = .041, as revealed 
by post-hoc pairwise comparisons). In line with our target congruency hypothesis, participants 
reacted faster to gain targets than to loss targets when they expected to gain (p = .001). 
Participants’ RTs did not differ significantly between any of the remaining conditions (all 
ps > .093). The optimism robustness hypothesis had to be rejected: Expecting to gain did not 
shorten RTs to gain targets compared with loss targets more than expecting to lose shortened RTs 
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to loss targets compared with gain targets, even though there was a trend in the anticipated 
direction, t(30) = 1.602, p = .060, d = .381. 
 
Figure 3.3. Reaction times. The error bars depict standard errors. The line labeled “all other 
conditions” indicates that all pairwise comparisons of the conditions encompassed by the line 
revealed highly significant differences (if not otherwise indicated). 
 
Eye tracking: Time to first hit the target 
The time to first hit the target for the experimental conditions is shown in Figure 3.4a. The time 
to the first hit did not differ between gain and loss targets or between the three expectancy 
conditions, ps > .180. Contrary to our cue and target congruency hypotheses, the 
expectancy × target interaction was not significant, p = .849. Moreover, the optimism robustness 
hypothesis had to be rejected: Expecting to gain did not reduce the time to first hit gain targets 
compared with loss targets more than expecting to lose reduced the time to first hit loss targets 
compared with gain targets (p = .327). 
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Figure 3.4. Time to first hit. The error bars depict standard errors. The line labeled “all other 
conditions” indicates that all pairwise comparisons of the conditions encompassed by the line 
revealed highly significant differences (if not otherwise indicated). 
 
Eye tracking: Percentage of gazing at the target half a second after the first hit 
Figure 3.5a depicts the amount of time (in %) participants spent gazing at the target half a second 
after the first hit. Where participants gazed in this time span did not differ between gain and loss 
targets or between the three expectancy conditions, ps > .155. However, the predicted 
expectancy × target interaction was significant, F(2.50) = 7.482, p = .002, η2p = .200. In line with our 
cue congruency hypothesis, participants gazed more at gain targets within half a second after the 
first hit when they expected to gain than when they expected to lose (p = .009, as revealed by 
post-hoc pairwise comparisons). In line with our target congruency hypothesis, when participants 
expected to gain, they subsequently gazed longer at gain targets than at loss targets during the 
half second after the first hit (p = .001). The amount of time participants gazed at the target in the 
half second after the first hit did not differ among the remaining conditions (all ps > .066). 
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Figure 3.5. Percentage of gazing at the target half a second after the first hit. The error bars depict 
standard errors.  
 
The optimism robustness hypothesis had to be rejected. However, expecting to gain 
showed a trend to increase the percentage of gazing at gain targets compared with loss targets 
more than expecting to lose increased the percentage of gazing at loss targets compared with gain 
targets half a second after the first hit, t(30) = 1.507, p = .071, d = .173. 
Relation with Comparative Optimism Bias 
Scatterplots of the correlations between optimism robustness scores and mean scores of the COS 
(Weinstein, 1980) for participants of both experiments are shown in Figure 3.6. As predicted in 
our comparative optimism bias hypothesis, there were significant weak, positive correlations 
between the mean score of the COS (Weinstein, 1980) and the optimism robustness score for all 
three measures of attention: RTs (rp = .274, p = .015), time to first hit (rp = .274, p = .015), and 
percentage of gazing at the target half a second after the first hit (rp = .245, p = .027).  
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Figure 3.6. Correlation between participants’ mean COS score and their optimism robustness 
scores revealed by the two experiments. Data of participants in Experiments 1 and 2 have been 
merged for this analysis in order to have a large enough sample size to investigate inter-individual 
differences. A score of zero represents no bias, a positive score represents a positivity bias, and a 
negative score represents a negativity bias in both measures. 
 
Experiment 1: Discussion 
As a manipulation check, we anticipated a larger increase in pupil diameter when participants 
were presented with gain or loss cues compared with ambiguous cues (control condition) because 
gain and loss cues were meant to elicit an affective response (i.e., optimistic and pessimistic 
expectancies). In line with our hypothesis, participants showed a significantly larger increase in 
pupil diameter for gain cues than for ambiguous cues during two of the analyzed time intervals 
(1-1.5 s and 1.5-2 s) in Experiment 1. In general, pupil diameter decreased in response to cue 
presentation and this decrease was significantly larger for ambiguous than for gain and loss cues. 
Therefore, the pupils were relatively more dilated during the presentation of gain and loss cues 
than during the presentation of ambiguous cues, indicating a stronger affective response elicited 
by gain and loss cues.  
Moreover, in accordance with our predictions, optimistic expectancies modulated 
attention, as apparent in the RT and eye gaze data. Participants reacted faster to loss targets when 
they were pessimistic rather than optimistic and optimistic expectancies shortened RTs to gain 
targets compared with loss targets (attention orientation). No significant differences in RTs were 
detected between gain and loss targets when pessimistic or ambiguous expectancies were 
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induced. Moreover, RTs to gain targets did not differ when optimistic expectancies were induced 
in comparison with pessimistic expectancies. 
However, similar results were not seen for the time to first hit (attention orientation) in 
our eye tracking data. One possible explanation for this is that because of the numerous visual 
inputs participants received, they tried to obtain an overview in the beginning by gazing at all faces 
but then reacted faster to gain targets following gain cues even if they had only paid peripheral 
attention to those targets. However, more focused attention may subsequently have been 
diverted to gain targets following gain cues during later stages of attention. Consistent with such 
a view, the results for the percentage of gazing at the target half a second after the first hit 
(attention maintenance) were very similar to the effects seen in RTs. Participants looked more at 
gain targets when they had optimistic expectancies compared with pessimistic expectancies and 
optimistic expectancies made participants look more at gain targets compared with loss targets 
within a half second after the first hit at a target. Similar to the RTs, the percentage of looking at 
gain and loss targets half a second after the first hit did not differ when pessimistic or ambiguous 
expectancies were induced. Moreover, the percentage of looking at loss targets did not differ 
when optimistic expectancies were induced in comparison with pessimistic expectancies. In 
conclusion our cue and target congruency hypotheses could only be confirmed for optimistic 
expectancies, not for pessimistic expectancies.  
Notably, although in our first hypothesis we had predicted that pessimistic expectancies 
guide attention toward punishment compared with reward, this result is congruent with our 
second hypothesis that optimistic expectancies have a stronger influence on subsequent attention 
to reward and punishment than pessimistic expectancies do. In line with our optimism robustness 
hypothesis, we found a small effect that optimistic expectancies shortened participants’ RTs to 
gain targets compared with loss targets more than pessimistic expectancies shortened 
participants’ RTs to loss targets compared with gain targets (attention orientation). A similar effect 
was seen in our eye tracking measure for attention maintenance. Optimistic expectancies made 
participants look more at gain targets compared with loss targets than pessimistic expectancies 
made participants look more at loss targets compared with gain targets half a second after the 
first hit. However, the trend for both effects was non-significant. Therefore, whether optimistic 
expectancies had a stronger effect on attention deployment to congruent confirming compared 
with disconfirming information than pessimistic expectancies was not clearly shown in our data 
and requires further investigation. In summary, our cue and target congruency hypotheses were 
only partly confirmed for attention orientation (RTs) and maintenance (percentage of gazing at 
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target half a second after first hit) and the optimism robustness hypothesis was rejected for both 
attention measures. 
As hypothesized, participants’ optimism robustness score for all three measures of 
attention revealed by our experiments is significantly positively correlated with the mean score of 
the COS (Weinstein, 1980). This supports the idea that processes present in optimism bias also 
play a role in the robustness of optimistic expectancies and their influences on attention in our 
experiments. 
 Even though the results of Experiment 1 are promising, one problem with the stimuli used 
in this experiment is that happy and sad faces could not be assigned to be gain or loss targets 
differentially across participants. Happy faces always have a positive valence and sad faces always 
have a negative valence and it would not have been meaningful to tell participants they lose 
money when seeing a happy face. These salient stimulus-specific attributes could have 
differentially influenced attention deployment. For instance, in everyday life, we have repeatedly 
learned that a happy face indicates important emotional information (e.g., a smiling doctor telling 
us we are completely healthy or a happy supervisor complementing us on our work), making 
happy faces particularly salient stimuli that might be processed preferably regardless of the 
context in which they are presented. Therefore, independently of assigning happy and sad faces 
as gain and loss targets in our experiment, the face stimuli might have captured participants’ 
attention differently, making them less prone to variations in expectancies. Thus, we conducted a 
second experiment to replicate our effects using non-social and inherently non-emotional stimuli.   
Experiment 2: Methods and materials  
Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1 with different stimuli. As both experiments were 
highly similar, we describe only the details that differ from Experiment 1. If not otherwise 
indicated, the procedures were identical to Experiment 1. 
Participants 
Thirty-two healthy psychology students (7 male, age: M = 22.19 years; SD = 3.00 years; 
range = 19 - 36 years) who had not participated in Experiment 1 were recruited via the participant 
pool at the University of Bern and took part in this RT and eye tracking study.  
Stimuli 
Visual search task (attention): The stimuli consisted of a green and a red “L” and a green and a red 
“T”.  The green “L” and the red “T” served as target stimuli and the red “L”s and green “T”s served 
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as distractor stimuli. In each trial, eight red and green “L”s and “T”s were shown on a white 
background on a circle around the position where the fixation cross was presented. There was an 
equal probability for the single green “L” or the single red “T” to appear in any of the eight different 
locations on the circle. The participants’ task was to find the deviant target letter (green “L” or red 
“T”) among seven neutral distractor letters (red “L”s and green “T”s). In contrast to Experiment 1, 
in which the stimuli in the visual search array had to be compared using a rather complex attribute 
comprising many different features (emotional facial expression), the stimuli in Experiment 2 only 
had to be compared using two clearly separable features (color and shape). However, because the 
emotional face stimuli used in Experiment 1 are highly familiar and overlearned in everyday life, 
they may generally produce a stronger pop-out effect among neutral distractor faces than the 
letter stimuli used in Experiment 2.  
Experimental procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 (Figure 3.1, bottom). The only difference was 
that letters were presented as stimuli in the visual search task instead of faces. For half of the 
participants, the green “L” represented gain (loss) and the red “T” represented gain (loss) for the 
other half.  
Manipulation check 
Three participants were excluded from pupil diameter change analysis because on average, more 
than 50 % of their trials per time interval had to be excluded because of too much missing eye 
gaze data. On average, we excluded 21.7 % of pupil diameter data per time interval from the 
analysis because missing eye gaze data made up > 50 % of the samples. In addition, outliers 
(deviating more than 3 SDs from the average diameter of a given participant during a particular 
time interval) were eliminated (on average 0.9 % of the remaining pupil diameter data per time 
interval). 
Dependent Variables 
Errors comprised ~ 7.7 % of responses and were excluded from the RT analysis. For the eye 
tracking analyses, ~ 13.2 % of trials were additionally excluded because participants did not hit the 
target. For the percentage of gaze analysis ~ 4.5 % of trials were additionally excluded because 
participants did not hit the target within the first 2000 ms of the presentation of the visual search 
task. Additionally, ~ 4.3 % of trials were excluded because missing eye gaze data comprised > 40 % 
of the samples.   
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Experiment 2: Results 
Expectancy phase 
Pupil Diameter Change 
Pupil diameter change during the presentation of expectancy cues is shown in Figure 3.2b. As 
predicted, the main effect of expectancy cue was significant, F(2.56) = 12.438, p < .001, η2p = .308. 
As anticipated, gain and loss cues elicited a larger pupil diameter increase than did ambiguous 
cues (gain vs. ambiguous cues: p < .001, loss vs. ambiguous cues: p = .001, as revealed by post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons). In addition, there was a significant main effect of time, F(2.43) = 4.284, 
p = .029, η2p = .133.  
Moreover, the predicted interaction expectancy × time was significant, F(4.120) = 4.988, 
p = .001, η2p = .151. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the differential effect of 
expectancy condition on pupil diameter change started between 1 and 1.5 s (0.5-1 s for loss vs. 
ambiguous cues) following the onset of the expectancy cues and remained stable until the end of 
the analysis interval. As anticipated, pupil diameter increase was larger for gain and loss cues than 
for ambiguous cues (0.5-1 s, 1-1.5 s, 1.5-2 s, 2-2.5 s: gain vs. ambiguous cues: ps = .080, < .001, 
= .009, < .001, respectively; loss vs. ambiguous cues: ps = .005, = .005, = .005, < .001, respectively).  
Visual search phase 
Reaction Times 
The RTs are shown in Figure 3.3b. Participants reacted faster to gain targets than to loss targets, 
showing a main effect of target, F(1.31) = 12.582, p = .001, η2p = .289. Moreover, participants 
reacted faster when they expected to gain or lose than when they had ambiguous expectancies, 
showing a main effect of expectancy, F(2.46) = 28.227, p < .001, η2p = .477. In addition, the predicted 
expectancy × target interaction was significant, F(1.43) = 79.723, p < .001, η2p = .720.  
In accordance with our cue congruency hypothesis, participants reacted faster to gain 
targets when they expected to gain than when they expected to lose or had ambiguous 
expectancies (gain vs. loss cues: p < .001, gain vs. ambiguous cues: p < .001, as revealed by post-
hoc pairwise comparisons). Moreover, participants reacted faster to gain targets when they had 
ambiguous expectancies than when they expected to lose (p < .001). Participants reacted faster 
to loss targets when they expected to lose than when they expected to gain or had ambiguous 
expectancies (loss vs. gain cues: p < .001, loss vs. ambiguous cues: p < .001). In addition, 
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participants reacted faster to loss targets when they had ambiguous expectancies than when they 
expected to gain (p = .015).  
As predicted by our target congruency hypothesis, when participants expected to gain, 
they reacted faster to gain targets rather than loss targets (p < .001); when they expected to lose 
they reacted faster to loss targets rather than gain targets (p < .001); and when they had 
ambiguous expectancies, they reacted faster to gain targets rather than loss targets (p = .002). 
The last effect is consistent with the idea of an attention bias for positive stimuli. Moreover, in 
line with our optimism robustness hypothesis, expecting to gain shortened RTs to gain targets 
compared with loss targets more than expecting to lose shortened RTs to loss targets compared 
with gain targets, t(31) = 3.019, p = .003, d = .501.  
Eye tracking: Time to first hit the target 
The time to first hit the target results mostly mirror the RT results and are shown in Figure 3.4b. 
Participants took less time to first hit gain targets compared with loss targets, showing a main 
effect of target, F(1.31) = 7.247, p = .011, η2p = .189. Moreover, they took less time to hit the target 
when they expected to lose than when they had ambiguous expectancies, showing a main effect 
of expectancy, F(2.62) = 4.918, p = .010, η2p = .137. Notably, the predicted expectancy × target 
interaction was significant, F(2.49) = 72.432, p < .001, η2p = .700.  
In line with our cue congruency hypothesis, participants first hit gain targets faster when 
they expected to gain than when they expected to lose or had ambiguous expectancies (gain vs. 
loss cues: p < .001, gain vs. ambiguous cues: p < .001, as revealed by post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons). Moreover, participants hit gain targets faster when they had ambiguous 
expectancies than when they expected to lose (p < .001). Furthermore, as anticipated, participants 
hit loss targets faster when they expected to lose than when they expected to gain or had 
ambiguous expectancies (loss vs. gain cues: p < .001, loss vs. ambiguous cues: p < .001). In 
addition, participants hit loss targets faster when they had ambiguous expectancies than when 
they expected to gain (p = .003).  
As predicted by our target congruency hypothesis, when participants expected to gain, 
they hit faster at gain targets rather than loss targets (p < .001) and when they expected to lose 
they hit faster at loss targets rather than gain targets (p < .001). When participants had ambiguous 
expectancies, they hit faster at gain targets rather than loss targets (p = .019), in agreement with 
the idea of an attention bias for positive stimuli. Finally, as stated in our optimism robustness 
hypothesis, expecting to gain reduced the time to hit at gain targets compared with loss targets 
more than expecting to lose reduced the time to hit at loss targets compared with gain targets, 
t(31) = 2.091, p = .023, d = .424.  
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Eye tracking: Percentage of gazing at the target half a second after the first hit 
The amount of time (in %) participants spent gazing at the target half a second after the first hit is 
shown in Figure 3.5b. Participants gazed more at gain targets than loss targets in this time span, 
showing a main effect of target, F(1.31) = 7.464, p = .010, η2p = .194, but the amount of time 
participants spent gazing at the target did not differ among the three expectancy conditions 
(p = 224). Notably, the predicted expectancy × target interaction was significant, 
F(2.50) = 31.007, p < .001, η2p = .500.  
As hypothesized by our cue congruency hypothesis, participants gazed more at gain 
targets within a half second after the first hit when they expected to gain than when they expected 
to lose or had ambiguous expectancies (gain vs. loss cues: p < .001, gain vs. ambiguous cues: 
p = .001, as revealed by post-hoc pairwise comparisons). Moreover, participants gazed more at 
loss targets within a half second after the first hit when they expected to lose than when they 
expected to gain or had ambiguous expectancies (loss vs. gain cues: p < .001, loss vs. ambiguous 
cues: p < .001). In line with our target congruency hypothesis, when participants expected to gain, 
they gazed more at gain targets than at loss targets within a half second after the first hit 
(p < .001). When participants expected to lose, they gazed more at loss targets than at gain targets 
within a half second after the first hit (p = .001). The amount of time participants spent gazing at 
the target a half second after the first hit did not differ among the remaining conditions (all 
ps > .063).  
Finally, consistent with our optimism robustness hypothesis, expecting to gain increased 
percentage of gazing at gain targets compared with loss targets half a second after the first hit 
more than expecting to lose increased percentage of gazing at loss targets compared with gain 
targets half a second after the first hit, t(31) = 2.713, p = .006, d = .595.  
Experiment 2: Discussion 
As hypothesized, a larger pupil diameter increase was evoked by gain and loss cues than by 
ambiguous cues in Experiment 2. This indicates that gain and loss cues elicited an affective 
response in our participants that can be attributed to the induction of optimistic and pessimistic 
expectancies, whereas ambiguous cues did not (manipulation check). Thus, differential effects of 
attention in our experiment can be attributed to the induction of optimistic and pessimistic 
expectancies. 
In accordance with our predictions, the expectancies in Experiment 2 modulated attention 
deployment, as apparent in the RT and eye gaze data. Participants reacted faster to gain and loss 
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targets when congruent expectancies were induced compared with incongruent expectancies. 
Furthermore, optimistic and pessimistic expectancies shortened RTs to congruent targets 
compared with incongruent targets (attention orientation). In the eye gaze data, the same effects 
were observed for the time to first hit the target (attention orientation) and the percentage of 
looking at the target half a second after the first hit (attention maintenance).  
In line with the idea of a general attention bias to positive stimuli, participants payed more 
attention to gain compared with loss targets when ambiguous expectancies were induced. This 
attention bias could be explained by a natural Pavlovian tendency to approach reward stimuli. 
Research has shown that approaching (i.e., initiating a response to) punishment is more difficult 
than approaching reward (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; Guitart-Masip, Duzel, Dolan, & Dayan, 2014). 
Therefore, a Pavlovian facilitation to approach reward could make people pay more attention to 
gain compared with loss targets when having ambiguous expectancies.  
In contrast to Experiment 1, the optimism robustness hypothesis was clearly supported: 
Optimistic expectancies biased participants’ attention more strongly toward gain targets in 
comparison with loss targets than pessimistic expectancies biased participants’ attention toward 
loss targets in comparison with gain targets, as shown by the RTs, time to first hit, and percentage 
of gazing at the target half a second after the first hit. The described Pavlovian tendency to 
approach reward but not punishment information could also represent an underlying mechanism 
of this optimism robustness effect because it explains why it might be more difficult to pay 
attention to loss targets when expecting to gain than to gain targets when expecting to lose. In 
conclusion, our cue and target congruency hypotheses and our optimism robustness hypothesis 
were confirmed for both attention orientation (RTs, time to first hit) and attention maintenance 
(percentage of gazing at the target half a second after the first hit). 
General discussion 
Affective states that can be attributed to optimistic and pessimistic expectancies were successfully 
induced in the experiments reported here. Both experiments demonstrate that optimistic 
expectancies guide attention toward positive compared with negative stimuli. This was revealed 
in the RTs and eye gaze behavior during the visual search task in Experiment 1 for emotional face 
stimuli (except for the time to first hit) and in Experiment 2 for non-social letter stimuli. Moreover, 
in Experiment 2 we clearly demonstrated that pessimistic expectancies guide attention toward 
negative compared with positive stimuli. As predicted, optimistic expectancies had a stronger 
influence on attention deployment than pessimistic expectancies – shown by small-to-medium 
effects in the RT analyses of both experiments and the eye tracking analyses of Experiment 2. 
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Moreover, this stronger influence of optimistic than pessimistic expectancies on attention was 
positively associated with individual differences in self-reported comparative optimism bias 
(Weinstein, 1980).   
Modulation of attention by expectancy cues is in line with predictive coding theory, which 
states that humans create a mental template while expecting certain outcomes in their future and 
compare sensory information with this template (C. Summerfield et al., 2006; Zelano et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, our findings correspond to empirical work on the interplay between expectancies 
and attention deployment to neutral stimuli (Aue et al., 2013a, 2016; Burra & Kerzel, 2013).  
In both studies, we show that optimistic expectancies guide attention toward positive in 
contrast to negative stimuli, a finding that is in line with Peters and colleagues´ (2015) results, 
even though different methods to induce optimism were used. Peters and colleagues (2015) 
showed that participants whose state optimism was increased by the Best Possible Self 
Manipulation (and those whose state optimism had unexpectedly increased by a presumably 
neutral control manipulation) gazed less at angry faces and more at joyful faces; we showed that 
optimism induced by cues signaling reward biased participants’ attention toward rewarding 
compared with punishing stimuli (apparent in the RTs and eye gaze behavior). Therefore, inducing 
state optimism in the beginning of an experiment or inducing optimistic expectancies through 
cues on a trial-to-trial basis successfully bias subsequent attention deployment. Notably, Peters 
and colleagues (2015) could only show rather weak effects of state optimism on attention in post-
hoc analyses on alternatively created experimental groups whereas we demonstrated much 
stronger effects of optimistic expectancies on attention to reward and replicated the effects using 
non-social stimuli.   
In addition to replicating results that show optimistic expectancies guide attention toward 
reward in contrast to punishment, in our second experiment, we demonstrated that pessimistic 
expectancies guide attention toward stimuli signaling punishment in contrast to stimuli signaling 
reward. Notably, this effect was only present when non-social letter stimuli were used. This finding 
initially arose in Experiment 2 (which generally led to stronger effects), which appears to be 
counterintuitive as social face stimuli would better represent real life situations in which 
expectancies rely on information with an intrinsic affective meaning. A possible explanation lies 
in participants’ answers to the post-hoc questionnaire about the experiments. Participants in 
Experiment 2 reported expectancy cues to be more helpful and important for the subsequent 
visual search task than participants in Experiment 1 (see Analysis S.3.1). It is conceivable that the 
search task in Experiment 2 was simply more difficult because letter target stimuli stood out less 
among distractors than the face stimuli did in Experiment 1. Therefore, participants probably had 
76 
 
to rely more strongly on the information given during the expectancy phase of the experiment. 
However, in some conditions, the RTs in Experiment 1 were longer than those in Experiment 2. 
Thus, it is also possible that social stimuli captured attention to a greater extent (which is likely 
due to the stimuli’s social interaction significance; potentially influential factors: emotional display 
signaling action intent, attractiveness, or gender). This implies that participants could withdraw 
attention from letters more easily than from faces. Because different participants were included 
in Experiments 1 and 2, it is difficult to draw final conclusions in this respect.  
In both experiments, optimistic expectancies had a stronger influence on attention 
deployment than did pessimistic expectancies and this asymmetry in attention deployment was 
positively related to participants’ self-reported optimism bias. Whereas in Experiment 1 only 
optimistic expectancies influenced subsequent attention to rewarding and punishing stimuli, in 
Experiment 2 both optimistic and pessimistic expectancies influenced attention but the effect was 
stronger for optimistic than for pessimistic expectancies (optimism robustness hypothesis). This 
robustness of optimistic expectancies was present in measures of attention orientation and 
attention maintenance. Therefore, both more automatic and more controlled or strategic types 
of stimulus processing during the different stages of attention were strongly influenced by 
optimistic expectancies. This finding underscores the outstanding relevance of optimism in 
determining attention processes that rely on very different mechanisms (such as salience 
detection during attention orientation and emotion regulation during attention maintenance; see 
Cisler & Koster, 2010 for details on the mechanisms underlying different stages of attention bias).  
Emotion regulation goals may explain why optimistic expectancies influenced attention 
more than pessimistic expectancies in our experiments: First, pessimistic expectancies may have 
been overridden (especially when stimuli were processed in a more controlled manner during 
attention maintenance; Cisler & Koster, 2010). In this case, strategic attention on rewarding 
stimuli (represented by no or smaller effects of pessimistic expectancies compared with optimistic 
expectancies on attention in our experiments) might be an emotion regulation strategy serving to 
maintain a positive affective state, which could ultimately provoke a positive feedback effect on 
initially positively biased expectancies, thereby generating and stabilizing optimism bias.  
Second, it is conceivable that people with optimistic expectancies do not want to confront 
themselves with disconfirming negative evidence and thus avoid attending to stimuli signaling 
punishment, enhancing attention for rewarding evidence. In this case, avoidance of punishing 
stimuli with coexistent attention on rewarding stimuli following optimistic expectancies 
represents an emotion regulation strategy that maintains optimism bias. As explained in the 
introduction, optimism bias is primarily viewed as a protective mechanism and people are highly 
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motivated to remain optimistic even considering contradictory information (Korn et al., 2014; 
Sharot et al., 2011; Sharot, 2011).  
Observations from our two studies imply that optimism bias and attention bias are 
strongly interrelated with dynamic bi-directional influences between each other that might 
vigorously strengthen both biases in the long run. Notably, our data might elucidate why people 
maintain their overly optimistic expectancies even when confronted with disconfirming 
information whereas they overcome pessimistic expectancies (Sharot et al., 2011). Attention 
processes apparently play a crucial role in this highly interesting phenomenon in optimism bias. 
As seen in our experiments, people pay less attention to disconfirming punishing feedback (“bad 
news”; compared with rewarding feedback) when they are optimistic than to disconfirming 
rewarding feedback ("good news"; compared with punishing feedback) when they are pessimistic 
(optimism robustness hypothesis). This asymmetry in attention deployment can explain why 
people update their expectancies when receiving good news but not when receiving bad news. 
Bad news might not be processed as deeply as good news, resulting in selective updating of 
expectancies when good news is received.  
To strengthen this interpretation of our data, we performed additional analyses on the 
evolution in RTs over the time course of our experiment (Analysis S.3.2). When participants were 
confronted with disconfirming rewarding feedback while they were pessimistic, they adapted 
their orientation of attention quite rapidly over the course of the experiment, as shown by faster 
RTs in the second block of the experiment (steep learning curve). In contrast, when participants 
were confronted with disconfirming punishing feedback while they were optimistic, they adapted 
their orientation of attention rather slowly, as shown by faster RTs only in the third and fourth 
blocks of the experiment (flat learning curve). Slower learning regarding necessary attentional 
switching when being optimistic might also be related to updated expectancies over the course of 
the experiment. In conclusion, our novel findings suggest an underlying cognitive (i.e., attention-
related) mechanism for asymmetric updating of expectancies, a crucial phenomenon implicated 
in the maintenance of optimism bias, with direct implications for mental health (Garrett et al., 
2014; Korn et al., 2014; Sharot et al., 2011).  
Some methodological features of this work might limit the conclusions that can be drawn 
about how optimistic and pessimistic expectancies influence attention deployment. First, most 
participants learned that gain and loss cues in our studies did not really represent a 90 % chance 
of gaining or losing. This might have weakened the influence of expectancy cues on participants. 
In our design, we had to reduce the actual chances of gaining or losing to obtain enough 
incongruent trials for data analysis. However, several important considerations show that the 
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expectancy cues in our studies influenced participants: (a) in most of the announced “90 % cue” 
trials (in 67 % of these trials) the expectancy cues correctly predicted the subsequent target. 
Moreover, participants were informed that the computer randomly chose a target, possibly 
leading to probabilities that differed from the announced average value of 90 %, thus reducing 
the likelihood that participants distrusted the cues; (b) past experiments have shown that 
instructions about proportions can be sufficient to produce corresponding behavioral effects 
(Entel, Tzelgov, & Bereby-Meyer, 2014, Experiment 1) even if the given information does not 
represent the true proportions; and (c) even if participants did not consciously believe the 
expectancy cues, the (possibly unconscious) effect of these cues on attention was still visible in 
the RTs and eye gaze behavior, thereby demonstrating their effectiveness.  
Second, one might argue that the expectancy cues used in our studies did not actually 
induce optimistic and pessimistic expectancies. It would be possible that participants only drew 
on the predictive cognitive information the cues entailed (i.e., which specific target to search for) 
when performing the visual search task. This would imply that the differences in attention 
deployment we found solely derive from the cue’s predictive information not from optimistic or 
pessimistic expectancies induced by the cues. However, such an interpretation of the data cannot 
explain the differential effect that gain compared with loss cues had on attention deployment in 
our studies (optimism robustness hypothesis) because the predictive cognitive information of the 
gain and loss cues was equal. Moreover, we demonstrate that participants with higher optimism 
bias scores as revealed by the COS (Weinstein, 1980) showed a stronger influence of gain 
compared with loss cues on their attention deployment. This implies that optimism and pessimism 
did indeed play a role in our experiments. Future studies might directly circumvent any doubts on 
whether the gain and loss cues in the present experimental design induce optimistic and 
pessimistic expectancies by adding a control condition containing a cue that is predictive of the 
target’s identity but is not associated with gains or losses.  
Third, we told participants that there will always be a target present in the visual search 
array. Consequently, some participants in Experiment 1 reported in the post-experimental 
questionnaire to have first looked at one side of the screen and pressed the button for the 
opposite side if the target was not present on the first side without further looking for the target. 
However, this strategy was not reported to be used in Experiment 2, which led to greatly 
overlapping results, making it very likely that this search strategy did not actually influence results. 
Moreover, even though some participants noted the use of this strategy in Experiment 1, eye 
tracking data showed that our expectancy manipulation influenced attention maintenance, 
implying that even if participants reported that they only looked at one half of the search array, 
79 
 
they possibly unconsciously gazed at the target. Notably, there is no reason to suspect that 
employment of such a strategy would have had differential implications for optimistic and 
pessimistic expectancies. Thus, none of the limiting features mentioned here should have greatly 
influenced the findings reported in this paper. 
In general, the findings are an important contribution to a more nuanced view of the 
processes at the basis of optimism bias. Modulation of subsequent attention processes from 
optimism bias is especially interesting because of its beneficial effects for mental health. Knowing 
that biased attention processes underlie important phenomena (such as selective updating) in 
optimism bias, which in turn are related to mental health, could ultimately yield a better 
understanding of psychological disorders and possible treatments. For instance, in contrast to 
healthy people, patients suffering from depression update their expectancies in both optimistic 
and pessimistic directions (Korn et al., 2014). Patients with depression do not display a positive 
attention bias but attend preferably to negative information (Gotlib et al., 2004). Maladaptive 
attention processes caused by an absence of optimism bias and/or resulting in an absence of 
selective updating of expectancies in patients could be addressed by attention bias modification 
training or even training that targets both future expectancies and attention deployment (Aue 
& Okon-Singer, 2015; Everaert et al., 2012; Hirsch et al., 2006). This approach is particularly 
important as optimistic biases in expectancies and attention might mutually reinforce and 
strengthen each other over time. The relationship of optimistic expectancies and attention is also 
important in non-clinical settings. For instance, when having a rough day, people can engage in a 
form of emotion regulation that incorporates active attempts at thinking positively and being 
optimistic about the future, thereby automatically driving their focus of attention to rewarding 
things in their environment, which likely results in enhanced well-being. 
In conclusion, our data show that optimistic and pessimistic expectancies influence how 
we see the world around us and which aspects of our environment we direct attention to. 
Optimistic expectancies appear to be very powerful in biasing our attention to rewarding 
information, which underscores the uniqueness of optimism-related processing in humans and 
might provide information on which cognitive mechanisms are essential for the benefits of 
optimism bias. This can be central for fostering individual well-being and mental health. As we 
have shown that being optimistic or pessimistic influences which parts of our environment we pay 
attention to, we agree with Charlie Chaplin’s famous words and know that we should look up and 
use all the optimism we can muster to ensure we see the beautiful rainbow. 
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Supplementary Information 
Analysis S.3.1. Differences between participants’ answers to questionnaires in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  
Data Analysis 
The participants indicated if (a) they had paid attention to the expectancy cues, (b) the cues were 
important to prepare their answer, (c) the cues helped them to answer as quickly and correctly as 
possible, and (d) the cues influenced the difficulty to find the targets on a post-experimental 
questionnaire. To obtain information on whether participants’ experience of the task might have 
differed among the two experiments, the differences between participants’ answers (“yes” or 
“no”) on the post-experimental questionnaire in Experiments 1 and 2 were investigated with a 
χ2 test (df = 1). An α-level of .05 (two-tailed) was applied.  
Moreover, participants completed the German version of the LOT-R (Scheier et al., 1994) 
measuring trait optimism. To ensure that trait optimism did not differ between participants in the 
two experiments, the LOT-R scores (Scheier et al., 1994) were compared between participants in 
Experiments 1 and 2 using a t-test for independent samples (two-tailed).  
Results 
In the post-experimental questionnaires of both Experiments 1 and 2, most participants reported 
that they paid attention to the expectancy cues, indicating that they followed the task instructions 
well (Experiment 1: 74 %, Experiment 2: 88 %). The answers to the post-experimental 
questionnaire are shown in Table S.3.8.  
In contrast to Experiment 1, most participants in Experiment 2 reported that the 
expectancy cues presented in the beginning of each trial were important to prepare their reaction 
(χ2 = 19.693, p < .001), helped them to answer as quickly and correctly as possible (χ2 = 15.276, 
p < .001), and influenced how difficult it was to find a target (χ2 = 9.958, p = .002; see Table S.3.8 
for details). Trait optimism did not differ between participants of Experiments 1 and 2, 
t(61) = .024, p = .981 (MExp 1 = 22.710 and MExp 2 = 22.688).  
Conclusion 
Even though participants in both experiments followed the task instructions, participants in 
Experiment 2 found the expectancy cues to be more helpful for the subsequent visual search task 
than participants in Experiment 1. This might show why the effects of expectancies on attention 
deployment were generally stronger in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. However, because 
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different participants were included in Experiments 1 and 2, it is difficult to draw conclusions 
about the distinct mechanisms employed in the experiments.   
Analysis S.3.2. Evolution of RTs over time. 
Data Analysis 
To further examine our optimism robustness hypothesis, we analyzed the changes in RTs over 
time. The evolution of RTs in the two incongruent conditions (gain cue, loss target and loss cue, 
gain target) could reveal differential updating mechanisms when incongruent feedback is given, 
underscoring the robustness of optimistic expectancies in contrast to pessimistic expectancies. 
Therefore, time was added to the ANOVA as a within-subject factor. As a result, a 4 × 3 × 2 ANOVA 
with the within-subject factors time (block 1, block 2, block 3, and block 4), expectancy (gain cue 
[gain 90 %], loss cue [loss 90 %], ambiguous cue [gain loss 50 %/loss gain 50 %]), and target (gain, 
loss) was conducted on the RTs. The focus of this analysis was on the development of RTs in the 
two incongruent conditions (gain cue, loss target and loss cue, gain target), which are depicted in 
Figure S.3.1. Therefore, only post-hoc tests that reveal information on the development of these 
two conditions over time were reported. 
 
Figure S.3.1. RT development of incongruent conditions over four blocks. To simplify the graph, 
the remaining conditions are not depicted although statistics were run on all experimental 
conditions. The error bars depict standard errors. 
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Results 
Experiment 1: Participants reacted faster in block 3 than in block 1, showing a main effect of time, 
F(3.84) = 5.902, p = .001, η2p = .174. There was a significant time × expectancy interaction, 
F(6.168) = 3.211, p = .005, η2p = .103, and a significant expectancy × target interaction, F(2.56) = 6.497, 
p = .003, η2p = .188. In addition, there was a trend for a time × expectancy × target interaction, 
F(6.168) = 1.876, p = .088, η2p = .063. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that when participants 
expected to gain, they only reacted significantly faster to loss targets in block 3 compared with 
block 1 (p = .032). In contrast, when participants expected to lose, they reacted significantly faster 
to gain targets in blocks 2, 3, and 4 compared with block 1 (block 1 vs. block 2: p = .001, block 1 
vs. block 3: p = .005, block 1 vs. block 4: p = .002).  
Experiment 2: Participants reacted faster in blocks 2, 3, and 4 than in block 1 and faster in 
blocks 3 and 4 than in block 2, showing a main effect of time, F(3.78) = 27.609, p < .001, η2p = .471. 
Moreover, participants reacted faster when they expected to gain or lose than when they had 
ambiguous expectancies, showing a main effect of expectancy, F(2.46) = 26.697, p < .001, η2p = .463. 
Participants reacted faster to gain targets than to loss targets, showing a main effect of target, 
F(1.31) = 13.089, p = .001, η2p = .297. Additionally, there was a significant expectancy × target 
interaction, F(1.43) = 81.530, p < .001, η2p = .725, and a significant time × expectancy × target 
interaction, F(5.144) = 3.752, p = .004, η2p = .108. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that when 
participants expected to gain, they reacted significantly faster to loss targets in blocks 3 and 4 than 
in block 1 (block 1 vs. block 3: p = .001, block 1 vs. block 4: p < .001) and faster in block 4 than in 
block 2 (p = .032). When participants expected to lose, they reacted significantly faster to gain 
targets in blocks 2, 3, and 4 than block 1 (block 1 vs. block 2: p < .001, block 1 vs. block 3: p < .001, 
block 1 vs. block 4: p < .001) and faster in block 4 than block 2 (p = .022).  
Conclusion 
In line with our optimism robustness hypothesis, analyses of the evolution of RTs in incongruent 
conditions showed that when participants received disconfirming rewarding feedback while being 
pessimistic, they updated their attention quite rapidly (from the first to the second block, a steep 
learning curve). In contrast, when participants received disconfirming punishing feedback while 
being optimistic, they updated their attention more slowly over the course of the experiment (only 
in the third and fourth blocks, a flat learning curve). These results underscore the robustness of 
optimistic expectancies compared with pessimistic expectancies when being confronted with 
disconfirming feedback.  
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Table S.3.1 
Table S.3.1. Mean values, standard errors, and 95 % confidence intervals (CIs) of pupil diameter 
change for the three expectancy cue conditions during five analyzed 0.5-s time intervals 
following cue onset in Experiments 1 (N = 31) and 2 (N = 32). 
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Table S.3.2 
Table S.3.2. Mean values, standard errors, and 95 % confidence intervals (CIs) of reaction times, 
time to first hit, and percentage of gazing at the target half a second after the first hit are 
summarized for all experimental conditions in Experiments 1 (N=31) and 2 (N=32). 
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Table S.3.3 
Table S.3.3. Difference scores of reaction times, time to first hit, and percentage of gazing at the 
target half a second after the first hit are summarized for Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
 
Table S.3.4 
Table S.3.4. Statistical values from the 3 (expectancy: gain, loss, ambiguous) x 5 (time: 0-0.5 s, 
0.5-1 s, 1-1.5 s, 1.5-2 s, 2-2.5 s) ANOVA are given for the pupil diameter change analysis from 
Experiments 1 and 2.  
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Table S.3.5  
Table S.3.4. Statistical values from the 3 (expectancy: gain, loss, ambiguous) x 2 (target: gain, 
loss) ANOVA are given for the reaction time analysis, time to first hit analysis, and percentage 
of gazing at the target half a second after the first hit analysis from Experiments 1 and 2.  
 
 
Table S.3.6  
Table S.3.6. P-values from post-hoc pairwise t-tests (Sidak corrected) comparing pupil diameter 
change for the different expectancy cues during five 0.5-s time intervals following cue onset in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  
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Table S.3.7 
Table S.3.7. P-values from post-hoc pairwise t-tests (Sidak corrected) comparing different 
experimental conditions are given for reaction time analysis, time to first hit analysis, and 
percentage of gazing at the target half a second after the first hit analysis from Experiment 1 
and 2.  
 
 
Table S.3.8 
Table S.3.8. Number (percentage) of participants answering “yes” and “no” to questions on the 
post-experimental questionnaire in Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Chapter 4 
The Interplay of Optimism Bias and Attention Bias: Neural 
and Behavioral Correlates 
 
Laura Kress, Laurent Schuepbach, Roland Wiest, Erno 
Hermans, and Tatjana Aue 
Abstract 
Optimism bias and positive attention bias are crucial features of healthy information processing. 
They have mostly been examined separately, although recent findings suggest dynamic bi-
directional optimism-attention interactions. The current study investigated neural mechanisms 
underlying such interactions. We hypothesized that optimistic and pessimistic expectancies guide 
attention to expected information and enhance salience network (SN) and executive control 
network (ECN) activity (e.g., insula, anterior cingulate cortex, posterior parietal cortex) during 
processing of unexpected information. Moreover, based on previous findings on the unique 
nature of optimism-attention interactions, we anticipated that optimistic expectancies have a 
stronger impact on attention and SN/ECN activity than pessimistic expectancies do. Optimistic and 
pessimistic expectancies were induced with verbal cues in 50 participants (both genders) before 
testing attention to reward and punishment in a visual search task while participants underwent 
functional MRI. As hypothesized, expectancy cues automatically guided attention to expected 
information (revealed in fast reactions), whereas processing of unexpected information enhanced 
SN/ECN activity. More important, these effects were stronger for optimistic than for pessimistic 
expectancy cues. Hence, although unexpected punishment following optimistic expectancies is 
thoroughly processed in the brain, it might inhibit behavioral responses. Our findings suggest that 
optimistic expectancies involve particularly strong predictions of reward, causing automatic 
guidance of attention to reward and great surprise about unexpected punishment. Maintenance 
of attention on reward following optimistic expectancies – as revealed by prior evidence – likely 
reduces the salience of disproving punishment to maintain initial strong predictions of reward. 
Thus, optimism bias can instigate a robust, self-sustaining upward spiral of positivity. 3  
                                                          
This chapter has been submitted for publication as: Kress, L., Schuepbach, L., Wiest, R., Hermans, E., & 
Aue, T. (submitted). The interplay of optimism bias and attention bias: Neural and behavioral correlates. 
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Introduction 
Most of us are overly optimistic about our future (Sharot, 2011; Weinstein, 1980). This optimism 
bias and similar cognitive phenomena such as positive attention bias (preferably attending to 
positive vs. neutral information; Pool et al., 2016a) determine the way we see the world. Optimism 
bias and positive attention bias have mostly been examined separately, even though both biases 
are crucial features of healthy information-processing (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Raila, Scholl, & 
Gruber, 2015; Sharot, 2011) and the combined cognitive biases hypothesis suggests that cognitive 
biases usually interact and mutually enforce each other (Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Hirsch et al., 
2006). In line with this theory, we have suggested that (a) optimistic expectancies guide attention 
to positive information in the environment and (b) directing attention to positive information 
enhances optimism bias (Kress & Aue, 2017). Notably, these suggestions are supported by recent 
empirical findings revealing an interplay between optimistic expectancies and attention 
deployment (Kress et al., 2018). Dynamic bi-directional optimism-attention interactions may 
result in a self-sustaining upward spiral of positivity (Booth et al., 2017; Garland et al., 2010). 
However, the neural mechanisms supporting this dynamic interplay have not been investigated 
yet, even though they can substantially increase our understanding of how optimism and 
attention bias maintain over time and boost mental health (Kress & Aue, 2017). 
Prior neuroimaging work revealed that attention processes rely on activity in large-scale 
neural networks (e.g., Kim et al., 1999). Specifically, the salience network (SN: e.g., insula, dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex [dACC]) has been suggested to be crucially involved in the detection of 
salient information and initial orientation of attention. Furthermore, the SN elicits dynamic shifts 
between the executive control network (ECN; e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [dlPFC], 
posterior parietal cortex [PPC]) and the default mode network (DMN; e.g., ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex [PCC]). Whereas the ECN is typically activated during 
cognitively demanding tasks (involved in attention maintenance and the modulation of 
information in working memory), the DMN is typically deactivated during cognitively demanding 
tasks (Menon, 2015b; Menon & Uddin, 2010). Studies investigating the impact of expectancies on 
attention indicate that nodes of these large-scale neural networks (particularly of the SN and ECN, 
e.g., insula, dlPFC, PPC, and PCC) are active when spatial attention is shifted to positive 
information following predictive cues (Mohanty et al., 2008; Small et al., 2003; Small et al., 2005). 
However, the predictive cues in these studies induced expectancies about the spatial location of 
relevant information (i.e., the target will be on the left/right) rather than the information’s valence 
(i.e., the target will be positive/negative). Thus, even though prior findings provide first hints on 
brain regions underlying the influence of spatial expectancies on attention, they do not reveal how 
91 
 
emotional expectancies (e.g., optimism/pessimism) guide attention (see Aue, Guex, Chauvigné, 
Okon-Singer, & Vuilleumier, in press for investigations of behavioral and neural mechanisms 
underlying such emotional expectancies on attention in relation to anxiety).   
Therefore, the present fMRI study investigated the impact of optimistic and pessimistic 
expectancies on attention and activity in large-scale neural networks. We induced expectancies 
about future gains and losses and examined their influence on attention deployment to stimuli 
signaling reward (i.e., gain) and punishment (i.e., loss). First, we hypothesized that induced 
optimistic, pessimistic, and ambiguous expectancies differentially modulate attention and activity 
in SN/ECN nodes during processing of reward versus punishment (interaction hypothesis). Second, 
we anticipated that optimistic and pessimistic expectancies guide attention to congruent rather 
than incongruent information (optimistic expectancies to reward rather than punishment and 
pessimistic expectancies to punishment rather than reward), whereas processing of incongruent 
information enhances SN/ECN activity (congruency hypothesis; den Ouden, Kok, & Lange, 2012). 
Third and most important, based on prior findings on the unique nature of optimism-attention 
interactions (Kress et al., 2018), we hypothesized that optimistic expectancies have a stronger 
impact on attention and SN/ECN activity than pessimistic ones do (asymmetry hypothesis). Fourth, 
we anticipated that behavioral and neural responses reflecting this asymmetry are positively 
related (asymmetry association hypothesis). 
Methods and materials 
Participants 
Fifty healthy participants (19 male, age: M = 25.06 years; SD = 4.68 years; range = 18 – 39) 
recruited at the University of Bern took part in this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
study. Based on previously published behavioral data obtained with an identical experimental 
design (Kress et al., 2018), we calculated a minimum sample size of 40 participants to detect a 
medium effect (dz = .534, α = .05, 95 % power) for our main analysis of interest (asymmetry 
hypothesis) in an a priori power analysis (using G*Power Version 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). Because we expected considerable participant drop-out due to head movement 
in the scanner, ten additional participants were tested. Self-reported neurological disorders, 
mental disorders, severe medical diseases, MRI contraindications, use of psychoactive substances, 
or left-handedness served as exclusion criteria. Moreover, color blind participants (tested with 
Ishihara plates; Ishihara, 1917) were excluded. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and were reimbursed with course credit or 25 Swiss francs per hour in addition to 5 Swiss 
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francs (their “gain” from the gambling task). Participants gave written informed consent according 
to the guidelines of the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki and were told that they 
could end the experiment at any time. All procedures were approved by the ethics commission of 
the canton of Bern, Switzerland. 
Procedure 
After obtaining written informed consent, participants read the instructions in which the 
experiment was described as a gambling task with the opportunity to gain or lose money. They 
were told to gain 25 Swiss cents in addition to a starting amount of 5 Swiss francs upon seeing a 
gain target in a visual search array and lose 25 Swiss cents upon seeing a loss target. Participants 
were told that cues (e.g., “90 % gain”) at the beginning of each trial describe an average 
expectancy value of a gain or loss target being subsequently presented in a visual search array. In 
reality, the expected target appeared less frequently than the cues indicated (real expectancy 
value ~ 67 % in order to have enough incongruent trials for data analysis, see Experimental Design 
section for further details). To reduce participant´s distrust in the cues, they were told that the 
computer randomly picked a target out of a pool of 100 targets (for 90 % gain [loss] cues this pool 
consisted of 90 gain [loss] and 10 loss [gain] targets) and that for this reason the real expectancy 
value may differ from the average value displayed as cues. Next, participants performed six 
practice trials to become familiar with the task. If they had no questions, they were comfortably 
positioned in an MRI scanner and the experimental task was performed. For visual stimulation, an 
LCD projector (PT-L711E, Panasonic, Kadoma, Japan) projected the stimuli onto a screen in front 
of the scanner that was viewed through a mirror mounted to the head coil.  
Stimuli and the experimental task of the current study are identical to Experiment 2 
reported in Kress and colleagues (2018). Figure 4.1 shows the timing and sequence of one example 
trial. In each trial, participants were presented with a fixation cross for 2000 – 3000 ms (jittered 
presentation) followed by a verbal cue presented for 1500 ms. The cue indicated how probable it 
was that the target in the subsequently presented search array would be a gain or loss a target. 
After the cue was presented, another fixation cross appeared for 2000 – 3000 ms. Next, a search 
array consisting of eight stimuli (seven distractors and either a gain or loss target) was shown for 
2500 ms. During the visual search task, participants had to indicate whether the target was 
presented on the left or right side of the screen by pressing with respectively the index or middle 
finger of the right hand on a button box connected to a response box outside the scanner (Lumina 
LP400, Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA). Participants were instructed to react as quickly and 
accurately as possible. After the detection period had elapsed, another fixation cross was 
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presented for 0 – 2000 ms before the next trial appeared (intertrial interval: 10 s). E-Prime 2.0 
Professional (Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA, USA) was used to present stimuli and 
record participants’ responses. 
 
Figure 4.1. Trial structure. An example of a gain cue (Gewinn [German word for gain] 90%) 
followed by a search array depicting a gain target (here a red “T”). Participants were told that the 
cues described the likelihood of seeing a gain or a loss target in the search array. They were also 
told that they would gain (lose) 25 Swiss cents in addition to a starting amount of 5 Swiss francs 
when seeing a gain (loss) target. Participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible according to the target (i.e., gain or loss target).  
 
A total of 256 experimental trials (128 congruent trials, 64 incongruent trials, 64 
ambiguous trials) were presented in random order in four sessions of 64 trials (around 11 minutes) 
with short pauses in between. The frequencies of trials of different kinds (different cues/targets) 
were comparable between sessions. In total, participants both gained and lost 32 Swiss francs, 
leaving them with the starting amount of 5 Swiss francs. Participants were not informed about the 
progression of their gains and losses during the experiment. After the experiment, participants 
completed a post-experimental questionnaire as well as additional affect and personality 
questionnaires that were assessed for a larger project on individual differences associated with 
optimism bias. Then, participants were debriefed and received their “gain” of 5 Swiss francs. 
Experimental Design and Statistical Analysis 
Experimental Design 
The experimental task represents a 3 × 2 repeated-measures design with the within-subject 
factors expectancy (gain/loss/ambiguous cue), and target (gain/loss). In the expectancy phase, 
one of three different verbal cues was presented to induce optimistic (“gain 90 %”), pessimistic 
(“loss 90 %”), or ambiguous expectancies (“gain loss 50 %” [“loss gain 50 %” for half of the 
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participants]). These cues indicated the probability that the target in a subsequently presented 
visual search array would be a gain or a loss target. Because we had to include enough incongruent 
trials for data analysis, the “gain 90 %” (loss 90 %”) cue referred to an actual probability of 67 % 
that there would be a gain target (loss target) among seven neutral distractor stimuli in the search 
array presented afterward. In the remaining cases, a loss target (gain target) was presented. In 
the 50 % cue condition, gain and loss targets were equally likely to be the target in the search 
array. This 50 % cue was included as a control condition inducing ambiguous expectancies with 
maximum uncertainty.  
Stimuli in the visual search phase consisted of a green and a red “L” and a green and a red 
“T”. In each trial, eight red and green “L”s and “T”s were shown on a white background on a circle 
around the position where the fixation cross was presented before. A single green “L” or a single 
red “T” served as target stimulus and signaled gain (i.e., reward) and loss (i.e., punishment) of 
money, respectively. For half of the participants, the green “L” represented a gain and the red “T” 
represented a loss, whereas for the other half the red “T” represented a gain and the green “L” 
represented a loss. The target stimulus appeared with equal probability in any of the eight 
different locations on the circle. The participants’ task was to detect the deviant target stimulus 
(green “L” or red “T”) among seven neutral distractor stimuli (red “L”s and green “T”s) as quickly 
as possible.  
Behavioral Data Analysis 
Behavioral data were analyzed with IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 24 (International Business 
Machines Corporation, Armonk, NY, USA). The dependent variable of attention orientation during 
the visual search task consisted of participants’ reaction times (RTs) for correct responses (in ms); 
errors comprised ~ 7.4 % of responses. We hypothesized that (1) gain, loss, and ambiguous 
expectancy cues differentially influence RTs to gain and loss targets (interaction hypothesis). To 
test this hypothesis, we conducted a 3 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the within-subject 
factors expectancy (gain cue [gain 90 %], loss cue [loss 90 %], ambiguous cue [gain loss 50 %/loss 
gain 50 %]), and target (gain, loss) on RTs. We also performed analyses on logarithmic RTs or data 
with outliers (± 3 SDs from individual average RT) excluded. However, the effects observed in the 
current study were not affected by these data transformations. Therefore, only the results for 
original RT data are described. Ambiguous cues that served as a control condition with maximum 
uncertainty in our experiment were included as an anchor in the analysis. If true, our hypothesis 
should be reflected in a significant interaction of the expectancy cue and target, which was further 
investigated by post-hoc comparisons. An α-level of .05 (two-tailed) was applied. Reported effect 
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sizes are partial eta squared and noted as η2p. If the sphericity assumption was violated, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported.  
More specifically, we hypothesized that (2) gain and loss expectancy cues guide attention 
to congruent rather than incongruent targets (congruency hypothesis). This congruency 
hypothesis would be demonstrated by faster RTs to expected (i.e., gain targets following gain cues 
and loss targets following loss cues) than unexpected targets (i.e., loss targets following gain cues 
and gain targets following loss cues) and was tested with a planned comparison (pairwise t-test) 
between RTs in the congruent and incongruent conditions.  
Furthermore, we hypothesized that (3) this congruency effect would be stronger for 
optimistic than for pessimistic expectancies (i.e., gain cues guide attention more to gain compared 
to loss targets than loss cues guide attention to loss compared to gain targets [asymmetry 
hypothesis]). Therefore, difference scores between RTs of incongruent and congruent conditions 
were computed for both gain and loss cues: DiffGainCue = [Gain cue, loss target] – [Gain cue, gain target] DiffLossCue = [Loss cue, gain target] – [Loss cue, loss target] 
We anticipated larger difference scores for optimistic expectancies than for pessimistic 
expectancies (DiffGainCue > DiffLossCue). This asymmetry hypothesis was tested with a planned 
comparison (pairwise t-test) between DiffGainCue and DiffLossCue. Pairwise t-tests were conducted 
with an α-level of .05 (one-tailed) and reported effect sizes are Cohen’s d, denoted by d.   
FMRI Data Analysis 
All MRI images were acquired using a 3 Tesla Siemens Magnetom Prisma Scanner (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany) with a 64-channel head coil. Volumes were registered using a T2*-weighted 
multi-band echo-planar imaging sequence (multi-band EPI) with 48 slices covering the whole brain 
(slice thickness = 2 mm; 0.5 mm gap; interleaved slice order; TR = 1000 ms; TE = 30 ms; flip 
angle = 80°; field of view = 192x192 mm; matrix size = 96 x 96; voxel size = 2 x 2 x 2.5 mm; PAT 
mode GRAPPA; acceleration factor 2; multiband factor = 3). An anatomical scan (MP-RAGE; 1 mm 
isotropic voxels; TR = 2300 ms; TE = 2.98 ms; flig angle = 9°; matrix size = 256 x 256) was 
conducted before the functional run to get highly resolved structural information for the 
normalization procedure.  
Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM12, Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in Matlab R2015b 
(Mathworks Inc., Sherborn, USA) was used for data analysis. Calculations were performed on 
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UBELIX (https://ubelix.unibe.ch/docs), the high performance computing cluster at the University 
of Bern. After slice time correction (middle slice acquisition was used as a reference slice), 
unwarping and spatial realignment (4th-degree b-Spline interpolation), retrospective noise 
correction was carried out using the Functional Image Artefact Correction Heuristic Package 
(FIACH; Tierney et al., 2016) implemented in R (R Development Core Team, 2008). Moreover, six 
principal components of physiological noise regressors were calculated with FIACH. Next, 
functional data were co-registered to each participant’s anatomical image, normalized to the 
standard space of the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) EPI template to permit group 
analyses, and spatially smoothed with an isotropic three-dimensional Gaussian filter with a full-
width at half maximum (FWHM) of 6 mm.  
For statistical analyses, event-related signal changes were modeled separately for each 
participant, using the general linear model (GLM) as implemented in SPM 12. The following 
regressors were included in the first-level model separately for each of the four sessions: gain cue, 
loss cue, ambiguous cue (expectancy phase; duration: 0 s); gain cue–gain target; gain cue–loss 
target; loss cue–loss target; loss cue–gain target; ambiguous cue–gain target; ambiguous cue–loss 
target (target phase; duration: 0 s). A parametric modulator that described the modulation of the 
hemodynamic response in the target phase by the participants’ behavioral responses (as indicated 
by standardized RTs) was added for each of the six target phase regressors. Moreover, one 
regressor for participants’ errors, six movement parameters of the realignment procedure, six 
physiological noise parameters obtained during noise correction with FIACH (all regressors of no 
interest), and a constant covariate representing the session-specific mean over scans were 
implemented in the first-level model. The model included a high-pass filter of 128 s to remove 
low-frequency drift of the scanner and first-order auto-regressive corrections for auto-correlation 
between scans.  
To test our interaction hypothesis (1) single-subject contrast maps obtained from first-
level analyses for the six target phase conditions were entered into a second-level factorial ANOVA 
to detect interaction effects between the factors expectancy cue (gain, loss, ambiguous) and 
target (gain, loss) on the group level. Moreover, specific contrasts of interest between incongruent 
and congruent targets (congruency hypothesis [2]) as well as between incongruent and congruent 
targets following gain compared with loss cues (asymmetry hypothesis [3]) were calculated on an 
individual level and analyzed in second-level random effects analyses (one-sample t-tests). 
Furthermore, simple regression analyses were conducted to evaluate the association of neural 
and behavioral (standardized RTs) responses for this asymmetry contrast (DiffGainCue - DiffLossCue; 
asymmetry association hypothesis [4]).  
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For exploratory whole-brain analyses, we report peak-voxel t or F statistics for activations 
that are significant at p < .05 after whole-brain family-wise error (FWE) random-field theory-based 
corrections, with an additional cluster-extent threshold of 10 voxels (at the same clustering 
threshold). For regions-of-interest (ROI) analyses, we report peak-voxel statistics using small-
volume corrections for reduced search volumes (p < .05, FWE-SVC), and report cluster sizes using 
a clustering threshold of puncorr < .001. Such ROI analyses were performed for the insula, the dACC, 
the dlPFC, and the PPC using the small volume correction option of SPM12. Bilateral masks of the 
insula (Automated Anatomical Labeling atlas, Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), the dACC (created 
with the MARINA software package; Walter et al., 2003), the dlPFC and the PPC (components 
identified from the left and right executive control network templates provided by the Functional 
Imaging in Neuropsychiatric Disorders Laboratory; Shirer, Ryali, Rykhlevskaia, Menon, & Greicius, 
2012) were used for ROI analyses.  
Results 
Interaction hypothesis 
Reaction time data revealed a significant main effect of expectancy cue, F(2,76) = 19.379, p < .001, 
η2p = .283 (participants reacted faster following optimistic [M = 1537 ms/SE = 44 ms] and 
pessimistic expectancies [M = 1521 ms/SE = 40 ms] than following ambiguous expectancies 
[M = 1619 ms/SE = 41 ms]; ps ≤ .001 as revealed by post-hoc pairwise comparisons), and a main 
effect of target, F(1,49) = 11.567, p = .001, η2p = .191 (participants reacted faster to gain targets 
[M = 1492 ms/SE = 45 ms] than to loss targets [M = 1625 ms/SE = 45 ms]). More important and as 
predicted, RTs showed a significant interaction between the factors expectancy cue and target, 
F(1,70) 70.441, p < .001, η2p = .590 (optimistic expectancies led to faster RTs to gain 
[M = 1295 ms/SE = 56 ms] compared to loss targets [M = 1778/SE = 45 ms], pessimistic 
expectancies led to faster RTs to loss [M = 1387 ms/SE = 57 ms] compared to gain targets 
[M = 1655 ms/SE = 42 ms], and ambiguous expectancies led to faster RTs to gain 
[M = 1526 ms/SE = 49 ms] compared to loss targets [M = 1711 ms/SE = 46 ms]; all ps < .001; see 
Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2. Reaction Times. Bold lines and bands depict mean reaction times and standard errors 
of all participants (N = 50). Points depict the mean reaction time of each participant. Beans depict 
smoothed density. Plots were created with the pirate plot function of the Yarrr package Version 
0.1.5 (https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=yarrr) in R (R Development Core Team, 2008).    
 
On a neural level, the expectancy × target interaction revealed differential activations in 
the left and right anterior insula (a prominent structure of the SN), a large bilateral cluster 
comprising of the posterior parietal cortex (PPC; superior and inferior parietal lobule, node of the 
ECN) extending into occipital areas (middle and superior occipital gyrus), a bilateral cluster 
comprising of supplementary motor area extending into the medial frontal gyrus and midcingulate 
area, bilateral clusters comprising of frontal lobe areas (precentral gyrus [PreCG], inferior frontal 
gyrus [IFG], middle frontal gyrus [MFG], superior frontal gyrus [SFG]), a cluster in the left 
cerebellum, left and right supramarginal gyrus, bilateral clusters in the visual cortex (calcarine 
sulcus and lingual gyrus), as well as a bilateral cluster in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (all whole-
brain analyses). Moreover, ROI analyses for the expectancy cue × target interaction revealed 
differential activations in the bilateral anterior insula and dACC (nodes of the SN) as well as the 
dlPFC and PPC (nodes of the ECN; see Table 4.1 for a summary of all activated clusters for this 
interaction and further activated clusters for main effects and Table 4.2 for respective post-hoc 
tests of significant interactions and main effects).  
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Table 4.1. Areas displaying differential activation for the interaction between expectancy cue 
and target, and the main effects for expectancy cue and for target during the visual search 
phase. 
H Brain Region k x y z Fmax pFWE 
Expectancy × Target Interaction 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
R INS 212 33 25 -3 44.85 <.001 
B SPL, IPL, MOG, SOG, PCU, ANG 2378 -30 -61 45 44.32 <.001 
B SMA, MeFG, MCA 653 -4 14 50 39.19 <.001 
L INS 105 -34 21 -5 34.75 <.001 
L PreCG, IFGpo, IFGpt, MFG  824 -46 12 33 31.67 <.001 
R PreCG, IFGpo, IFGpt, MFG 433 47 25 30 30.62 <.001 
R MFG, SFG 104 29 0 55 23.51 <.001 
L CB 17 -8 -73 -23 22.27 <.001 
R SMG, STG 46 68 -24 20 19.61 .002 
L STG, SMG 24 -59 -28 20 19.57 .002 
R CAL 36 13 -67 13 19.16 .002 
L LING, CAL 19 -2 -75 5 18.55 .004 
B MOFC 36 -6 47 -10 18.44 .004 
L CAL 17 -16 -69 5 17.09 .012 
Expectancy × Target Interaction 
Region-of-Interest Analysis 
R INS 280 33 25 -3 44.85 <.001 
L INS 248 -34 21 -5 34.75 <.001 
R DACC 134 5 27 40 17.60 <.001 
L DACC 39 -8 14 43 17.21 <.001 
R DLPFC 550 47 25 30 30.62 <.001 
R DLPFC 108 29 10 58 20.37 <.001 
L DLPFC 134 -46 17 33 25.74 <.001 
L DLPFC 18 -6 29 45 16.44 <.001 
L DLPFC 35 -26 12 58 12.41 .010 
R PPC 439 35 -61 48 33.68 <.001 
L PPC 306 -32 -61 45 39.67 <.001 
Expectancy Main Effect 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
L LING, CAL, IOC, MOG 54 -14 -90 -10 32.92 <.001 
R LING, CAL, IOC 49 19 -88 -5 28.32 <.001 
Target Main Effect 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
no significant results 
Note. All coordinates (x, y, z) of peak voxel activation are given in Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) space; k = cluster size in number of voxels (voxel size = 2 x 2 x 2.5 mm); L = left, R = right, B 
= bilateral; for exploratory whole-brain analyses, a clustering threshold of p <.05, whole-brain FWE 
corrected, and an additional cluster-extent threshold of 10 voxels was used; for ROI analyses, a 
clustering threshold of p <.001, uncorrected, was used; ANG = Angular Gyrus, CAL = Calcarine 
Sulcus, CB = Cerebellum, DACC = Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex, DLPFC = dorsolateral Prefrontal 
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Cortex, IFGpo = Inferior Frontal Gyrus - pars opercularis, IFGpt = Inferior Frontal Gyrus – pars 
triangularis, INS = Insula, IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobule, LING = Lingual Gyrus, MCA = Midcingulate 
Area, MeFG = Medial Frontal Gyrus, MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus, MOFC = Medial Orbitofrontal 
Cortex, MOG = Middle Occipital Gyrus, PCU = Precuneus, PreCG = Precentral Gyrus , 
PPC = Posterior Parietal Cortex, SFG = Superior Frontal Gyrus, SOG = Superior Occipital Gyrus, SMA 
= Supplementary Motor Area, SMG = Supramarginal Gyrus, SPL = Superior Parietal Lobule, STG = 
Superior Temporal Gyrus, as defined by the automated anatomical labeling of activations in SPM 
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) or anatomical region-of-interest masks (see Methods and Materials 
for further details).   
Table 4.2. Areas displaying differential activation for post-hoc comparisons of the interaction 
between expectancy cue and target and the main effect for expectancy cue during the visual 
search phase. 
H Brain Region k x y z Tmax pFWE 
Expectancy × Target Interaction 
Optimistic expectancies: Gain Target > Loss Target 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
R SMG, STG 45 64 -22 25 6.6 .002 
L MOFC 20 -2 45 -10 6.24 .008 
Optimistic expectancies: Loss Target > Gain Target 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
R SMA, MeFG, MCA 426 -4 14 48 8.78 <.001 
R INS 102 33 25 -3 8.22 <.001 
L INS 38 -34 21 -5 8.09 <.001 
L SOG, MOG, SPL, IPL, PCU 625 -24 -73 38 7.82 <.001 
L PreCG,  FGpo, IFGpt 360 -38 0 50 7.78 <.001 
R SOG, MOG, SPL, IPL, PCU, ANG 471 27 -63 40 7.66 <.001 
R MFG, SFG 68 33 2 58 7.45 <.001 
L SFG, MFG, PreCG 112 -24 0 63 7.41 <.001 
R SMG 14 41 -39 43 6.87 .001 
R IFGpo, PreCG 11 37 6 30 6.34 .006 
Pessimistic expectancies: Gain Target > Loss Target 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
R MeFG 55 5 35 53 7.46 <.001 
L IPL, SPL, SOG, MOG 295 -36 -51 43 7.28 <.001 
R SPL, SOG, ANG 165 25 -69 53 7.15 <.001 
R INS 36 35 23 -3 6.84 .001 
R IFGpt 14 49 25 30 6.3 .006 
Pessimistic expectancies: Loss Target > Gain Target 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
no significant results 
Ambiguous expectancies: Gain Target > Loss Target 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
no significant results 
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Ambiguous expectancies: Loss Target > Gain Target 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
no significant results 
Expectancy Main Effect 
Optimistic expectancies > pessimistic expectancies 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
no significant results 
Pessimistic expectancies > optimistic expectancies 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
no significant results 
Optimistic expectancies > ambiguous expectancies 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
L LING, CAL, IOC 38 -14 -90 -10 8.53 <.001 
R LING, CAL, IOC 53 19 -92 -5 8.05 <.001 
Ambiguous expectancies > optimistic expectancies 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
no significant results 
Pessimistic expectancies > ambiguous expectancies 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
R CAL, LING, IOC 48 19 -90 -3 8.01 <.001 
L CAL, LING, IOC, MOG 31 -14 -92 -8 7.41 <.001 
Ambiguous expectancies > pessimistic expectancies 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
no significant results 
Note. All coordinates (x, y, z) of peak voxel activation are given in Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) space; k = cluster size in number of voxels (voxel size = 2 x 2 x 2.5 mm); L = left, R = right, B 
= bilateral; for exploratory whole-brain analyses, a clustering threshold of p <.05, whole-brain FWE 
corrected, and an additional cluster-extent threshold of 10 voxels was used; ANG = Angular Gyrus, 
CAL = Calcarine Sulcus, CB = Cerebellum, DACC = Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex, 
DLPFC = dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex, IFGpo = Inferior Frontal Gyrus - pars opercularis, IFGpt = 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – pars triangularis, INS = Insula, IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobule, LING = Lingual 
Gyrus, MCA = Midcingulate Area, MeFG = Medial Frontal Gyrus, MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus, 
MOFC = Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex, MOG = Middle Occipital Gyrus, PCU = Precuneus, PreCG = 
Precentral Gyrus , PPC = Posterior Parietal Cortex, SFG = Superior Frontal Gyrus, SOG = Superior 
Occipital Gyrus, SMA = Supplementary Motor Area, SMG = Supramarginal Gyrus, SPL = Superior 
Parietal Lobule, STG = Superior Temporal Gyrus, as defined by the automated anatomical labeling 
of activations in SPM (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) or anatomical region-of-interest masks (see 
Methods and Materials for further details).   
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Congruency hypothesis  
As anticipated, optimistic and pessimistic expectancies guided attention to congruent compared 
to incongruent information. Participants reacted significantly faster to congruent than to 
incongruent targets, t(49) = 9.230, p < .001, d = 1.095 (congruent: M = 1341 ms/SE = 53 ms, 
incongruent: M = 1716 ms/SE = 38 ms). On a neural level, processing of incongruent compared to 
congruent targets resulted in stronger activation in the left and right anterior insula (SN), a large 
bilateral cluster comprising of the PPC (superior and inferior parietal lobule; ECN) extending into 
occipital areas (middle and superior occipital gyrus), a bilateral cluster comprising of 
supplementary motor area extending into the medial frontal gyrus and midcingulate area, 
bilateral clusters comprising of frontal lobe areas (PreCG, IFG, MFG, SFG), as well as bilateral 
clusters in the visual cortex (calcarine sulcus and lingual gyrus; all whole-brain analyses). 
Moreover, ROI analyses revealed that processing of incongruent targets resulted in stronger 
activation in the bilateral anterior insula and dACC (nodes of the SN) and the dlPFC and PPC (nodes 
of the ECN; see Figure 4.3 for a visualization of activations). In contrast, processing of congruent 
compared to incongruent targets resulted in stronger activation in a bilateral cluster in the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex and the left and right supramarginal gyrus (whole-brain corrected; see Table 
4.3 for a summary of all activated clusters).  
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Figure 4.3. Brain areas displaying differential activation on viewing incongruent compared with 
congruent information during the visual search phase. Processing incongruent information elicits 
stronger activation in nodes of the salience network (insula, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
[dACC]) and of the executive control network (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [dlPFC], posterior 
parietal cortex [PPC]) than processing congruent information following both optimistic and 
pessimistic expectancies. Statistical parametric maps are thresholded at p <.05, whole-brain 
corrected. 
 
Table 4.3. Areas displaying differential activation for incongruent versus congruent information 
during the visual search phase following both optimistic and pessimistic expectancies. 
H Brain Structure k x y z tmax pFWE 
Incongruent > Congruent 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
R INS 192 35 25 -3 10.03 <.001 
B SOG, MOG, SPL, IPL, PCU, ANG (R) 2141 29 -65 45 9.24 <.001 
B SMA, MeFG, MCA 597 -4 12 53 8.64 <.001 
L PreCG, IFGpo, IFGpt, MFG  404 -44 6 35 8.29 <.001 
L INS 88 -32 21 -5 8.09 <.001 
R MFG, SFG 94 31 2 58 7.28 <.001 
R CAL, LING 66 11 -65 10 6.87 .001 
L MFG, SFG 63 -24 0 60 6.84 .001 
R IFGpo, IFGpt 86 49 25 30 6.75 .001 
L CAL, LING 51 -14 -71 8 6.53 .003 
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R PreCG, IFGpo 22 37 6 30 6.32 .006 
R PreCG, IFGpo 32 49 10 33 6.27 .007 
L LING 18 -2 -75 5 6.25 .008 
R IOC 13 31 -85 -5 6.22 .009 
Region-of-Interest Analysis 
R INS 301 35 25 -3 10.03 <.001 
L INS 289 -32 21 -5 8.09 <.001 
B DACC 234 -6 14 43 6.65 <.001 
R DLPFC 673 49 25 30 6.75 <.001 
L DLPFC 158 -46 17 33 7.05 <.001 
L DLPFC 27 -4 31 43 5.17 .004 
R PPC 463 35 -63 53 7.16 <.001 
L PPC 354 -42 -51 50 7.26 <.001 
Congruent > Incongruent 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
B MOFC 110 -2 41 -13 7.07 <.001 
L SMG, STG 38 -65 -30 30 6.66 .002 
R SMG, STG 37 64 -24 20 6.64 .002 
Note. All coordinates (x, y, z) of peak voxel activation are given in Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) space k = cluster size in number of voxels (voxel size = 2 x 2 x 2.5 mm); L = left, R = right, B 
= bilateral; for exploratory whole-brain analyses, a clustering threshold of p <.05, whole-brain FWE 
corrected, and an additional cluster-extent threshold of 10 voxels was used; for ROI analyses, a 
clustering threshold of p <.001, uncorrected, was used; ANG = Angular Gyrus, CAL = Calcarine 
Sulcus, DACC = Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex, DLPFC = Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex, IFGpo = 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus - pars opercularis, IFGpt = Inferior Frontal Gyrus – pars triangularis, 
INS = Insula, IOC = Inferior Occipital Cortex, IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobule, LING = Lingual Gyrus, 
MCA = Midcingulate Area, MeFG = Medial Frontal Gyrus, MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus, 
MOFC = Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex, MOG = Middle Occipital Gyrus, PCU = Precuneus, PreCG = 
Precentral Gyrus, PPC = Posterior Parietal Cortex, SFG = Superior Frontal Gyrus, SOG = Superior 
Occipital Gyrus, SMA = Supplementary Motor Area, SMG = Supramarginal Gyrus, SPL = Superior 
Parietal Lobule, STG = Superior Temporal Gyrus, as defined by the automated anatomical labeling 
of activations in SPM (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) or anatomical region-of-interest masks (see 
Methods and Materials for further details).   
 
Asymmetry hypothesis 
In line with our asymmetry hypothesis, attention deployment to congruent compared to 
incongruent targets differed following optimistic and pessimistic expectancies. Optimistic 
expectancies accelerated reactions to gain compared to loss targets more than pessimistic 
expectancies accelerated reactions to loss compared to gain targets, t(49) = 2.760, p = .004, 
d = .541 (DiffGainCue: M = 483 ms/SE = 52 ms, DiffLossCue: M = 267 ms/SE = 60 ms). On a neural level, 
ROI analyses revealed stronger activation of the left anterior insula (k = 12; MNI coordinates: x = -
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26, y = 19, z = 10; tmax = 4.87; pFWE = .010), a prominent structure of the salience network, when 
participants reoriented attention to loss compared to gain targets following optimistic 
expectancies than when participants reoriented attention to gain compared to loss targets 
following pessimistic expectancies (Figure 4.4a).  
 
Figure 4.4. Brain areas displaying differential activation on viewing incongruent vs. congruent 
information following optimistic vs. pessimistic expectancies during the visual search phase. a. 
Processing unexpected punishing (compared to expected rewarding) information following 
optimistic expectancies elicits stronger insula activity than processing unexpected rewarding 
(compared to expected punishing) information following pessimistic expectancies. b. Participants 
demonstrating strongest asymmetric attention deployment following optimistic vs. pessimistic 
expectancies (indicated by RTs) also show the strongest activity in nodes of the salience network 
(insula, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex [dACC]) and the executive control network (posterior 
parietal cortex [PPC]) when processing unexpected vs. expected information following optimistic 
vs. pessimistic expectancies. Statistical parametric maps are thresholded at p <.001, uncorrected, 
for visualization purposes. See Table 4.4 for corrected inferential statistics. c. Positive correlations 
between behavioral and neural responses representing an asymmetric processing of expected and 
unexpected information following optimistic versus pessimistic expectancies. 
 
Asymmetry association hypothesis 
Participants’ RTs reflecting asymmetric attention deployment following optimistic and pessimistic 
expectancies was predicted by enhanced activation in bilateral clusters in frontal lobe areas 
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(PreCG, IFG), bilateral SMA, and clusters comprising of the left PPC (SPL, IPL, nodes of the ECN) as 
well as MFG and SOG when processing incongruent information following optimistic vs. 
pessimistic expectancies (whole-brain analyses). Moreover, ROI analyses revealed that behavioral 
responses reflecting asymmetric attention deployment were predicted by enhanced activation in 
the left insula and the right dACC (nodes of the SN) when reorienting attention to incongruent 
information following optimistic vs. pessimistic expectancies (Figure 4.4b and c). 
Furthermore, behavioral responses reflecting asymmetric attention deployment were 
predicted by reduced activation in the left angular gyrus when processing incongruent information 
following optimistic vs. pessimistic expectancies (whole-brain corrected; see Table 4.4 for a 
summary of all activated clusters).  
Table 4.4. Areas displaying differential activity to unexpected punishment (vs. expected reward) 
following optimistic expectancies compared to unexpected reward (vs. expected punishment) 
following pessimistic expectancies in the visual search phase predicting asymmetric attention 
deployment following optimistic compared to pessimistic expectancies indicated by RTs 
(DiffGainCue > DiffLossCue). 
H Brain Structure k x y z tmax pFWE 
Positive Correlation 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
L IFGpo, PreCG 72 -40 4 28 7.56 <.001 
L PreCG, PostCG 32 -42 -6 45 7.27 <.001 
B SMA 61 0 10 60 6.83 .001 
L SPL, IPL 18 -26 -55 45 6.66 .002 
L SOG, SPL 10 -20 -71 40 6.59 .002 
R IFGpo, PreCG 12 43 2 30 6.45 .004 
L PreCG, MFG 16 -30 -6 55 6.2 .010 
Region-of-Interest Analysis 
L INS 57 -30 23 8 5.47 .002 
R DACC 42 7 17 43 4.86 .008 
Negative Correlation 
Whole-Brain Analysis 
L ANG 48 -61 -57 25 6.39 .005 
Note. All coordinates (x, y, z) of peak voxel activation are given in Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) space; k = cluster size in number of voxels (voxel size = 2 x 2 x 2.5 mm); L = left, R = right, B 
= bilateral; for exploratory whole-brain analyses, a clustering threshold of p <.05, whole-brain FWE 
corrected, and an additional cluster-extent threshold of 10 voxels was used; for ROI analyses, a 
clustering threshold of p <.001, uncorrected, was used; ANG = Angular Gyrus, DACC = Dorsal 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex, IFGpo = Inferior Frontal Gyrus - pars opercularis, INS = Insula, IPL = 
Inferior Parietal Lobule, MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus, MTG = Middle Temporal Gyrus, 
PostCG = Postcentral Gyrus, PreCG = Precentral Gyrus, SOG = Superior Occipital Gyrus, SMA = 
Supplementary Motor Area, SPL = Superior Parietal Lobule, as defined by the automated 
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anatomical labeling of activations in SPM (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) or anatomical region-of-
interest masks (see Methods and Materials for further details).   
Discussion 
The current study replicates prior behavioral findings showing that optimistic (and pessimistic) 
expectancies causally influence attention deployment (Kress et al., 2018; Peters et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, it reveals the importance of large-scale neural networks underlying such 
expectancy-attention interactions. Specifically, induced optimistic and pessimistic expectancies 
guide attention to congruent information and result in enhanced activity in SN (anterior insula, 
dACC) and ECN (dlPFC, PPC) nodes during processing of incongruent information. Whereas the SN 
underlies the detection of salient (in this case incongruent) information, the ECN underlies further 
processing (e.g., modulation) of such salient information (Menon, 2015b; Menon & Uddin, 2010). 
These findings suggest that optimistic and pessimistic expectancies create a mental template that 
facilitates the detection of expected information and enhances neural processing of unexpected 
information (allowing the brain to devote relatively little resources to expected information as 
proposed by predictive coding theory; den Ouden et al., 2012; Gottlieb, 2007; Molenberghs, 
Mesulam, Peeters, & Vandenberghe, 2007; C. Summerfield et al., 2006; Zelano et al., 2011). Our 
results are in line with recent findings indicating that attention deployment to neutral information 
and associated brain activity in frontal/parietal areas is modulated by prior expectancies (Aue et 
al., in press). Notably, we additionally found strong insula and dACC activity during processing of 
unexpected information following optimistic and pessimistic expectancies, conforming with 
theoretical considerations on the neurophysiological basis of optimism-attention interactions 
(Kress & Aue, 2017). The anterior insula plays a crucial role in the subjective awareness of positive 
and negative feelings (Damasio et al., 2000; Menon & Uddin, 2010; Phan et al., 2002) and may, 
therefore, be particularly important for the salience detection of unexpected reward/punishment 
compared with unexpected neutral information. 
More important, the observed expectancy-attention interactions show a clear 
asymmetry: Both behavioral and neural effects were stronger for optimistic than for pessimistic 
expectancies. Optimistic expectancies guided attention particularly fast to reward and resulted in 
particularly strong insula activity during processing of unexpected punishment. This asymmetry 
was even more pronounced when taking individual differences into account. Participants who 
demonstrated the strongest asymmetry in behavioral responses (i.e., attention deployment 
indicated by RTs) following optimistic and pessimistic expectancies also demonstrated the 
strongest asymmetry in neural responses (note that our neural model incorporated RTs, thereby 
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ensuring that the observed effects are not due to motor responses). Thus, people whose reactions 
to reward were particularly fast following optimistic expectancies also displayed particularly 
strong SN and ECN activation during processing of unexpected punishment. The validity of these 
findings is supported by three arguments: First, the asymmetry observed in the present RT data 
replicates prior findings obtained with different samples (Kress et al., 2018); second, 
interindividual differences in asymmetric (behavioral) attention deployment following 
optimistic/pessimistic expectancies were positively related to asymmetric neural processing; 
third, the brain areas observed to underlie asymmetric attention deployment following 
optimistic/pessimistic expectancies are co-activated in a wide range of cognitive tasks (e.g., 
anterior insula and dACC; Menon & Uddin, 2010) and together form large-scale neural networks 
that have been extensively described to relate to attention (re)orientation and maintenance in 
the literature (Menon, 2015b).  
Furthermore, asymmetric attention deployment and neural processing of incongruent 
information following optimistic and pessimistic expectancies complement prior findings on 
asymmetric information-processing related to optimism bias (Sharot et al., 2011, 2012b). People 
selectively update future expectancies following positive feedback but not following negative 
feedback – a key process maintaining optimism bias over time (Sharot, 2011). Selective attention 
to reward and strong neural processing of unexpected punishment following optimistic 
expectancies as revealed by our study can uncover cognitive mechanisms underlying this updating 
asymmetry. Whereas our behavioral data reveal the exceptional power of optimistic expectancies 
in automatically guiding attention to reward, our neural data suggest that unexpected punishment 
elicits strong expectancy violation (Shulman et al., 2009) and is especially surprising/salient when 
people are optimistic (i.e., leading to enhanced SN activity). Even though unexpected punishment 
following optimistic expectancies is thoroughly processed in the brain, it might be so surprising 
that it cannot easily be translated into behavior (e.g., fast reaction to surprising punishment; 
Wessel & Aron, 2017).  
Our findings suggest that initial predictions of reward are stronger when people are 
optimistic than predictions of punishment when people are pessimistic (i.e., optimism leads to 
greater SN activity when processing unexpected information; in line with the idea that prediction 
errors enhance neural processing; den Ouden et al., 2012). Therefore, automatic attention is 
guided more strongly to reward when people are optimistic than to punishment when they are 
pessimistic (i.e., optimism leads to faster reactions to reward). Later, more controlled attention 
maintenance on reward following optimistic expectancies (as observed in Kress et al., 2018) can 
then act as a form of emotion regulation reducing surprising punishing information´s salience 
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(Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008). Strategic attention deployment (e.g., distraction/attentional 
avoidance) is an important emotion regulation strategy (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Gross, 1998; Koole, 
2009), supporting the idea that attention maintenance on reward following optimistic 
expectancies can decrease the impact of salient punishment. In a similar vein, ECN activity has 
been suggested to underlie emotion regulation via attention processes and to manipulate 
information in working memory for sustained goal-relevant and adaptive processing (Martin & 
Ochsner, 2016; Menon, 2015a; Miller & Cohen, 2001). ECN nodes observed to be active in the 
current study may, therefore, be involved in the down-regulation of punishing information’s 
salience following optimistic expectancies. 
Taken together, our data imply that optimistic expectancies are particularly robust even 
in the presence of punishing information (i.e., minimal attention is directed to disproving 
punishment to maintain initial strong predictions of reward). In contrast, weaker pessimistic 
expectancies could be more easily disrupted by rewarding information (i.e., relatively more 
attention is directed to such an unexpected reward, thereby interfering with initial punishment 
predictions). Such asymmetric attention deployment and neural processing following optimistic 
and pessimistic expectancies can, in turn, explain why people selectively update future 
expectancies into an optimistic, not a pessimistic direction following feedback: Strong reward 
predictions automatically guide and maintain attention on reward, thereby reducing disproving 
punishing information’s salience and prioritizing rewarding information when updating 
expectancies. This process can maintain optimism over time (in line with recent ideas on the 
interplay between attention and expectancy updating during reinforcement learning; Leong, 
Radulescu, Daniel, DeWoskin, & Niv, 2017). 
The neural mechanisms underlying optimism-attention interactions uncovered by the 
current study provide a more nuanced view on how optimism bias is maintained. Whereas purely 
behavioral observations easily led to the conclusion that asymmetric updating of expectancies 
after receiving positive feedback (Sharot et al., 2011, 2012b) is rooted in more thorough 
processing of positive reward following pessimistic expectancies (Kress et al., 2018), our neural 
data imply that actually the opposite is true. Even though optimistic expectancies strongly guide 
attention to reward on a behavioral level, disproving punishing information following optimistic 
expectancies is thoroughly processed in the brain. Thorough processing of salient negative 
information following optimistic expectancies can be crucial to differentiate between relevant 
negative information (e.g., situations in which fast detection of threatening stimuli ensures 
survival/optimistic expectancies should be overridden; Aue et al., in press; Ledoux & Phelps, 2008) 
and irrelevant negative information (e.g., situations in which punishing information does not 
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require instant action but diminishes motivation and adaptive processing; Kress & Aue, 2017). In 
the latter scenario, more controlled attention processes (attention maintenance on reward) may 
serve the purpose to reduce unexpected punishment´s salience, thereby regulating negative 
emotions and maintaining an optimistic outlook (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Fenske & Raymond, 2016; 
Gross, 1998; Koole, 2009; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008). Thus, the current fMRI study highlights 
the potential importance of such controlled attention processes for dynamic optimism-attention 
interactions. 
Unfortunately, we did not directly measure attention maintenance in the present fMRI 
study, which limits the conclusions we can draw on these processes. However, we have previously 
shown that people maintain attention on rewarding information following optimistic expectancies 
in two independent studies using a similar experimental design (Kress et al., 2018). Because 
findings on attention orientation (RTs) in the current study replicated our previous work, one can 
strongly assume that the same would be true for attention maintenance. Nevertheless, it is 
important that future research simultaneously assesses both attention orientation and attention 
maintenance (e.g., through eye tracking) in addition to neural and further physiological responses 
to provide an even more elaborative view on asymmetric attention deployment following 
optimistic and pessimistic expectancies.  
In conclusion, the present findings further expand our understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying dynamic optimism-attention interactions. Our data indicate that even though 
optimistic expectancies automatically guide attention to reward, unexpected punishment signals 
high saliency and is profoundly processed in the brain. These results emphasize the importance of 
additional mechanisms (i.e., controlled attention maintenance on reward to reduce the salience 
of unexpected punishment) and can, therefore, give first hints on how interacting positive 
cognitive biases may be interrupted in psychopathology (e.g., a failure to downregulate salience 
of punishment through attention maintenance leading to more pessimistic expectancies and 
initiating a downward spiral of negativity). Thus, the present findings have brought us a significant 
step further to unraveling why most of us are overly optimistic about our future and how attention 
processes contribute to this positive outlook.  
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Chapter 5 
Learning to Look at the Bright Side of Life: Attention Bias 
Modification Training Enhances Optimism Bias 
 
Laura Kress and Tatjana Aue 
Abstract 
 
Identifying cognitive mechanisms underlying optimism bias is essential to understand its benefits 
for well-being and mental health. The combined cognitive biases hypothesis suggests that biases 
(e.g., in expectancies and attention) interact and mutually enforce each other. Even though, in 
line with this hypothesis, optimistic expectancies have been shown to guide attention to positive 
information, reverse causal effects have not been investigated yet. Revealing such bi-directional 
optimism-attention interactions could explain how cognitive biases contribute to a self-sustaining 
upward spiral of positivity. We hypothesized that extensive training to direct attention to positive 
information enhances optimism bias. To test this hypothesis, 149 participants underwent a two-
week attention bias modification training (ABMT) to accepting and away from rejecting faces or a 
neutral control training. Comparative optimism bias and state optimism were measured before, 
after one, and after two training weeks via questionnaires. ABMT enhanced comparative 
optimism bias, whereas control training did not. Our findings reveal that ABMT to positive social 
information causally influences comparative optimism bias and may, thereby, trigger the biases’ 
benefits for well-being and mental health. In times of rising numbers of patients with psychological 
disorders, positive ABMT can be a low-cost and easy-to-access support for psychotherapy.4 
 
                                                          
This chapter has been submitted for publication as: Kress, L. & Aue, T. (submitted). Learning to look at the 
bright side of life: Attention bias modification training enhances optimism bias. 
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Introduction 
People are usually overly optimistic about their future (optimism bias) and preferably attend to 
positive information around them (attention bias; Pool et al., 2016a; Weinstein, 1980). Even 
though both behaviours relate to benefits in everyday life (maintaining motivation) and clinical 
domains (protecting mental health; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Sharot, 2011), we know little about 
how optimism and attention bias interact and mutually enforce each other (Kress & Aue, 2017). If 
we knew that one bias increases the other (bi-directional interplay) instigating a self-perpetuating 
upward spiral of positive emotions (Garland et al., 2010), we could employ the biases’ benefits in 
everyday life and clinical applications.   
Theories such as the combined cognitive biases hypothesis suggest that cognitive biases 
(e.g., in expectancies and attention) interact and mutually enforce each other (Aue & Okon-Singer, 
2015; Hirsch et al., 2006; Kress & Aue, 2017). The hypothesis is supported by empirical findings 
showing that optimistic expectancies indeed guide visual attention toward rewarding information 
(Kress et al., 2018). If bi-directional optimism-attention interactions exist, the reverse causal 
influence must be demonstrated as well.  
Attention bias modification training (ABMT: repeated training to attend to specific target 
stimuli and ignore others) may help to investigate such causal influence of attention on optimism, 
because it promises to modify attention (bias) and affect emotions (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). 
However, recent meta-analyses question the efficacy of ABMT and reveal methodological 
challenges (e.g., Cristea, Kok, & Cuijpers, 2015; Grafton et al., 2017; Heeren, Mogoașe, Philippot, 
& McNally, 2015; see E. Jones & Sharpe, 2017 for an overview). 
Most studies in these meta-analyses used threat-avoidance ABMT to reduce pre-existing 
attention biases to threat in anxiety, but these biases are not consistently shown in ABMT studies 
(and can therefore not be modified; Mogg, Waters, & Bradley, 2017). This constraint (and 
observations that control trainings often elicit similar benefits) raises the question whether bias 
modification indeed drives beneficial emotional outcomes of ABMT. Notably, ABMT also increases 
attentional control, a top-down process that may be just as relevant for anxiety as bottom-up bias 
modification according to theories (Heeren, Mogoaşe, McNally, Schmitz, & Philippot, 2015). 
Similarly, both top-down and bottom-up attention play a key role for the optimism-attention 
interactions that are in the current work’s focus (Kress & Aue, 2017). 
Based on the controversies concerning appropriateness, efficacy, and driving attention 
processes of threat-avoidance ABMT, a novel approach (positive-search ABMT) has been 
proposed as more promising in eliciting beneficial emotional outcomes. Positive-search ABMT 
works more reliably in home settings and elicits emotional benefits without exclusively relying on 
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changes in attention bias (Mogg et al., 2017). Here, we used a particular positive-search ABMT 
(developed to improve people’s ability to inhibit social rejection and approach social acceptance 
information by training to find the smiling face among frowning faces (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 
2004) in order to boost optimism bias. 
  People’s attention was biased away from negative and toward positive social information 
after completing positive-search ABMT in most (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004, 2009; Dandeneau, 
Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007; Voogd et al., 2016; Voogd, Wiers, Prins, & 
Salemink, 2014; Waters, Pittaway, Mogg, Bradley, & Pine, 2013) but not all studies (Waters et al., 
2015) assessing attentional changes following training. More important, positive-search ABMT 
elicited several beneficial emotional outcomes (lower perceived stress, enhanced self-
esteem/positive self-regulation; Dandeneau et al., 2007; Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2009; reduced 
anxiety/social phobia; Voogd et al., 2014; Waters et al., 2013, 2015, 2018; but see Voogd et al., 
2016 for null-findings). These beneficial outcomes are also associated with optimism bias (e.g., 
self-esteem and self-regulation; Armor & Taylor, 1998; Hoorens, 1996). Thus, positive-search 
ABMT constitutes a promising tool to examine effects of positive attention processes on optimism 
bias.  
The present work investigates whether repeatedly directing attention toward positive and 
away from negative social information during training causally influences optimism bias. 
Participants were randomly assigned to ABMT or control training. Before, after one, and after two 
training weeks, all participants completed the Comparative Optimism Scale (Weinstein, 1980; 
measuring optimism bias via social comparison) and the Future Expectancy Scale (Peters et al., 
2015; measuring current optimistic states that are not necessarily biased but likely instigate 
optimism bias; see Garland et al., 2010 for details on how momentary emotional experiences 
trigger durable changes in emotional systems/affective styles). Because optimistic states vary 
across situations, ABMT directing attention to positive aspects of a situation may particularly 
trigger such state optimism. In addition to these optimism bias measures (primary outcomes), we 
assessed participants’ mood with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988; 
secondary outcome) during the two-week training period. Prior research has shown that the 
ABMT does not affect mood state (Dandeneau et al., 2007; Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004). Thus, 
we assessed mood in the current study to replicate this finding and rule out the possibility that 
potential training effects on optimism bias arose because of changes in mood.  
Whereas comparative optimism bias was measured to uncover the importance of social 
and self-enhancing components in relation to attention processes, state optimism was measured 
to examine whether attention processes elicit optimistic states that then instigate the biases’ 
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formation. By measuring these different aspects, the current study can uncover crucial 
determining factors for the influence of attention processes on optimism bias (social comparisons 
and/or transient optimistic states). If repeatedly directing attention to positive information 
through training enhanced optimism bias, then people’s level of comparative optimism bias and 
state optimism should increase after participating in positive-search ABMT but not after the 
control training.  
Methods 
Participants 
Based on a recent systematic review of meta-analyses on the efficacy of ABMT on emotional 
outcomes, we anticipated a small effect of ABMT on optimism bias (E. Jones & Sharpe, 2017, 
because effect sizes varied considerably, we chose the most modest assumption of a small effect). 
A minimum sample size of 128 to detect such small effect (η2p = .02) was determined with a power 
analysis (α = .05, power = .95). Because we expected high drop-out rates over the two training 
weeks, 20 additional participants were tested. Thus, 149 healthy participants with 
normal/corrected-to-normal vision, who did not report using psychoactive substances took part 
in this online study. Sixteen participants were excluded from data analysis because of technical 
errors in data logging (N = 2), or because they did not complete the training on more than two 
days (N = 14) , leaving a final sample of 133 participants for completer analysis1 (experimental 
group: N = 71, 26 male, age: MExp = 22.17 years, SDExp = 3.92 years, control group: N = 62, 16 male, 
age: MCon = 23.35 years, SDCon = 3.16 years). Participants were randomly assigned to a group and 
did not differ in age (t(131) = -1.904, p = .059) or dispositional optimism (i.e., LOT–R sum scores; 
Scheier et al., 1994; t(131) = -1.920, p = .057, MExp = 22.61, SDExp = 3.89, and MCon = 23.89, 
SDCon = 3.78). Furthermore, the two groups did not demonstrate baseline differences in any of the 
analyzed outcome measures (i.e., optimism or mood; all ps ≥ .283). Participants gave written 
informed consent according to the guidelines of the ethical standards of the Declaration of 
Helsinki and were told that they could end the experiment at any time. All procedures were 
approved by the local ethical review board. 
 
 
                                                          
1 For results of an intention-to-treat analysis including all participants see Analysis S.5. 
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Procedure 
For two weeks, participants underwent daily five-minute online training2 (see Figure 5.1 for 
details) and indicated whether they had performed the training completely, partly, or not at all on 
an online questionnaire. Moreover, participants completed personality questionnaires (see 
Information S.5) before, one week, and two weeks after training began (to prevent suggestibility 
effects, participants were not informed about different training versions or that effects on 
optimism were investigated). Participants received a daily email containing links to their version 
of the training and questionnaires. If participants had not answered the questionnaires by evening 
they were reminded. After the last training participants were debriefed.  
 
Figure 5.1. Schematic sequence of the experimental procedure. At baseline all participants 
completed the COS (Weinstein, 1980) and FEX (Peters et al., 2015) as optimism bias measures 
(primary outcome), the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) as mood measure (secondary outcome), and 
the LOT-R (Scheier et al., 1994). The following fourteen days participants completed a daily 80-trial 
ABMT or control attention training. During ABMT participants were instructed to click on the 
smiling face (here circled in red) among 15 frowning faces on a 4-by-4 matrix as quickly as possible 
(in total 16 face pictures [half female] were presented and the target appeared at random location 
within the matrix but equally often in each cell); during control training participants were 
instructed to click on the 5-petaled flower (here circled in red) among 15 7-petaled flowers as 
quickly as possible (controlling for activity of engaging in a visual search while not directing 
attention toward smiling/away from frowning faces). In both trainings the next trial followed 
directly after participants had clicked on the preceding trial’s target (no inter-trial interval; 
trainings are based on Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004). On day seven, all participants completed the 
                                                          
2 The attention bias modification training and control training used in the current study can be accessed via 
the following links:  
ABMT - http://baldwinlab.mcgill.ca/labmaterials/materials_16fa_c_80.html  
Control training - http://baldwinlab.mcgill.ca/labmaterials/materials_16fl_80.html. 
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optimism bias/mood measures, the BIS/BAS (Carver & White, 1994), and the BFI–10 (Rammstedt, 
2007). On day 14, all participants completed the optimism bias/mood measures, the ERQ (Gross 
& John, 2003), and the SWLS (Diener et al., 1985). BIS/BAS, BFI-10, ERQ, and SWLS have been 
conducted for a larger project on individual differences associated with optimism bias.  
 
Dependent variables  
Primary outcomes (optimism): On the COS (Weinstein, 1980) participants indicated the likelihood 
to experience 18 positive (e.g., “Marrying someone wealthy”) and 23 negative future life events 
(e.g., “Having a heart attack”) for themselves compared to another person of the same age and 
gender on a scale ranging from -3 (much less likely) to 3 (much more likely). On the FEX (Peters et 
al., 2015), measuring state optimism, participants indicated the likelihood of experiencing 10 
positive (e.g., “You will get a lot of satisfaction out of life”) and 10 negative future events (e.g., 
“You will have health problems”) on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“not at all likely to 
occur”) to 7 (“very likely to occur”). Sub-scores representing comparative optimism bias and state 
optimism about future positive events were computed using mean scores of participants’ answers 
to positive items of the COS and FEX.3  
Secondary outcome (mood): On the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) participants indicated 
how strongly they experience 10 positive (e.g., “excited”) and 10 negative feelings (e.g., 
“distressed”) at the moment on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very much”). 
Sub-scores representing positive and negative mood were computed using sum scores of 
participants’ answers to positive and negative items of the PANAS. 
Data analysis 
Primary outcomes (optimism): We hypothesized that performing positive-search ABMT increases 
comparative optimism bias and state optimism, whereas performing neutral control training does 
not. We performed two 3 × 2 ANOVAs with the within-subject factor time (baseline, one training 
week, two training weeks) and the between-subject factor group (experimental, control) on 
positive sub-scores of COS (Weinstein, 1980) and FEX (Peters et al., 2015). Support for our 
hypothesis should be reflected in significant time × group interactions.  
                                                          
3 Optimism bias for positive and negative events do not seem to be two sides of the coin but represent 
different aspects with independent motivating factors (e.g., self-enhancement vs. impression management; 
Weinstein, 1980; Hoorens, 1996). Self-esteem, for instance, is particularly correlated with optimism bias for 
positive but not for negative events. As the goal of the current study was to examine cognitive mechanisms 
of self-enhancing positivity, we focus on optimism bias for positive events.  
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Secondary outcome (mood): We also performed two 3 × 2 ANOVAs with the within-
subject factor time (baseline, one training week, two training weeks) and the between-subject 
factor group (experimental, control) on positive and negative sub-scores of the PANAS (Watson et 
al., 1988). However, we did not hypothesize an effect of either positive-search ABMT or neutral 
control training on positive or negative mood. 
Significant interactions were further investigated by post-hoc (Sidak corrected) pairwise 
comparisons. An α-level of .05 (two-tailed) was applied to all analyses. Reported effect sizes are 
partial eta-squared and noted as η2p. If the sphericity assumption was violated, Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected values are reported.  
Results 
Training adherence  
On average participants completed 13 of 14 training sessions and training adherence did not differ 
between the experimental and the control group (t(145) = .770, p = .442, MExp = 13.05, SDExp = 2.41, 
and MCon = 12.76, SDCon = 2.22). Of the 147 participants that initially enrolled in the study and had 
no technical errors during data collection, 81 participants (55.1 %) completed all 14 training 
sessions, 38 participants (25.9 %) completed 13 of 14 training sessions, 13 participants (8.8 %) 
completed 12 of 14 training sessions, and one participant completed 11 of 14 training sessions 
and started the other three training sessions without finishing (adding up to the 133 participants 
included in the completer analysis). The remaining 14 participants (10.2 %) completed 1 (N = 2), 2 
(N = 2), 4 (N = 1), 8 (N = 1), 9 (N = 1), 10 (N = 1), or 11 (N = 6) of the 14 training sessions (for results 
of intention-to-treat analyses including all 147 participants see Analysis S.5). 
Primary outcome (optimism)  
Comparative optimism bias did not generally differ between groups, F(1,131) = .442, p = .507, 
η2p = .003, but it increased over time, F(2,228) = 4.178, p = .021, η2p = .031. Notably, the predicted 
time × group interaction was significant, F(2,228) = 4.653, p = .014, η2p = .034 (Figure 5.2a). In line 
with our hypothesis, comparative optimism bias increased from before to after two training weeks 
and showed a trend to increase from before to after one training week when people performed 
daily ABMT (baseline vs. two training weeks: p = .001, baseline vs. one training week: p = .062, as 
revealed by post-hoc pairwise comparisons), but not when people performed neutral control 
training (baseline vs. two training weeks: p = 1.000, baseline vs. one training week: p = .969). State 
optimism did not differ between groups; main effect of group, F(1,131) = 2.255, p = .136, η2p = .017; 
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time × group interaction, F(2,228) = .507, p = .577, η2p = .004. It only decreased over time, 
F(2,228) = 5.628, p = .006, η2p = .041 (Figure 5.2b). 
 
Figure 5.2. Change in comparative optimism bias and state optimism over the two training 
weeks in the experimental/control group. Error bars depict standard errors. a. Comparative 
optimism bias significantly increases over the two-week training period in the experimental group 
but does not change in the control group. b. State optimism significantly decreases over the two-
week training period in both the experimental and the control group. 
 
Secondary outcome (mood)  
Positive mood did not differ between groups; main effect of group, F(1,131) = .095, p = .759, 
η2p = .001; time × group interaction, F(2,262) = .671, p = .512, η2p = .005; or change over time, 
F(2,262) = .418, p = .659, η2p = .003 (Figure 5.3a). Similarly, negative mood did not differ between 
groups; main effect of group, F(1,131) = .377, p = .540, η2p = .003; time × group interaction, 
F(2,232) = .313, p = .705, η2p = .002; or change over time, F(2,232) = 2.423, p = .091, η2p = .018 
(Figure 5.3b). 
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Figure 5.3. Change in positive and negative mood over the two training weeks in the 
experimental/control group. Error bars depict standard errors. a. Positive mood does not change 
over the two-week training period in the experimental or control group. b. Negative mood does 
not change over the two-week training period in the experimental or control group. 
 
Discussion 
The present experiment demonstrates that repeatedly directing attention to smiling faces and 
away from frowning faces over two weeks enhances comparative optimism bias, whereas 
performing neutral control attention training does not (Weinstein, 1980). Adherence of the online 
attention training used in the present study was generally high (about 90 % of participants 
completed all or the great majority of training sessions). Furthermore, enhanced optimism bias 
could not be attributed to peoples’ mood (i.e., positive and negative feelings did not change over 
the training period), and beneficial training effects on optimism bias remained stable when 
analysing data of all participants that initially enrolled in the study (i.e., intention-to-treat analysis; 
see Analysis S.5). Thus, training a cognitive habit to pay attention to positive social information 
not only increases self-esteem and reduces stress but also enhances optimism bias, an important 
protective factor for mental health (Dandeneau et al., 2007; Sharot, 2011). This finding supports 
the combined cognitive biases hypothesis and implies that (a) expectancy biases are an essential 
part of the hypothesis (despite being rarely considered in past research Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015) 
and (b) cognitive bias interactions are not only present in psychological disorders but extend to 
positivity biases in healthy individuals (Kress & Aue, 2017).  
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However, our findings suggest that performing ABMT does not generally enhance 
optimism (i.e., it did not increase state optimism), but has specific effects on comparative 
optimism bias. There are two possible explanations for this distinction. First, items of the FEX 
(Peters et al., 2015) used to measure state optimism are more general than items of the COS 
(Weinstein, 1980) and might therefore rather uncover temporary variations in dispositional 
optimism (i.e., a general positive life orientation that is not necessarily biased such as the belief 
that good things will happen) than in optimism bias (i.e., biased expectancies about the likelihood 
of specific future life events such as being more likely to live past 85 years than other people). 
Even though dispositional optimism might increase someone’s readiness to display optimism bias, 
the two phenomena represent separate concepts (Shepperd et al., 2015).  
Second, it is possible that the ABMT used in the current study specifically influenced self-
enhancing aspects of comparative optimism bias related to social comparison (Hoorens, 1996). 
The ABMT has shown to increase self-esteem (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004), which plays an 
important role in social comparison (A. Jones & Buckingham, 2005) and might, therefore, mediate 
the relation between positive attention processes and comparative optimism bias. Furthermore, 
the ABMT’s social stimuli might have had specific effects on the strong social component of 
comparative optimism bias (i.e., social comparison). A more general ABMT (e.g., using words) 
potentially also influences state optimism. To draw final conclusions on such mediating factors, 
future research should directly examine the relationship between social and non-social ABMT, 
different measures of optimism bias, and self-esteem. 
Two methodological features of this work might limit the conclusions to be drawn. First, 
information on training adherence was based on participants’ self-report. However, 
questionnaires were self-administered online, which reduces social desirability bias (Nederhof, 
1985). Furthermore, there is no reason to suspect that social desirability bias would differ between 
participants in the experimental and control condition. Thus, the effects observed in the current 
study should not be limited by self-reported adherence data. 
The second potential shortcoming relates to the fact that we did not assess if and how 
ABMT changed attention processes in the current study (e.g., whether attention bias or 
attentional control changed throughout the training). Because previous research has already 
shown that positive-search ABMT changes attention bias and that this change is not due to mere 
stimulus exposure (Dandeneau et al., 2007), we focused on the training’s outcome in the current 
study (i.e., whether extensively training a cognitive habit to direct attention to positive 
information enhances optimism bias) instead of the exact attentional mechanisms causing this 
outcome.  
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Following controversies on traditional threat-avoidance ABMT’s reliability in modifying 
attention bias and emotional outcomes, it has been suggested to rather adapt ABMT based on 
theoretical considerations and investigate its benefits for emotional outcomes (Mogg & Bradley, 
2018). Once these novel ABMT approaches reliably elicit emotional benefits, attentional 
mechanisms potentially underlying these benefits should be investigated with multiple measures 
(e.g., initial attention orienting, attention maintenance, attention bias variability, attentional 
control; Mogg et al., 2017; Mogg & Bradley, 2016; Waters et al., 2018). Notably, from a theoretical 
view both controlled top-down and automatic bottom-up attention processes potentially targeted 
by the ABMT are relevant for the mutually enforcing optimism-attention interactions we aimed to 
investigate (Kress & Aue, 2017). However, to draw final conclusions on which exact attentional 
mechanisms cause benefits of positive-search ABMT on optimism bias, future research needs to 
investigate (a) how training affects multiple attentional processes and (b) how these relate to 
changes in optimism bias. Such investigation can then further refine positive-search ABMT to 
make it more effective.  
In general, the present findings contribute to a more nuanced view on the cognitive 
processes underlying optimism bias. A cognitive habit to pay attention to positive information is 
likely involved in the development and maintenance of optimism bias and, therefore, reveals how 
it can be triggered and maintained (Kress & Aue, 2017). We have previously shown that optimistic 
expectancies strongly guide attention toward reward (Kress et al., 2018) and hypothesized that 
subsequent attention on positive information stabilizes optimism bias. Such supportive attention 
processes could explain why future expectancies are selectively updated into an optimistic (not a 
pessimistic) direction following feedback (Sharot, 2011). The current results independently reveal 
the crucial missing piece of information corroborating our idea that attention processes maintain 
optimism bias over time: Directing attention to positive information does indeed enhance 
optimism bias and can, thereby, provoke positive feedback effects on initial optimistic 
expectancies. Together these findings argue for dynamic bi-directional optimism-attention 
interactions that maintain positivity and contribute to well-being and mental health.  
Even though the attentional mechanisms underlying optimism bias are an important 
contribution to our understanding of its maintenance over time, future research should 
additionally consider the neural basis underlying this optimism-attention-interplay. Neuroimaging 
studies can identify brain areas involved in dynamic cognitive-bias-interactions, and point to 
neurotransmitter systems that might be triggered by pharmacological interventions if these 
interactions are malfunctioning (i.e., in psychological disorders), thereby revealing valuable 
insights for such interactions’ application in the clinical domain and in everyday life. 
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In everyday life the present findings imply that focussing on positive aspects of the 
environment can boost motivation concerning a difficult task; in the clinical domain the findings 
imply that changing one aspect of biased cognition can alter other aspects, thereby improving 
overall conditions for prevention and treatment of psychological disorders. ABMT can be a low-
cost, standardized, and easy-to-access support for psychotherapy. Online trainings that do not 
require therapist contact constitute a first intervention for people with contact anxiety (e.g., social 
phobia) and for patients who have to wait months before seeing a psychotherapist due to an 
overstrained health system.  
In conclusion, our data show that repeatedly directing attention to positive and away from 
negative social information enhances comparative optimism bias. Uncovering such cognitive 
processes underlying optimism bias is essential for employing its benefits for mental health. 
Positive-search ABMT could trigger a self-sustaining upward spiral of positivity (through dynamic 
optimism-attention interactions), making our findings central for individual well-being as well as 
the prevention and treatment of psychological disorders (Garland et al., 2010; Kress & Aue, 2017). 
The present findings reveal that paying attention to positive information around us makes us more 
optimistic about our future; and the findings lead to some practical advice: If we want to look into 
a great future, we should start looking at the good things around us right now. 
Supplementary Information 
Information S.5. List of personality questionnaires participants completed during 
the study. 
Life Orientation Test – Revised (LOT-R; Scheier et al., 1994) 
Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994) 
10-Item Big Five Inventory (BFI-10; Rammstedt, 2007) 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) 
Analysis S.5. Intention-to-treat analysis.  
Methods 
To take into account that not all participants completed the attention training in our study, we 
additionally performed intention-to-treat (ITT) analyses on all 147 participants that initially 
enrolled and did not have technical errors in data logging (experimental group: N = 77, 28 male, 
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age: MExp = 22.19 years, SDExp = 3.78 years, control group: N = 70, 17 male, age: MCon = 23.21 years, 
SDCon = 3.14 years). Experimental and control group did not differ in age (t(145) = -1.768, p = .079) 
but the control group displayed higher dispositional optimism than the experimental group (i.e., 
LOT–R sum scores (Scheier et al., 1994; t(145) = -2.166, p = .032, MExp = 22.74, SDExp = 3.85, and 
MCon = 24.10, SDCon = 3.75). However, the two groups did not demonstrate baseline differences in 
any of the reported outcome measures (i.e., optimism or mood; all ps ≥ .236). The last data point 
carried forward method was used to replace missing data in this ITT analysis (Waters et al., 2014).  
Results 
Primary outcomes (optimism)  
Comparative optimism bias did not generally differ between groups, F(1,145) = 1.212, p = .273, 
η2p = .008, but it increased over time, F(2,264) = 5.419, p = .006, η2p = .036. Notably, the predicted 
time × group interaction was significant, F(2,264) = 3.164, p = .049, η2p = .021. In line with our 
hypothesis, comparative optimism bias increased from before to after two training weeks and 
showed a trend to increase from before to after one training week when people performed daily 
ABMT (baseline vs. two training weeks: p = .001, baseline vs. one training week: p = .065, as 
revealed by post-hoc pairwise comparisons), but not when people performed neutral control 
training (baseline vs. two training weeks: p = .929, baseline vs. one training week: p = .988). State 
optimism did not differ between groups; main effect of group, F(1,145) = 2.878, p = .092, η2p = .019; 
time × group interaction, F(2,255) = 1.026, p = .352, η2p = .007. It only decreased over time, 
F(2,255) = 5.440, p = .007, η2p = .036 
Secondary outcome (mood)  
Positive mood did not differ between groups; main effect of group, F(1,145) = .000, p = .992, 
η2p = .000; time × group interaction, F(2,290) = .325, p = .723, η2p = .004; or change over time, 
F(2,290) = .599, p = .550, η2p = .004. Similarly, negative mood did not differ between groups; main 
effect of group, F(1,145) = .182, p = .670, η2p = .001; time × group interaction, F(2,265) = .658, p = .505, 
η2p = .005; or change over time, F(2,265) = 1.250, p = .286, η2p = .009. 
Discussion 
The results of this ITT analysis confirm that comparative optimism bias increases when 
participants perform a two-week ABMT whereas it does not change when participants perform a 
neutral control attention training. Thus, beneficial effects of ABMT on optimism bias revealed by 
our completer analysis remain stable when including all participants that initially started with the 
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training. Similar to the results of our completer analysis, performing the ABMT did not enhance 
state optimism. Furthermore, as expected neither the ABMT nor the control training influenced 
positive or negative mood, demonstrating that the beneficial training effects on optimism bias do 
not merely result from changes in mood. 
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Chapter 6 
General Discussion 
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Discussion  
The findings reported in the present thesis yield corroborative evidence for dynamic bi-directional 
optimism-attention interactions. The theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 integrates 
prior behavioral and neuroimaging findings of studies that investigated optimism bias and reward-
related attention bias separately. This integrative framework highlights important commonalities 
between the two biases and their underlying neural mechanisms. Based on these commonalities, 
influential theoretical accounts, and first empirical data on optimism-attention interactions, the 
presented theoretical framework postulates (a) that optimism bias and reward-related attention 
bias enforce each other in both directions, (b) that the two biases recruit a common underlying 
neural network (e.g., comprising of the ACC as well as frontal and parietal brain regions), and (c) 
that both biases are characterized by similar motivational processes (i.e., a motivation to strive 
for reward initiated by limbic brain regions). Hence, the theoretical framework emphasizes that 
future research should examine optimism bias and reward-related attention bias together and 
investigate dynamic interactions between the two. Such innovative investigations can reveal how 
positive cognitive bias interactions contribute to mental health and psychopathology, thereby 
significantly advancing our understanding of normal functioning as well as the development and 
maintenance of mental disorders (Kress & Aue, 2017). 
Based on the postulates derived from this theoretical framework, a series of empirical 
studies examining bi-directional optimism-attention interactions in healthy people was conducted 
in the present thesis (chapters 3-5). These studies revealed that (a) optimistic expectancies guide 
attention to confirming rewarding information in the environment, whereas they (b) enhance 
neural processing of unexpected punishing information and that (c) repeatedly paying attention 
to positive social information, in turn, enhances optimism bias about the future. In particular, the 
experiments described in chapter 3 demonstrated that both induced optimistic and pessimistic 
expectancies guide attention to expected (rewarding or respectively punishing) information. This 
effect was shown for automatic orientation of attention and controlled maintenance of attention. 
More important, optimistic expectancies had a stronger influence on attention orientation and 
maintenance than pessimistic ones did (i.e., people paid more attention to rewarding versus 
punishing information following optimistic expectancies than to punishing versus rewarding 
information following pessimistic expectancies). This stronger influence of optimistic compared to 
pessimistic expectancies on attention (i.e., asymmetric attention guidance) was particularly 
pronounced in people with high levels of optimism bias (Kress et al., 2018).  
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Chapter 4 reports an fMRI study that replicated these behavioral effects and additionally 
revealed important neural processes underlying causal influences of optimistic expectancies on 
attention. Specifically, the study demonstrated that both optimistic and pessimistic expectancies 
guide attention to expected (rewarding or respectively punishing) information, whereas 
processing of unexpected information enhances salience and executive control network activity 
(e.g., comprising of the insula, dACC, dlPFC, and PPC). Notably, these behavioral and neural effects 
were stronger for optimistic than for pessimistic expectancies. In particular, people oriented their 
attention particularly fast to expected rewarding information following optimistic expectancies 
(asymmetric attention guidance), whereas processing of unexpected punishing information 
following optimistic expectancies elicited particularly strong insula activity – a prominent node of 
the salience network (asymmetric neural processing). Furthermore, this asymmetry was 
particularly pronounced when taking individual differences into account (i.e., people who oriented 
their attention fastest to reward following optimistic expectancies also demonstrated strongest 
salience and executive control network activity when processing unexpected punishment). Hence, 
although unexpected punishment following optimistic expectancies is thoroughly processed in the 
brain, it might inhibit behavioral responses (Kress, Schuepbach, Wiest, Hermans, & Aue, 
submitted).  
Finally, the training study reported in chapter 5 investigated the opposite direction of 
influence between optimism and attention, namely causal effects of a positive attention training 
on optimism. In this study, people either performed an extensive two-week online training in 
which they guided attention to positive, accepting (i.e., smiling) and away from negative, rejecting 
(i.e., frowning) face stimuli or a neutral control training in which they guided attention to five-
petaled and away from seven-petaled flower pictures. As expected, performing the positive 
attention training enhanced optimism bias whereas performing the neutral control training did 
not. However, similar training benefits were not shown for state optimism or mood, indicating 
that the positive attention training may specifically instigate optimism bias (Kress & Aue, 
submitted). Taken together, the findings reported in the present thesis provide empirical support 
for dynamic bi-directional optimism-attention interactions for the first time. Such mutually 
enforcing optimism-attention interactions can maintain optimism bias and attention bias over 
time. 
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Toward an updated model of dynamic optimism-attention interactions 
The results of the present thesis provide a more nuanced view on the neurocognitive 
mechanisms underlying causal interrelations between optimism bias and attention bias and call 
for an update of the behavioral model presented in chapter 1 (Figure 1.1). The behavioral model 
demonstrated that both optimism bias and positive attention bias are associated with mental 
health (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Sharot, 2011) but did not contain any information on how the 
two biases interact (Kress & Aue, 2017). However, the model already suggested an important 
mechanism that maintains optimism bias: people selectively update their expectancies into an 
optimistic direction when receiving positive (desirable) feedback about a given future prediction 
(e.g., their likelihood to get a good job after graduation is higher than initially predicted), but they 
do not update their expectancies into a pessimistic direction when receiving negative 
(undesirable) feedback (e.g., their likelihood to get a good job after graduation is lower than 
initially predicted; Sharot et al., 2011).  
Notably, the attentional processes following optimistic expectancies revealed by the 
present thesis can explain why this updating asymmetry arises. Specifically, people selectively 
attend to positive feedback following optimistic expectancies, which may prevent negative 
feedback from being considered during expectancy updating (see Leong et al., 2017 for evidence 
on similar dynamic interactions between attention and expectancy updating during reinforcement 
learning). The present findings suggest that optimistic expectancies involve particularly strong 
predictions of reward and automatically guide attention to rewarding information in the 
environment (more than pessimistic expectancies do; asymmetric attention orientation to 
positive feedback). In contrast, unexpected punishing information following optimistic 
expectancies causes great surprise and elicits strong processing in the brain’s salience network 
(again more than unexpected rewarding information following pessimistic expectancies does; 
asymmetric neural processing of negative feedback). The salience network is involved in the 
detection of salient information in the environment and elicits dynamic shifts between additional 
brain networks that need to be activated or deactivated during further processing of such 
information (Menon & Uddin, 2010). Even though unexpected punishment signals saliency and is 
strongly processed in the brain when people are optimistic, it might be so surprising that people 
cannot instantly react to such salient punishment. Thus, the strong neural response to unexpected 
punishment following optimistic expectancies does not translate into behavior (i.e., reaction times 
reveal that people automatically orient their attention to expected rewarding compared to 
unexpected punishing information; Kress et al., submitted).  
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Importantly, people also maintain their attention on rewarding information following 
optimistic expectancies (again more than they maintain attention on punishing information 
following pessimistic expectancies; asymmetric attention maintenance on positive feedback). 
Such more controlled attention maintenance on reward following optimistic expectancies may act 
as a form of emotion regulation that reduces the salience of surprising punishment and impedes 
deeper processing of it (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Fenske & Raymond, 2016; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 
2008). Thereby, particularly strong guidance of attention to positive feedback following optimistic 
expectancies results in a positive attention bias (i.e., more attention on positive than on negative 
feedback). Such attention bias to positive information may, in turn, strengthen optimistic 
expectancies (i.e., optimism bias) by preventing negative information from being integrated into 
the formation of new expectancies (asymmetric expectancy updating). The present thesis 
revealed empirical evidence for this idea by demonstrating that repeatedly directing attention to 
positive social information while inhibiting negative social information during an extensive two-
week online training enhances optimism bias (Kress & Aue, submitted). Together, the findings of 
the present thesis suggest dynamic bi-directional interactions between optimism bias and 
attention bias (Figure 6.1) that can result in an upward spiral of positivity protecting mental health 
(Garland et al., 2010). 
Figure 6.1. An updated model of positive cognitive bias interactions. Healthy people have overly 
optimistic expectancies about their future (i.e., optimism bias). Following such optimistic 
expectancies they automatically orient attention to positive information and strongly process 
unexpected negative information in the brain (stronger influence of optimistic than pessimistic 
expectancies; asymmetric attention guidance). In addition, people strongly maintain their 
attention on positive information following optimistic expectancies, which may reduce the salience 
of unexpected negative information and lead to a positive bias in attention. Paying more attention 
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to positive than to negative information in turn enhances optimism bias (potentially by preventing 
negative information from being integrated into new expectancies; asymmetric expectancy 
updating). At this point the circuit starts from the beginning again, thus resulting in an upward 
spiral of positivity that can protect mental health. Note, however, that there is no clear starting 
point in this circuit (i.e., optimism bias and positive attention bias mutually enforce each other and 
could both initiate the upward spiral). 
 
Limitations and future directions 
Because the specific methodological limitations of the reported studies on optimism-attention 
interactions have already been pointed out in chapters 3-5, this section will focus on more 
conceptual limitations and important questions that were not directly investigated or answered 
by the present thesis. Thereby, crucial aspects that should be targeted by future research on 
positive cognitive bias interactions will be identified.  
For instance, even though the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 suggests that 
positive memory biases may influence the link between optimism bias and attention bias, memory 
processes were not investigated in the empirical studies reported in chapters 3-5 of the present 
thesis. However, memory bias as well as additional positive cognitive biases (e.g., during 
interpretation) should be investigated in addition to optimism and attention in future research. 
Considering these additional cognitive processes can further clarify the exact mechanisms 
underlying positive cognitive bias interactions and refine the integrative model proposed here 
(Figure 6.1). In particular, future research should investigate the direct and indirect relations 
between various positivity biases (e.g., whether one bias mediates/moderates the relation 
between other biases). Such potentially indirect relations between different positivity biases were 
proposed in the theoretical framework in chapter 2 (Kress & Aue, 2017) and have already been 
shown in negative cognitive bias interactions (i.e., attention bias may influence memory via 
interpretation bias in subclinical depression; Everaert et al., 2013).  
Moreover, previous findings on negative cognitive bias interactions in depression 
(Everaert et al., 2017) and the neuroimaging findings of the present thesis highlight the potential 
role of emotion regulation processes in positive cognitive bias interactions (Kress et al., 
submitted). Thus, future studies should investigate emotion (regulation) processes that may cause 
or result from positive cognitive bias interactions. For example, the question whether controlled 
attention maintenance on reward serves the purpose to regulate negative emotions arising from 
surprising, salient punishment should be directly examined in the future. Future studies also need 
to investigate whether attention training to positive information enhances optimism bias via 
improved emotion regulation or increased self-esteem. 
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 Likewise, future research should directly address the influence of mutually enforcing 
positive cognitive bias interactions on well-being and positive emotions (i.e., by examining causal 
relations instead of correlations). Whereas the studies in the present thesis demonstrated that 
optimism bias and positive attention bias mutually enforce each other, beneficial effects of such 
optimism-attention interactions on well-being and mental health were not directly investigated in 
the present thesis (prior research has shown that both optimism bias and positive attention bias 
are positively associated with mental health though; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Sharot, 2011). 
Directly investigating causal relations between positive cognitive bias interactions and well-being 
is essential to facilitate the development of specific interventions to improve well-being and 
prevent mental health. 
Apart from investigating how positive cognitive bias interactions causally influence well-
being, it is further important to examine how an excess or absence of these positivity biases 
contributes to the development of mental disorders. For instance, future research should examine 
how interactions between excessive positive biases (e.g., extreme optimism bias instead of the 
moderate optimism bias shown by healthy people) interact and contribute to manic episodes in 
patients with bipolar disorder. Furthermore, it needs to be investigated how an absence of 
optimism bias in patients with depression influences the way they process information in the 
environment (i.e., do they show symmetric attention guidance to both positive and negative 
feedback or even an asymmetry toward negative feedback?).  
In this regard, it is especially important to examine the transition between adaptive 
positive cognitive bias interactions (i.e., upward spiral; Figure 6.2, right) and maladaptive negative 
cognitive bias interactions (i.e., downward spiral; Figure 6.2, left) and identify specific processes 
that allow for a shift from one spiral to the other. This transition is ideally investigated in healthy 
populations that are vulnerable to mental disorders, such as trauma patients who have an 
elevated risk for developing chronic emotional problems. Experiencing trauma may initiate a shift 
from adaptive to maladaptive information processing, thus allowing for direct examination of such 
negative transitions. Future research investigating these negative transitions can crucially inform 
the development of interventions aimed to prevent mental disorders in at risk populations. Such 
potential future interventions could, for instance, involve neuro stimulation, pharmacological 
treatments, and/or cognitive training methods.  
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Figure 6.2. Downward spiral of negativity in patients with depression (left) and upward spiral of 
positivity in healthy people (right). Whereas the interplay of negative biases in expectancies and 
attention may lead to a downward spiral of negativity via symmetric expectancy updating and 
symmetric attention guidance in patients with depression, the interplay of positive biases in 
expectancies and attention may lead to an upward spiral of positivity via asymmetric expectancy 
updating and asymmetric attention guidance in healthy people. 
  
For the development of future interventions it is further crucial to take individual 
differences into account. Positive cognitive bias interactions may influence well-being and the 
development of mental disorders quite differently in various people. In line with this idea, genetic 
risk factors have been suggested to play an important role in determining the impact of cognitive 
bias interactions on later mental health (Booth et al., 2017). Investigating individual differences 
(e.g., genetics, self-esteem, and emotion regulation skills) that may influence how cognitive biases 
impact well-being and mental health will uncover ways to personalize future interventions and, 
thus, make them most effective for each patient.  
Furthermore, apart from applying positive cognitive bias interactions in interventions 
related to mental health and psychopathology, it is equally important to consider their usefulness 
in boosting performance or motivation in healthy people (e.g., in the sports context). For instance, 
future research should investigate whether positive cognitive bias interactions enhance 
motivation and self-esteem in athletes. Such investigations can inspire the development of 
cognitive enhancement trainings aimed at boosting performance. Cognitive enhancement 
trainings may, for instance, help to recover motivation, reestablish mental resources, and boost 
team spirit when a football team has lost the first half time and needs to turn an important match 
in the second half time. However, to ensure an efficient translation of positive cognitive bias 
interactions to both mental health preventions and cognitive enhancement trainings in the sports 
context, the trainings that are currently used in research need to be significantly improved. 
Currently used trainings are usually perceived as dull and repetitive (Beard, Weisberg, & Primack, 
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2012; Dennis & O'Toole, 2014) and need to be leveraged into attractive gamified trainings that 
will be more motivating and, therefore, effective. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present thesis yields, for the first time, empirical evidence for a dynamic 
interplay between positive cognitive biases, in particular, optimism bias and positive attention 
bias. These dynamic optimism-attention interactions reveal important neurocognitive processes 
underlying healthy information processing. Thereby, the findings of the present thesis serve as a 
starting point for further investigations on how interacting positive cognitive biases protect well-
being and prevent the development of mental disorders. The findings reported in the present 
thesis have only scratched the surface of much more fundamental interrelations between biased, 
emotional systems, and mental health. Investigating positive cognitive bias interactions within a 
larger context will have far-ranging impact on our everyday life and may strongly impact the way 
we preserve well-being and treat mental disorders in the future. Till then, let us keep our glass 
half full, put on those rose-colored glasses, and walk through the opening door to reach the light 
at the end of the tunnel and look forward to a life worth living! 
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